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Abstract 
This thesis presents detailed accounts of policymaking in contemporary risk communication 
arenas where strong power dynamics are at play, but which have hitherto lacked theoretical 
depth and empirical validation. Specifically, it expands on the understanding of how policy 
decisions are made where there is a weak evidential base and where multiple interpretations, 
power dynamics and values are brought to bear on public health risk issues. The aim of the 
study is to understand the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication 
as it relates to policy making. This research describes case studies and relied largely upon 
published sources of data because it was determined that these captured stakeholder inputs, 
reflected the debates, drew differentially on evidence and experts, would provide greater 
insight to each of the cases and were more readily comparable across cases. These sources 
included published peer reviewed articles, press releases, statements and official documents 
from government departments and organisations, reports from non-governmental 
organisations, scientific committee reports, media and newspaper sources. The findings 
indicate that public health risk communication as it relates to policy making is a process 
embedded in institutional, productive and structural dimensions of power. This suggests that 
there are several underlying (and salient) mechanisms of power that shape how risk is 
communicated and in particular, whose expertise is called upon and whose voices are heard. 
Further analysis of the cases indicates that ‘power’ in public health risk communication may 
be expressed through technical expertise, control of communication and creation of trust 
(through scientific credibility) such that an argument (within a set of risk arguments) may 
become amplified (or dominant) in the policy context. These findings are conceptualised 
into a new model - a policy evaluation risk communication (PERC) framework by 
identifying key themes that shape social amplification (or attenuation) of risk. 
 
The study contributes to the growing literature on risk communication by advancing 
knowledge about the role of power and expertise. Testing of the PERC framework further 
enabled this study to extend the existing conceptualisation of social amplification of risk 
framework (SARF) from the power and expertise perspective, and to inform the critique of 
the framework in extant literature. The study also shed light on policy making in situations 
of risk and uncertainty. Further research should aim at using primary data (such as elite 
interviews) in investigating the role of power and expertise in risk communication.  
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1 The Concept of Risk and Risk Communication  
 
1.1 Introduction to the Study 
Risk communication as a public health measure 
 
“Risk communication is one of several policy instruments to achieve risk 
management goals in areas as diverse as health, safety, technology, environment, and 
finance” (Gutteling, 2015). 
 
 
Risk communication is a key component in understanding the nature of health risk faced 
by the public (Bennett, 2010, Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010, Veland and Aven, 2013) and 
has become a key measure designed to improve public health in many countries, including 
the United Kingdom (UK) (Alaszewski, 2005, de Jong et al., 2014, Plough et al., 
2013). Risk communication is defined as the exchange of information about health risks 
resulting from human and natural processes (Löfstedt, 2008, Veland and Aven, 2013) 
amongst various stakeholders’ groups, such as government agencies, professional 
organizations, scientists, corporations and individual citizens (Covello et al., 1986), and it 
is a key platform for risk management stakeholders. Therefore, it contributes immensely in 
shaping public understanding of risk and the policy perspectives taken in the management 
of that risk (Smith, 1988, Smith, 1990, Wynne, 1996, Stilgoe et al., 2006b, Stilgoe, 2007, 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, Irwin, 2014b, Welsh and Wynne, 2013). However, risk 
communication has become the means by which powerful interest groups have sought to 
exploit their resources in a bid to protect their interests in public health policy making 
(Smith, 1988, Warner and Kinslow, 2013, Veland and Aven, 2013, Demeritt and Nobert, 
2014, Hardy and Maguire, 2016, McKell and De Barro, 2016). Yet, understanding of the 
role of ‘power’ in public risk communication has, to date, lacked both theoretical depth and 
empirical validation. 
 
Different disciplinary perspectives of risk communication 
 
The field of risk communication is by no means uniform as there are different disciplinary 
perspectives that exist around risk communication (Demeritt and Nobert, 2014). Three 
major disciplinary perspectives can be identified in the literature. These are (a) science and 
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technology studies (STS), which is concerned with the relationship between social-political 
values, scientific research and technological innovation (Aarden and Barben, 2013, 
Jasanoff, 2015, Stilgoe, 2016), (b) the communication disciplinary perspective, which 
focuses on the exchange of information about risk amongst stakeholders (Covello and 
Sandman, 2001), and (c) the management disciplinary perspective, which relates to how 
affected or interested stakeholder or groups engage and understand the processes of risk 
assessment and management, in order to form valid perceptions of the likely hazards, and 
to participate in making decisions about how risk should be managed (Irwin, 2014b, Renn, 
2015). This study sits within these three disciplinary perspectives. However, it is more 
inclined towards the management disciplinary perspective.  
 
Risk communication as a field of play and competition 
 
This study subscribes to the view that risk communication is ‘a field of play and 
competition’ (Bourdieu, 1998) between competing stakeholders’ interests (Pidgeon and 
Barnett, 2013, Petts et al., 2001), and where each of the actors seeks to frame the agenda 
in a way that serves their own interest and drives the communication dynamics of their own 
discourse (Murdock et al., 2003, Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). According to the extant 
literature, framing is used to define the risk problem, establish the source of the hazard, and 
suggest policy solutions to the risk problem (Entman, 2014). This view recognises and sets 
out the parameters of risk communication as a process that is about the competition for 
resources (such as profit, health etc.), and winning an argument. Unfortunately, risk 
communication is prone to abuse by powerful interest groups, especially where there exists 
in a risk arena large residual uncertainties and vested interests combined with an unequal 
status between stakeholder groups (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). The danger here is that, 
this may create inadequacies or even errors in understanding and framing of the risk 
(Taghavifard et al., 2009), especially in new and emergent forms of risk where there is little 
or no prior scientific understanding of the nature of the risk and its emergent properties.  
 
Why the understanding and framing of risk is important in a policy context  
 
Indeed, the understanding and framing of risk is a crucial part of the policy process, as it 
determines how public health problems are perceived and whether risks are evaluated in 
terms of gains or losses (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). It also determines the policy 
strategies put in place (Fischer, 2003, Bovaird, 2007, Fischer, 2009), which condition both 
individual behavioural and policy responses to the associated health risk (Bradbury, 1989). 
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However, it is very important to add here that where there are inadequacies or errors in the 
understanding and framing of the risk, negative impacts are expected. Such negative 
impacts may occur in form of delays in developing appropriate health policy interventions 
(Bero, 2003) that could potentially be lifesaving or used as a means of improving public 
health and safety standard. Errors in understanding the framing of risk may also lead to 
situations where timely interventions may not reflect available evidence or local 
experiences of those in close proximity to the risk. Within the policy context, this may 
result in over-regulation that could be costly and over precautionary or under regulation 
(Diggle, 2010) that have real consequences for health, resulting from longer periods of 
public exposure to health risks and danger, which could cost lives and be detrimental to 
health. Efficient and timely policy interventions and risk communication (Glik, 2007) 
minimize the possibility of poor outcomes associated with uninformed or inappropriate 
decision making. It is also taken by the public as an indication of the seriousness of the risk 
to the health. Furthermore, delay in policy intervention undermines trust and credibility, 
eroding public trust in government and public health officials, or state responses to 
protecting public health and ensuring safety standards. Moreover, government bodies and 
those individuals seeking medical interventions could incur high costs while attempting to 
resolve negative health outcomes; together, these negative outcomes present significant 
health risks to the public. 
 
The consequences of such negative impacts can be heightened in situations of large residual 
uncertainty, especially in new or emergent forms of risk (e.g. nanotechnology) or diseases 
(e.g. flu viruses and Ebola virus), where there is little or no clear scientific understanding 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) of the nature of the risk and its emerging properties. The 
problem here in making sense of the limited, or lack of, available evidence is the multiple 
interpretations and worldviews that are brought to bear on the risk assessment (Renn, 2008, 
Bennett et al., 2010), especially in situations where there exist multiple and powerful vested 
interests, each competing to legitimise its health risk argument above the others. This 
makes a key priority for public health and safety of the understanding of public health risk 
communication processes and how a risk signal is interpreted and framed. This is 
particularly challenging, given the uneven distribution of costs and benefits associated with 
risk issues. Typically, it is the less powerful groups (such as ordinary citizens) among larger 
sections of society that will bear the consequences of such errors in policy perspective, and 
interventions taken on the risk issue. For example, Chigwedere et al. (2008), concluded 
that South Africa’s human immunodeficiency virus infection and acquired immune 
deficiency syndrome (HIV/AIDS) denialist policy under President Thabo Mbeki’s was to 
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blame for the deaths of over 330,000  ordinary citizens in South Africa. Proponents of 
HIV/AIDS denialism deny that HIV exists or that it is the cause of AIDS (Kalichman, 
2009). 
 
Risk amplification and attenuation  
 
Despite the various contributions to knowledge in the area of risk communication, where 
there are large residual uncertainties in the existing knowledge and understanding of public 
health risk and its emergent properties, there exists a potential for risk amplification (or 
attenuation) (Kasperson et al., 1988) in how emerging risk signals are interpreted and 
framed  (Latour, 1987). Such a scenario makes it possible for powerful interest groups to 
exploit the resources within their means to their advantage, as they often have the means to 
purchase the scientific expertise that supports their interests (Collingridge and Reeve, 
1986). In contrast, the most vulnerable and poorer sections of society that do not have the 
resources or technical expertise often rely on information and expertise provided by open 
sources to advance their positions. These open sources (some of which are often seen as 
credible sources, e.g. scientific experts) may have interest taken to risk-related activities, 
and be prone to influence by powerful interest groups. The danger here is that, risk 
information, even if incomplete or misrepresented by a (perceived) credible source, may 
be relied upon as the ultimate truth or taken as the outcome of an actual technical analysis 
of risk. The question that then arises is: how do we analyse and communicate the message 
of safety or danger where there are unknowns, especially where the management of risk 
perception is crucial? This question is important from the everyday societal perspective 
where power differentials exist between different and unequal stakeholder groups engaged 
in risk communication. The fact that some stakeholders may experience advantages while 
others disadvantages from the public perception and policy framing of risk, underscores the 
very critical question raised by Kasperson et al. (1988) social amplification of risk 
framework (SARF). The SARF framework focused on why certain perspectives of risk are 
amplified, while risks that are potentially more dangerous are reduced or less amplified.  
  
 
 
 
 
The social amplification of risk framework 
 
5 
 
The SARF developed by Kasperson et al. (1988) attempts to provide a conceptual 
framework for selecting, ordering and classifying social phenomena relevant to risk 
communication and perception. The framework describes various processes whereby some 
hazards and events seen by experts as of low concern, become a focus of social and political 
concern (i.e. risk amplification), while other, more potentially seriously perceived events 
receive comparatively little attention (i.e. risk attenuation). One of the strengths of the 
SARF is its ability to combine research from several fields of study, for example, from 
psychometric and cultural research to provide a perspective on risk communication and 
perception. However, the framework has been criticised for failing to account for the role 
of power and knowledge/expertise in risk communication (Petts et al., 2001); the impact 
this may have for public perception of risk and its associated health and other consequences 
remains unclear. Other theories of risk, such as the cultural theory, focus on group and 
cultural perspectives on risk (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983, Rayner, 1992, Rippl, 2002), 
and the psychometric theory of risk focuses on affect, emotion, and stigma (Marris et al., 
1998, Krimsky and Golding, 1992). However, none of these or any other theories of risk, 
has considered how underlying, yet salient mechanisms of power shapes public health risk 
communication and its subsequent health and socio-political consequences.  
 
Risk and policymaking 
 
Existing debates in the interdisciplinary field of risk and policy science have paid some 
attention to the issue of power in policy inquiry relating to health risk and safety (Wynne, 
1989, Irwin, 1995b, Wynne, 1996, Smith, 1990, Fischer, 1998, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 
2003, Stilgoe, 2004, Renn, 2008). One commonality within these studies is the promotion 
of post-positivist logic. This views science as rooted in a social and historical contexts, and, 
as such, not value free (Wynne, 1989, Irwin, 1995b, Wynne, 1996, Smith, 1990, Fischer, 
1998, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003, Stilgoe, 2004, Renn, 2008). This post-positivist logic 
makes a radical move away from the neo-positivist ideology that relies largely on 
technocratic policy-making, which views science as speaking the truth to power. Central to 
the neo-positivist ideology is the reliance on technical expertise as a sense making aid in 
policy decisions in what Jasanoff (2009) refers to as the fifth branch of government. 
Jasonoff talks about the expanding role of technical expertise as adviser, and argues that 
the increasing dependence of regulatory agencies on science and its experts is such that has 
granted scientific institutions and their experts a greater influence in policy decision-
making when compared to other non-scientific groups (e.g. ordinary citizens). 
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Post-positivist scholars such as (Wynne, 1989, Irwin, 1995b, Wynne, 1996, Smith, 1990, 
Fischer, 1998, Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003, Stilgoe, 2004, Renn, 2008). Fischer (2003) 
argue for a deliberative and participative approach to policy inquiry where public (in 
particular, non-scientific) input is equally valued in risk assessment. For example, Fischer 
(2003) advanced the idea of ‘democratic policy science’ where he elaborated on how 
scientific knowledge and normative evaluation of risk occur in his practical logic of policy 
formulation framework. He identifies four interactive stages (of both scientific and non-
scientific discourses) in the negotiation around policymaking. These include technical 
verification, situational validation, societal vindication and ideological choice. In his study 
of Cumbrian sheep farmers and their responses to scientific advice after a radioactive 
exposure, Wynne (2007) argues for a more scientific reflection upon the relationship and 
epistemological status of scientific expertise to localized (non-scientific) expertise. Irwin 
(1995b) highlighted the need to recognize and value the contribution  of citizens’ expertise 
in policy inquiry. This, according to him, is “a form of science generated outside of [the] 
formal walls of [a] scientific institution … developed and enacted by ... citizen[s] 
themselves” (p.xi) in what he calls “citizen’s science”. Using a case study of the impact of 
corporate power on risk assessment in Canvey Island and Ellesmere Port, Smith (1988) 
suggested the need for more scrutiny of technical risk analysis, which he argues ‘can be 
used to support the interests of powerful groups’. He explains that “corporate bodies are 
able to exert considerable influence on the decision-making process due to their economic 
power and technical expertise” (p1).  
 
Furthermore, Funtowicz and Ravetz (2003) advanced the notion of ‘post-normal science’ 
that addresses challenges to epistemology and governance when confronted with issue-
driven science. Issue-driven science describes a situation where there are large residual 
uncertainties, values at stake, and urgent decisions to be made, yet science is expected to 
provide a ready answer (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1995). Such situations, according to 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (2003), require an extended peer community that includes all those 
affected (including scientists and local citizens), who are prepared to enter into dialogue to 
deliberate and negotiate the processes of measuring the probability of risk and its 
consequences. Where the risk issue is well understood, routine techniques or procedures 
will likely be adequate (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003). Moreover, Collingridge and Reeve 
(1986) have argued that there is an unhappy marriage between science and policy making. 
They suggested that the effect of science within policymaking is determined by the absence 
and presence of power that could either result in an under critical or overcritical model.  
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The under critical and over critical model 
 
The under critical model occurs where scientific evidence is accepted without much 
scrutiny because powerful interests determine what is legitimate science and what is not. It 
may also be because of the fact that it fits with existing policy, ideology and interests, or 
where the argument is already institutionalised in policy practices, even though it might be 
uncertain. The under critical model may also occur as a result of the suppression of other 
scientific conjectures which threaten policy consensus (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). The 
over critical model on the other hand, is a situation where disagreements exist within the 
scientific community and where those with power cannot suppress or constrain other 
perspectives, leading to endless technical debate (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986).  
 
While the under critical or over critical model of Collingridge and Reeve (1986) provides 
valuable insight on how power shapes the relationship between science and policy making, 
what is however missing from this model is the question of ‘how’ power shapes the 
transition or negotiation of arguments between the under critical and the over critical model 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Several factors have been highlighted that could potentially 
influence the transition or shift of policy arguments from one model to the other. These 
include the interdisciplinary nature of the risk problem (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986); 
powerful nature of elites involved in the debate, information availability, location of hazard 
and processes around policy making in its wider political context (Fischbacher-Smith, 
2012); privileged interaction amongst certain public groups (Sutton, 1999); the discourse 
characterisation of the risk (Kasperson, 2012a); and the manner in which trust and 
credibility are brought to bear on the risk (Frewer, 2003). Within these are the processes of 
expertise and power, and also communication and trust/credibility, shaping arguments 
about the negotiation of risk between over critical and under critical models. However, 
there is no clear understanding of how these elements interact to shape these transitions of 
argument between the two models; this will therefore require further research attention.  
 
 
Gaps in literature and why they are significant 
 
Therefore, this study is motivated by two research gaps in extant literature, both of which 
are linked to the notions of power and expertise. On the one hand, the research is driven by 
the critiques of social amplification of risk framework, where it was argued that the SARF 
paid too little attention to the issue of power and knowledge in social amplification (or 
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attenuation) of risk processes. On the other hand, this research is driven by the critique of 
over critical and under critical model (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986) where it was argued 
that the negotiation of risk argument between one model and another remains 
undocumented (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).  
 
Developing knowledge in these areas will provide valuable insight into how policy 
decisions are made where there is a weak evidential base and where multiple 
interpretations, power dynamics and values are brought to bear on risk issues relating to 
public health and safety. This research is also timely, especially in this post-truth1 era 
(Keyes, 2004, Pazzanese, 2016, Flood, 2016) where there are big voices (such as the UK’s 
former justice secretary Michael Gove or in the case of the United States, Donald Trump) 
challenging intellectualism and the role of evidence and experts in making sense of risk 
issues in times of uncertainty. Gove, in the last days leading up to the UK’s European Union 
(EU) referendum campaigns attempted to dissuade the public from expert interpretations 
(of gloom and doom if Britain existed from the EU) (Brown, 2016). He stated that “people 
in this country have had enough of experts.” (Brown, 2016); his contention was however 
fiercely and immediately challenged. It would therefore be interesting to understand the 
role of experts in shaping our understanding of risk in public health risk communication.  
 
Understanding the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication is 
crucial because it can reveal salient factors that may, in the public understanding and policy 
perspective taken towards risk, shape risk communication (which otherwise would go 
unnoticed or unscrutinised) in ways that may benefit or disadvantage certain public groups. 
Powerful or resourced stakeholders’ groups for instance, can use the resources within their 
means to influence the credibility of information flow stations (such as media, technical 
expertise and educational institutions), which in effect may influence public perception of 
risk. In addition, they can extend their influence to different response mechanisms of 
society by introducing bias to individual perception (see (Lukes, 2004)) through media such 
as marketing, advertising and film and documentary production. Furthermore, there is the 
possibility that stakeholder groups may use their influence to engage in relationships with 
powerful groups, which in turn influences member responses and the type of rationality 
brought to risk issues (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). Barnett and Duval (2005) described 
                                                 
1 The ‘post truth era’ refers to a culture in which facts or evidence are discounted or rendered secondary to 
emotional appeals see KEYES, R. 2004. The post-truth era: Dishonesty and deception in contemporary 
life, Macmillan, PAZZANESE, C. 2016. Politics in a ‘post-truth’ age. Harvardgazette, FLOOD, A. 2016. 
'Post-truth' named word of the year by Oxford Dictionaries. TheGaurdian, Tuesday 15 November 2016..   
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this type of power as ‘structural power’, in which actors control others by virtue of their 
membership of social groups. Furthermore, powerful groups can also extend their influence 
to tarnish the reputation of persons or groups who are opposed to their interests by 
amplifying negative events associated with these people or places in order to reduce their 
credibility, and therefore any claims made by them.  
 
This multi-dimensional exercise of power that amplifies or attenuates risk perception is one 
weakness of the SARF. One way to improve existing models (such as the SARF) would be 
to explore ‘the human element’ in situations where dominant actors or resourced groups 
can deliberately amplify or attenuate risk debates and messages that shape risk perception. 
There is therefore a need to explore the key concepts of power and expertise that can inform 
a critique of the aforementioned frameworks, and that leads to the development of a new 
approach to enhancing the understanding of public health risk communication and its 
associated policymaking. Henceforth, this study takes the view that social amplification is 
a multi-dimensional and multi-channelled process (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) (as will be 
argued in chapter ten of this thesis). 
 
Contribution of study 
 
By drawing together, the interdisciplinary literature on risk communication and policy 
science in the context of public health and safety, the study will contribute to the growing 
literature on risk communication by advancing knowledge about how certain risk 
perspectives or issues within the policy domain become amplified or dominant. Thus, there 
will be greater understanding of how policy decisions are made where there are multiple 
legitimate viewpoints and where a strong power dynamic is at play. On the other hand, 
insight from this study will be used to extend existing conceptualisation of social 
amplification of risk from the ‘power’ and ‘expertise’ perspective to inform a critique of 
SARF. As a result, the study sheds light on the transition of risk argument between the over 
critical and under critical model (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). Based on these two 
research gaps, a predicted outcome of this study will be the development of a new and/or 
extension of an existing framework for understanding public health risk communication as 
it relates to policy making.  
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1.2 Research Aims and Question  
Therefore, the main aims of this study are  
 
1. To examine the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication as 
it relates to policy context. 
2. Design a (and/or extend an existing) framework for understanding how a certain 
risk argument becomes dominant in a policy context. 
3. Draw out lessons and identify best practices for public health risk communication 
 
The research question underpinning this study is: 
 
How does a set of risk arguments evolve such that a particular perspective becomes 
amplified in a policy context?  
 
The research question highlights two key elements in this thesis; these are – risk 
amplification and policy-making. The research question has been carefully constructed to 
address the two research gaps identified in extant literature (which are linked). The 
following sections will explore the key constructs of risk and risk communication, 
highlighting current debates and the perspective taken to study them. This is essential at 
this point in order to clarify the study perspective, considering the different disciplinary 
perspectives that exist around risk and risk communication. The rationale of the context of 
study is also explained thereafter. 
 
1.3 The Construct of Risk 
The construct of risk has become a subject of considerable debate within the academic 
community and across various communities of practice (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010, 
Rogers, 2000). ‘Risk’ has been popularly associated with negative or undesirable events or 
outcomes (Renn and Roco, 2006) and framed differently to include the probability of an 
adverse event occurring (Warner et al., 1992); the probability of loss in an outcome 
(Brearley and Hall, 1982) or a situation where something of human value is put at stake 
(including human health and lives) (Jaeger et al., 2013); a combination of hazard versus 
outrage (Sandman, 1993); an anticipation of a catastrophe (Beck, 2006) and a chance for 
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mishap (Cranor et al., 2007). Douglas, (1992) defines risks from a cultural perspective as a 
collective (rather than individualistic) product of shared social and cultural meanings.  
 
There are three schools of thoughts that shape our understanding of risk. The differences 
between the first and second of these exemplify a contentious area of scientific debate - the 
objective and subjective schools respectively (Hansson, 2010).  
 
The objective school of thought views risk as objectively given and determined by physical 
facts, independent of any assumptions, prejudices, or values (Hansson, 2010). The 
assumption here is that risk can be understood without it being a reflection of, or being 
dependent on, any features of the particular subject who assesses it. This viewpoint has 
been long held by engineers and natural scientists (Renn and Swaton, 1984) and even 
described by Cohen (2003) as the “only meaningful way to evaluate the riskiness of a 
technology” (p909). However, this is difficult when the technology is new as there is no 
means of determining the probability in any meaningful way. The objective school of 
thought has been criticized for ignoring subjective decisions around risk measurement, the 
methodology used, and the fact that a community of researchers often shares certain ideas 
and assumptions that adjust the lens through which risk is viewed (Douglas and Wildavsky, 
1982). It also undermines structural, institutional and organisational factors that shape risk 
measurement (Wynne and Jasanoff, 1992). The notion of scientific objectivity works for 
laboratory based science where the variables can be controlled and the test-retest validity 
of the experiment monitored under controlled conditions. However, there are problems 
involved with intervening variables when science is moved out of the laboratory into the 
real world.  
 
The subjective school of thought argues that all risk is essentially a social construction or 
an outcome of social processes (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982). It explores risk as a social 
phenomenon and holds that risk has meaning only to the extent to which risk is perceived 
(Hilgartner, 1992, Lupton, 1999, Zinn, 2008, Douglas and Wildavsky, 1983). The 
assumption here is that there is no risk out there waiting to be measured, rather a reflection 
of perceived harm or hazard (Slovic and Weber, 2002). This school of thought assumes that 
the understanding of risk is shrouded with values and assumptions, which are brought to 
bear on the measurement or assessment of the risk. This raises the following questions: (a) 
whether risk can be measured with any degree of accuracy; (b) if the tools for measurement 
are meaningful; and, (c) the extent to which the impetus for measurement is perceptual. 
Gephart et al. (2009) argue that risk is never “fully objective and knowable outside belief 
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systems and moral positions” (p.144). From this perspective, risk practices are pluralistic 
and as such disputable (Hood and Jones, 2003). The subjective school of thought has 
however, been criticised for over emphasizing the value associated with risk (which is 
something of a social construction) (Shrader-Frechette, 1991a), and because it seems to 
deny that harm does occur whether you believe it or not. 
 
The criticism of the objective and subjective school of thought for advancing extreme 
views of risk (Shrader-Frechette, 1991a) led to the emergence of a third perspective on risk, 
one that views risk as a combination of both objective and subjective elements (Kasperson 
et al., 1988, Shrader-Frechette, 1991b). The assumption made here is that regardless of our 
subjectivity, there is a real threat or hazard. However, this is only effectively realised when 
harm is shown to have occurred. Even then, it may still be disputed. Scholars such as 
(Shrader-Frechette, 1991a), who embody this assumption, question the perspective of the 
first two schools and view them as a failed attempt to get rid of much of the complexity of 
risk assessment. For instance, Shrader-Frechette (1991a), accused the first school of 
thought of viewing ordinary citizens as ignorant of science and assuming that a technical 
expert alone has the expertise and ability to make a rational risk assessment. On the other 
hand, the second school was criticised for assuming that citizens’ unwanted behaviour in 
relation to risk arises because they are a product of biased thinking (Shrader-Frechette, 
1991a). The alternative perspective is that the understanding of risk requires the 
identification of factual and value components (Shrader-Frechette, 1991a) in order to create 
a robust understanding of the construct of risk. 
 
This study aligns with the third school of thought, recognising that while there are values 
associated with risk that often are an issue of perception, the consequences of associated 
health risk are real. This study therefore, subscribes to a definition that views risk as: the 
probability of a negative or undesirable event occurring (Renn and Roco, 2006) where 
something of human value is at stake (Jaeger et al., 2013). This definition recognises that 
our understanding of risk is conditioned by both objective (scientific estimate of potential 
loss) and subjective (value and emotive) elements that are often associated with risk issues. 
While there is an indeterminate but real risk (especially in the absence of sufficient 
information about the hazard), the perception of the risk plays a significant role in 
magnifying the consequences of the risk, which makes the management of risk and its 
perception crucial. This highlights therefore the importance of risk communication in the 
understanding of risk and the policy perspective taken towards it. 
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1.4 Risk Communication  
Risk communication has been defined differently by several authors. For example, 
Rohrmann (2008) defines risk communication as “a social process where people become 
informed about hazards, to influence behavioural change and participate in risk related 
decision-making in an informed manner” (p. 1). It is a “process of exchanging information 
among interested parties about the nature, magnitude, significance, or control of a risk” 
(Covello, 1992 p.359). There are those who define risk communication as ‘a field of play 
and competition’ between competing interests (Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013, Petts et al., 
2001) where each of the actors seeks to frame the agenda in a way that serves their interest 
and drives the communication dynamics of their story (Murdock et al., 2003, Pidgeon and 
Barnett, 2013). However, it is important to note that the definition of risk is determined by 
the disciplinary practices by which risk communication is viewed (Demeritt and Nobert, 
2014). The main disciplinary perspective of risk communication are: (a) science and 
technology studies (STS) which is concerned with the relationship between social-political 
values and scientific research and technological innovation (Aarden and Barben, 2013, 
Jasanoff, 2015, Stilgoe, 2016); (b) the communication disciplinary perspective – that 
focuses on the exchange of information about risk amongst stakeholders (Covello and 
Sandman, 2001); and, (c) the management disciplinary perspective that pays attention to 
how affected or interested stakeholder groups engage and understand the processes of risk 
assessment and management, to form valid perceptions of the likely hazards, and to 
participate in making decisions about how risk should be managed (Irwin, 2014b, Renn, 
2015).  
 
This study straddles the interface between communication and management disciplinary 
perspectives of risk communication; however, it is more inclined towards the management 
disciplinary perspective. As such, the study subscribes to the view that risk communication 
is a ‘a field of play and competition’ (Bourdieu, 1998) between competing stakeholders’ 
interests (Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013, Petts et al., 2001), and where all the actors seek to 
frame the agenda in such a way that serves their own interest and drives the communication 
dynamics of their narrative (Murdock et al., 2003, Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). 
 
There are several considerations relevant to the present discussion on risk communication. 
First is the fact that the assessment of risk, especially new and emergent forms of risk, is 
14 
 
masked in uncertainty and ambiguity (Jaeger et al., 2013), and this creates problems for 
risk communication and decision-making, especially in terms of multiple interpretations 
brought to bear on the risk (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010). There is the fact that something 
of human value (including human health and lives) is deemed to be at risk, such that an 
emotive element is added to the risk concern that will permeate the entire risk 
communication processes (Adekola et al., 2017). Finally, there are the costs and benefits 
associated with most forms of risk (Zerbe, 2008). However, the benefits are not always 
borne by those who are exposed to the negative aspects of the risk and as such there can be 
considerable distributive inequalities when the consequences of such risk are encountered. 
When combined with the emotive aspects associated with ‘value’ noted above, it is clear 
that risk communication will encounter complex objective and vested interests, as well as 
emotive value-laden issues and technical issues that may require a certain level of scientific 
expertise to be appreciated in full (Adekola et al., 2017). 
 
 
1.4.1 Evolution and Revolution of Risk Communication  
Historically, risk communication has been viewed as a process that frequently moves from 
expert to non-expert, typically referred to as the ‘deficit model’ (Wright and Nerlich, 2006, 
Sturgis and Allum, 2004). Irwin, (2008) termed this model of risk communication as the 
‘first order of thinking’ that views the public as ignorant; science is presented as speaking 
the truth to power; scientific claims are often based on the language of certainty; and the 
diversity and knowledge-ability of the public are ignored by risk managers/communicators. 
This top-down, one-way model of risk communication has proven to be unsuccessful, as 
the public has a greater ability to deal with issues of risk than was previously acknowledged 
(Hansen et al., 2003). In addition, this one-way model of risk communication has been 
criticised for failing to open up risk assessment and rationality for public input and scrutiny 
(Petts, 1997). According to Petts et al. (2001), the effectiveness of risk management 
requires that the locus of control be extended beyond the institutional and political domain 
to that of the individual. Against this background, there is an increasing recognition, and 
now a general consensus, that risk communication is a two-way, interactive process 
between communicators and recipients of the message (Shannon, 1961, Grönroos, 2004). 
 
The “two-way communication model” recognises that the nature of feedback is essential 
in ensuring the effectiveness of the communication, and where there is an appreciation of 
how information and knowledge are exchanged between the individuals, groups and the 
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public at large (Petts et al, 2001). This, according to Irwin (2014b), is a shift to a second 
order of thinking that encourages greater transparency and public engagement. The move 
towards greater transparency and engagement has been attributed to the rising recognition 
of the merits of deliberative democracy and to discussions around the need to invigorate 
the political processes (Fischer, 1999). Democratic accountability and engagement have 
also become central to contemporary political and social life (Beck 1992, Irwin, 2008).  
Irwin (2014b) also identified a third order of thinking where there is “more critical 
reflection – and reflection-informed practice about the relationship between technical 
change, institutional priorities and wider conceptions of social welfare and justice” (p.169). 
Here differences amongst interest groups, including those within scientific communities, 
are perceived as a resource rather than an impediment (Stilgoe et al 2006). This, according 
to Irwin (2014b), “opens up fresh inter-connections between public, scientific, institutional, 
political and ethical visions of change in all their heterogeneity, conditionality and 
disagreement” (p.169). Irwin (2014b) remarks that the three different orders of thinking 
are neither about developing a new toolkit for communication or superiority. Rather they 
are about interrogating the ‘operating assumptions and mode of thoughts’ (p.167) on which 
each individual initiative is based. Nonetheless, a choice of either a first, second or third 
order of thinking will raise questions around the notion of power and the nature of expertise 
brought to bear on risk communication, especially where there are large residual 
uncertainties and where something of human value has been put a stake.  
The next section rationalises the context of this study, highlighting why public health risk 
debate is used as the situational context to investigate the role of power and expertise in 
public health risk communication. 
 
1.5 The Rising Trend in Public Health Risk 
Debate: Rationalizing the Context of Study  
 
The last few decades have seen a rise in risk communication relating to public health 
and safety in United Kingdom some of which are outlined below (see Table 1.1). 
 
Table 1.1: Summary of some of previous public health debates in the UK 
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Public 
health 
debates 
Main Issues References 
Smoking 
debate  
Public health risk communication around the effects 
of tobacco on health and the public. Some argue that 
smoking is linked to cancer. Those on the side of the 
argument point to the inadequacies and gaps in the 
scientific understanding of the risk associated with 
smoking.  
(Doll and 
Hill, 
1950a, Van 
Lancker, 
1977, Lima 
and Siegel, 
1999) 
Measles, 
Mumps, 
Rubella  
 
Public health risk communication around safety, 
risk and efficacy to MMR vaccines. A study 
published in 1998 links MMR vaccine to rubela, 
against the dominant view that it was safe for 
consumption. The study was later dismissed for lack 
of evidence and faulty interpretation due to an 
undisclosed interest. 
and 
Rubella 
debate 
(Wakefield 
1998, 
Taylor et al 
1999) 
Genetically 
modified 
food  
Public health risk communication around the use of 
genetically modified crops in place of conventional 
ones, and other genetic engineering in food 
production. Some argue the GMF can be used to 
solve the world’s food crisis. Others argue that the 
health implication is not adequately understood 
therefore putting public health at risk. 
(Gaskell et 
al., 1999) 
Mobile 
phones and 
phone masts  
 
Public health risk communication around potential 
health risks of mobile phones and their associated 
masts. Some claim local residents living close to 
mast complain of health issues ranging from 
nosebleeds to headaches. Others point to the lack of 
evidence, as mobile phone use is still in its early 
stage. 
(Stilgoe, 
2004, 
Drake, 
2010) 
Sugar and 
Salt 
consumption  
Public health risk communication around obesity 
and other health conditions relating to sugar and salt 
intake. Some call for government intervention (e.g. 
higher taxes), others point to the ‘nanny state’ 
ideology and the need to leave consumption 
decisions within individual control. 
(Cordain et 
al., 2005, 
He et al., 
2008, 
Grimes et 
al., 2013) 
Electronic 
cigarette  
Public health risk communication around the safety 
and efficacy of electronic cigarettes (EC). Some 
argue that EC could renormalize smoking, 
undermining many years of effort deglamourizing 
smoking. Others argue that EC could save over 
50,000 lives a year, if people switch from 
conventional smoking to EC. 
(Cahn and 
Siegel, 
2011, 
Vardavas 
et al., 2012, 
McNeill et 
al., 2015) 
 
 
Table 1.1 (above), summarises some of the public health communication that has taken 
place in the UK since 1950. It conveys a range of issues as well as a common thread of 
power and disputed evidence. One commonality of these debates is that in no case is 
there any clear scientific evidence because they are all risk events with of which there is 
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no prior experience, nor clear understanding of the risks involved. There are other 
emergent problems due to new technologies and new information. These debates were 
characterised by disagreement amongst stakeholder groups over fundamental values, 
technical disputes about evidence and its interpretation, and differences over what 
precautionary measures to take in mitigating risk. 
 
The rise in risk communication relating to public health has been linked to many factors. 
First, the continuous advancement in information and communication technology (ICT) 
has made access to information and more general interaction possible at almost any time 
and place. For example, Riedlinger and Rea (2015) note the redistribution of power 
associated with internet-based communication, although it must be acknowledged that 
some information is sometimes inaccurate or incomplete. A good example of such 
inaccurate or incomplete information can be observed in debates around the United 
Kingdom’s exit from the European Union (Brexit) during which a lot of claims were 
made with no evidence to support them. With advancement in ICT, the public is able to 
seek knowledge, engage in public debates relating to science and risk, or even seek 
opportunities to disrupt existing states of knowledge and challenging existing 
assumptions. Advancement in communication has also enhanced the speed of 
information allowing visual and real time communication (e.g. through the use of social 
media). Social media (such as Facebook or Twitter) for instance have given the public 
access to a social space where grievances and sensitive issues can be discussed, debated 
or shared.  
 
The rise in risk communication has also been linked to the fact that the mechanisms put 
in place to mitigate or reduce risk have themselves become sources of further risk 
(Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010) because of unforeseen emergent conditions. For 
example, certain technological advances (e.g. vaccination, medicine, nuclear weapons), 
which were developed for the improvement in the quality of human lives, have become 
threats in themselves (Tenner and Rall, 1997, Renn and Roco, 2006, Singh and Nalwa, 
2007). Concerns have been raised by some groups within the public that vaccines 
invented to protect infants from diseases may in fact be damaging to their health (e.g. 
the measles mumps and rubella vaccine debate). This has generated a lot of interest about 
the rationality and scientific protocols used to make policy decisions involving such risk. 
There is also an increasing societal emphasis on corporate social responsibility (CSR), 
focused on issues around the precautionary principle, which has shifted the boundaries 
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of CSR in contemporary political life beyond the domain of legality into that of ethics 
and morality (Irwin, 2014a) thereby extending the scope of risk debates.  
 
Given advances in ICT, a more knowledgeable and aware public and societal emphasis 
on CSR, there is the expectation that public health risk communication will continue to 
be witnessed as a means of forging public health policy-making, and it is on this basis 
that this study adopts public health risk debates (communication) as the situational 
context in which the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication is 
investigated.  
 
 
1.6 Thesis Structure  
 
This thesis is structured into eleven chapters. Chapter one (this chapter) situates the study 
within extant literature on risk and risk communication. Chapter two situates the 
discussion on risk and risk communication further within the policy context. It considers 
the role of expertise in policymaking and emerging debates around technical expertise in 
policy making that may amplify or reduce certain perspective of risk. Chapter three 
provides an account of the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) and then 
explores key concepts within the literature that can inform a critique of this framework. 
Chapter four theoretically illustrates the transition of risk argument from the anecdotal 
stages of risk to its policy formation. Insight from this literature led to the development 
of the Policy Evaluation Risk Communication (PERC) framework, which was set out to 
advance the understanding of public health risk communication within its policy context. 
The PERC framework synthesizes insights of the alternative perspective taken to social 
amplification of risk in this study and the over critical and under critical models of 
Collingridge and Reeve (1986). Chapter five presents the thesis methodology and 
methods, and explains why a case study approach was adopted. It also discusses in detail 
the sources and processes of data collection, the data analysis and how the data was 
interpreted.  
 
Chapter six, seven and eight represent the results and analysis chapters of this thesis and 
aim empirically to explain how power and expertise shape risk communication and the 
policy perspective taken to risk. Chapter nine discusses the study findings through the 
lens of the policy evaluation risk communication framework described in chapter four. 
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The implication of the findings for risk communication is also discussed here. Insights 
from the study lead to the development of a modified account of social amplification of 
risk in chapter ten. This is based on the assumption that social amplification of risk is a 
multi-channel and multi-dimensional process. The final chapter summarises and 
illustrates how the work carried out in this thesis addresses the study’s aims and 
objectives. It also makes recommendations for future research and reflects on the PhD 
journey.  
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2 Policy Inquiry and Expertise 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter (one) has set out the problem space and the study aims, which 
ultimately is to examine the role of power and expertise in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policymaking. The study views risk communication as a 
field of ‘play and competition’ between the interests of competing stakeholders (Pidgeon 
and Barnett, 2013, Petts et al., 2001), recognising that the process is about both winning 
an argument and the competition for resources.  
 
This chapter (two) sets the present study within the policy-making context. The policy 
context will allow the study to examine those whose expertise was called upon in the 
negotiation of risk in the policy domain, those whose argument is legitimised, and which 
precautionary measures are put in place (that may bring about socio-political, health and 
economic consequences). The chapter begins by reviewing the literature on public health 
policy making and unpicks the nature of the problems faced in public health risk. It then 
considers the technique of risk assessment and examines the role of expertise in policy 
inquiry relating to risk.  
 
2.2 Public Health Policy Making 
 
Public health policy has a significant impact on how public health risk is perceived and 
on subsequent individual and group behavioural responses. This has implications for 
human health generally (Brownson et al., 2009). Dewey (1927) defines public policy as 
the public and its problem that is concerned with how public issues are defined, framed 
and viewed in the political agenda; a process rooted within risk communication. It can be 
viewed simply as what government chooses to do or not to do (Dye, 1992). Cochran et 
al. (2015) define public policy as both the actions of, and intention of the government that 
determine those actions, shaped by the outcome of struggle within the policy domain over 
what is legitimised and who gets what. However, public policy can be viewed as the sum 
of government activities carried out directly or indirectly, and which affect or have 
consequences for the daily life of people within society (Peters, 2015). The management 
of public health risk functions at the forefront of science and policy by informing 
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measures that will maintain and create improvements in human health (Public Health 
Sciences Working, 2006).  
 
There are both linear and non-linear approaches to policy making. Thomas and Grindle 
(1990), for instance, describe a simple and linear approach to policy development in 
which policy development starts from setting the policy agenda, then moves to decision 
and implementation. This approach has been criticised for viewing the public as passive 
consumers of ready-made policy; the public should instead be seen as a collection of 
multiple agendas and players actively engaged in those decisions (Howlett et al., 1995). 
The linear approach is argued to be naïve and idealistic, and to fails to see the public as 
constituents of social communities (Harrison and Mort, 1998) that require policy to be 
framed within a social and political context in an evolutionary, non-linear and interactive 
manner (Tödtling and Trippl, 2005). Policy inquiry relating to public health risk often 
requires that risk is framed within international, national, and local contexts (Holland et 
al., 2004). In an ideal situation, this would require the input of experts (both technical and 
local), considering the power differentials amongst groups engaged in the process and the 
multiplicity of values, ethics and principles. As a result, a non-linear approach to policy 
development is a more appropriate reflection of modern day evolutionary and interactive 
policy making, especially when confronted with issues of ambiguity, complexity and 
uncertainty.  
 
2.3 The Nature of the Problem in Public Health 
Risk 
 
Public health risk, like many other forms of risk, is confronted with issues of ambiguity, 
complexity and uncertainty (Renn et al., 2011); these are the key concepts underlying the 
transition of risk argument in a policy debate. Ambiguity, complexity and uncertainty 
have consequences for public health risk communication, within both the public and 
scientific community. For instance, disagreement within the scientific community may 
bring about conflicting theories, speculations, and wild assumptions owing to a weak 
evidence base (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010) resulting in situation where science 
becomes irrelevant to policy making (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986) and as such, further 
politicizing the decision-making process and any resultant policy formulation. 
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Ambiguity is the existence of multiple values where different legitimate viewpoints exist 
in calculating the consequences of risk and its acceptability. It may also be as a result of 
the different perspectives on the justification, severity or wider meanings associated with 
a perceived threat or risk (Stirling, 2003). Renn and Klinke (2015) identify two forms of 
ambiguity – interpretive and normative. Interpretive ambiguity refers to the differences 
in legitimate interpretation, which may be due to the lens through which a risk is viewed. 
For example, experts and non-experts’ interpretations often differ due to the nature of 
their familiarity with the risk, assignment of blame and locus of control (Renn et al., 
2011). Normative ambiguity refers to disagreement about what should be considered to 
be priorities, and about assumptions and value and how these can be applied in the 
definition of risk (Renn and Klinke, 2014). The problem that ambiguity creates in a public 
health risk communication is the multiple legitimate interpretations that are brought to 
bear on the risk compounded by multiple vested interests competing to legitimise their 
own argument among others. This compounds the challenges faced by policy makers and 
risk regulators in mitigating the risk.  
 
The issue of complexity is exemplified by emergent conditions associated with risk. 
Complexity is defined as the difficulty in demonstrating and estimating causal links 
between multiple factors and adverse effects (Underdal, 2010). The difficulty in 
determining causal relationships and calculating the probability and consequences of risk 
has been linked to several factors, including the tight coupling and interactive 
complexities of the system (Perrow, 2011), complex multi-causal factors surrounded by 
uncertainty and ambiguity (Klinke and Renn, 2002), long delay periods between cause 
and effect, inter-individual variation, positive and negative feedback loops, and external 
intervening variables (Renn et al., 2011). A non-linear relationship may also be 
experienced where cause and effect relationships do not follow a linear pattern, due to the 
evolving nature of the risk, or errors in judgement (Fischbacher-Smith and Calman, 
2010). Complexity may bring difficulty in estimating a causal link in public health risk 
communication and may also lead to errors in policy decisions that may be costly to public 
health and safety (Fischbacher‐Smith and Fischbacher‐Smith, 2009), and that may be 
blamed for any emergent problems.   
 
Furthermore, there are issues around uncertainty referred to as ‘unknowns’ - especially in 
new and emergent forms of risk and diseases. Uncertainty arises as a result of limited or 
a complete absence of scientific knowledge that makes it difficult to make any conclusive 
calculation of probability or judge the consequences of a risk (Renn, 2008, Filar and 
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Haurie, 2010). Donald Rumsfeld in a Press Conference at NATO Headquarters in 
Brussels, Belgium, highlighted a three dimensional view of uncertainty in what he termed 
as ‘unknowns’.  
 
“There are things we know that we know ‘known knowns’. There are ‘known unknowns’. 
That is to say there are things that we now know we don’t know. But there are also 
‘unknown unknowns’. There are things we don’t know we don’t know. So when we do 
the best we can and we pull all this information together, and we then say well that’s 
basically what we see as the situation, that is really only the known knowns and the known 
unknowns. And each year, we discover a few more of those unknown unknowns” 
(Rumsfeld, 2002). 
 
Figure 2.1: A four dimensional diagram of Uncertainty 
Source: Adapted from Donald Rumsfeld three dimensional view of uncertainty 
 
 
 
 
Rumsfeld acknowledges that uncertainty is relative; as there are things we may not even 
be aware that we do not know, and this only becomes known when effectively realised, 
or when new knowledge or information sheds light in the area in question. This also 
means that there may also be things we do not know, we know. New information and 
more data may reduce uncertainty (Kasperson, 2012a) or may serve to uncover new 
uncertainties (National Research Council report, 2005). Renn (2008) distinguishes 
uncertainty based on five components. These are: 1) variability – different target of 
existing vulnerabilities; 2) inferential effect – modelling errors; 3) indeterminacy – 
different interpretation in the cause and effect relationship due to variation in a random 
event; 4) systematic boundaries – focusing on a limited parameter; and, 5) ignorance - 
lack or absence of knowledge. Renn and Klinke (2015) explain that while the first two 
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components are epistemological issues that can be resolved with improved knowledge 
and better re-modelling techniques, the last three components, according to them are 
genuinely uncertain and can only be characterised with a scientific approach but not 
necessarily resolved by it. Uncertainty is inevitable even in familiar circumstances 
(Hammond, 1996) and presents a challenge for public health risk especially around 
systemic evaluation, policy decisions and the management of risk. 
 
 
The nature of problems in public health risk suggests that public health risk 
communication is embedded within a larger societal context complicated by ambiguity, 
complexity and uncertainty. The implication of this is that powerful interest groups, 
which are able to use the resources at their disposal, or those who are able to shout the 
loudest, will dominate the risk communication arena, pushing forward their arguments 
and protecting their interests. The less disadvantaged groups will however be left to bear 
the consequences of the misunderstanding the risk. This makes public health risk 
communication and its associated development a challenging task for risk regulators and 
policy makers. This especially is the case where available evidence does not relate to the 
amplified claim of risk, thereby creating response-based problems, particularly in relation 
to budgeting, taking precautionary measures and the experience of policy and 
management decisions as non-linear, cause and effect relationships. The situation is 
amplified where there are emergent properties of risk that can make calculations of 
probability and consequences of risk difficult.  
 
 
2.4 Risk Assessment 
 
The judgements, perceptions and decisions regarding the nature of risk and its 
acceptability largely rely on the technique of ‘risk assessment’. Risk assessment is “the 
process of estimating and evaluating risk, understood as the possibility of beneficial and 
harmful outcomes and the likelihood of their occurrence in a stated timescale” (Titterton, 
2005 p.83). It enables the generation of “probability distribution or similar quantification 
that describes uncertainty about the magnitudes, timing or nature of possible health and 
environmental consequences associated with possible exposure to specified substance, 
processes, actions or events” (Covello and Merkhoher, 2013 p.3). The aim of risk 
assessment is to identify and explore the nature, likelihood and magnitude of 
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consequences related to a particular risk (Renn and Sellke, 2011). Rowe (1980) views 
risk assessment as having two main components – risk analysis (identification, estimation 
of risk and a determination of the consequences) and risk acceptability. This is further 
subdivided into three components by Renn and Walker (2008) to include the 
identification of risk and its causal relationships; an assessment of the exposure and 
vulnerability of a risk target and; the estimation of the risk establishing the validity of the 
causal link.  
 
Risk assessment involves both technical and social evaluation of the nature, magnitude 
and likelihood of a risk occurring (Slovic, 1999). Science typically carries out only 
technical analysis. However, the problem here lies in the weight given to the technical 
analysis of risk (and technical expertise) over other normative concerns or that privileges 
(or amplifies) scientific perspective over non-scientific perspectives (or local expertise) 
in risk communication. Jasanoff (1998) describes how formal analytic practices (such as 
quantitative risk assessment and cost-benefit analysis) privileges authoritative and 
technical knowledge to the detriment of social/personal perceptions of risk in way that 
may exclude valid viewpoints of disadvantaged or less resourced groups.  
 
Technical expertise has been relied upon by policy makers as a means of making rational 
decisions on a technical, rather than, on a political basis and, to defend the legitimacy of 
such decisions (Nelkin, 1975). This traditional model of risk assessment (where there is 
large reliance on technical experts) is thought to thrive where there is prior knowledge or 
evidence. This is not often the case in relation to new and emergent forms of risk, where 
there are large residual uncertainties. This is because there is little or no prior scientific 
knowledge or evidence upon which technical experts can effectively rely. Fischbacher-
Smith et al. (2010) explain that risk assessment often uses established tools and 
techniques for calculating the probability and consequences of risk. However, in 
situations of risk and uncertainty where there is little or no prior knowledge, relying on 
such tools and techniques becomes questionable, as the data available for technical 
experts to make effective judgements is insufficient. Such situations, according to 
Funtowicz and Ravetz (2003), require an extended peer community that includes all those 
affected (including scientists and local citizens), who are prepared to enter into dialogue 
in order to deliberate and negotiate the processes of measuring the probability of risk and 
its consequences. Where the risk issue is well understood, the use of routine techniques 
or procedures is regarded as adequate (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003). Moreover, 
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Collingridge and Reeve (1986) have argued that there is an unhappy marriage between 
science and policy making.  
 
The limitations of the traditional model of risk assessment has led to a suggested model ( 
Figure 2.2) adapted by both Irwin et al. (1982) and Fischbacher-Smith et al. (2010), which 
goes back to the work of Rowe (1977) on ‘anatomy of risk’. According to Irwin et al. 
(1982) and Fischbacher-Smith et al. (2010) this is suitable in situations of new or 
emergent forms of risk where there exists little or no prior knowledge or evidence that 
will allow learning and co-production of knowledge to occur from (and between) all 
interested stakeholder groups.  
 
Figure 2.2 The process of risk assessment (after Rowe)  
Source:  (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010). Pg. 28 
 
 
 
The risk assessment model of Rowe (1977) adapted by both Irwin et al. (1982) and 
Fischbacher-Smith, et al., (2010) separates the process around risk analysis (technical 
process) from risk acceptability (social process). But, they argue that risk assessment 
especially where there are large residual uncertainties should not be two distinct 
(technical and social) processes but a socio-technical process that allows input from all 
stakeholders in the identification, construction and communication of the risk. The socio-
technical process recognises that those potentially at risk or in close proximity to various 
hazards may have valuable insight into the nature of the risk. This according to Irwin et 
al. (1982) and Fischbacher-Smith, et al., (2010) could be useful in bridging the knowledge 
gap where there is insufficient scientific evidence to be relied upon by risk technical 
experts and policy makers. This model of risk assessment is immersed in post positivist 
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logic; one that views knowledge, as grounded in and shaped by the normative 
assumptions and social meanings of the world it explores (Fischer, 1992). 
 
The socio-technical risk assessment model to policy making comes with added 
advantages, as it avoids the ‘pitfalls of individualism’ in terms of omission, divergence, 
and counter-production; and one that encourages a bottom up (Schreurs, 2008) and 
‘bottom top’ (Adekola, 2012) approach to policy making in a nonlinear and interactive 
way. It also enhances the ability of policy makers and risk regulators to deal with ‘wicked 
problems’ (Rittel and Webber, 1973) while enhancing its risk acceptability. Wicked 
problems are issues that are difficult to resolve (Grint, 2010) because they are difficult 
clearly to define, they are associated with unforeseen consequences that are politically 
and socially complex (trans-scientific issues), present conflicting goals, entail policy and 
risk issues that evolve and mutate, and have multiple interdependent and causal factors 
(Australian Public Service, 2012). Where ‘wicked’ problems exist, as they do in many 
public health risk issues, the use of a collaborative (Weber and Khademian, 2008) and 
socio-technical approach (Westbrook et al., 2007) that draws on multiple expertise and 
inputs, is regarded as an effective solution to complex policy problems that require 
complex solutions.  
 
The practical logic of the policy evaluation framework developed by Fischer (2003) 
attempts to advance knowledge of a socio-technical policy inquiry approach to policy 
making. The framework sheds light on the interaction between technical and normative 
discourse in policy inquiry.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   
 
 
2.4.1 Practical Logic of Policy Evaluation Framework  
 
The practical logic of the policy evaluation framework (Fischer, 2003) is concerned with 
how knowledge is incorporated into policy processes and describes how a set of policy 
arguments transitions between technical evaluation and normative evaluation. The 
framework identifies four levels of discourse that allow a “marriage of scientific 
knowledge with interpretive and philosophical knowledge about norms and values” 
(Fischer 1995, p.243). These levels are: the technical analytical discourse (technical 
verification), situational validation, societal vindication and ideological choice. These 
four layers are set in such a way that the process of technical verification is influenced by 
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and influences those normative processes of local validation and societal vindication that 
determine the outcomes of ideological choices made by policy makers (Fischbacher-
Smith, 2012). Technical evaluation of the risk is carried out at the technical verification 
stage to shed light on what is known, and on areas of uncertainty (Fischer, 2003). 
Disagreement may exist between different expert and public groups based on available 
evidence and its interpretation, as the debate here determines where the burden of proof 
lies (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). 
 
The outcome of the technical verification then leads to evaluation and social construction 
that raises questions of validation and whether a particular line of argument can be 
adopted in a local context; “validation is an interpretive process of reasoning that takes 
place within the framework of the normative belief systems brought to bear on the 
problem situation” (P.21) and discussed within societal context where the problem lies. 
According to Fischer (1995), this type of policy evaluation “steps outside of the 
situational action context … [and is] applied and implemented in order to assess 
empirically the instrumental consequences of a policy goal in terms of the system as a 
whole.” (p. 21). The processes around situational validation and societal vindication then 
shape the ideological choice made by policy makers as they seek to establish and examine 
the selection of a critical basis for making rationally informed choices about societal 
systems and their respective ways of life (Fischer, 2003). Fischbacher-Smith (2012) has 
suggested that technical analysis of risk takes place between technical verification and 
situational validation. Risk acceptability debate takes place between the processes of 
situational validation and social vindication, and, as we move towards social vindication 
and ideological choice, the risk debate becomes more politicised, and political power is 
perceived more as shaping the risk arguments (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). 
 
The practical logic of policy evaluation framework is useful in terms shedding light on 
how technical and normative discourse interacts in deliberative and socio-technical policy 
making. However, the framework did not explicate the outcome of science and expertise 
in policy making. It is in this arena that the Collingridge and Reeve (1986) ‘under critical 
and over critical model’ becomes useful. The under critical and over critical model more 
explicitly sets out the outcome of science-policy relationship that describes how scientific 
experts influence policy-making.  
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2.4.2 Under critical model and Over critical 
 
The over-critical model and under-critical model is based on the assumption of an 
unhappy marriage between science and policy making, where science is argued to have 
only marginal influence on policy decisions (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). Collingridge 
and Reeve (1986) regard science to be used only to back up or refute arguments or policy 
perspectives that have been already decided. In the under critical model, criticism of 
scientific evidence is absent or not openly expressed because: (a) powerful interests 
determine what is legitimate science and what is not; (b) little or no scrutiny is given to 
the facts that fit with existing policy, ideology and interests; (c) the argument is already 
institutionalised in policy practices, even though it might be uncertain; and, (d) there may 
be suppression of other scientific conjectures which threaten policy consensus 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). In this scenario, there is greater influence of political 
power shaping how science and expertise is expressed than in an expert advisory situation 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).  
 
The overcritical model describes a situation where disagreements exist within the 
scientific community and where those with power cannot suppress or constrain other 
perspectives because: (a) the evidence base is weak or inconclusive; (b) scientific 
evidence presented by different groups of experts is subjected to intense scrutiny with the 
aim of undermining the evidence of the other; and (c) there are challenges associated with 
interdisciplinary risk problems, which lead to different and conflicting worldviews. In the 
over critical model, less political power is perceived to determine the outcome of 
technical evidence (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The result is endless technical debate, 
which could carry on as long as actors involved are motivated and interested to remain in 
the debate. 
 
The over critical and under critical model described by Collingridge and Reeve (1986) 
provides useful insight into how technical expertise is incorporated into policy making. 
The nature of political power within this is made explicit by Fischbacher-Smith et al, 
(2012). However, what Collingridge and Reeve (1986) did not do, was to shed light on 
how in an evolving policy debate, arguments transition from one model to the other 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Fischbacher-Smith et al, (2012) argue that the over critical 
and the under critical model are two ends of a continuum that leaves the understanding of 
the negotiation of policy arguments between them unclear and poorly documented. The 
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negotiation of policy arguments between the under critical and over critical models is an 
essential gap in the literature that needs to be filled. This is the context of this study. This 
will help advance understanding of how a certain policy perspective become dominant 
and legitimised in a policy context, especially where multi interpretation, values and 
strong power dynamics are brought to bear in policy debates relating to risk.  Policy 
inquiry relating to risk is a process at the forefront of science and technical expertise in 
shaping public understanding and policy perspectives taken to the risk. Therefore, 
understanding the construct of ‘expertise’ and emerging debates within this literature 
becomes essential, especially when dealing with interdisciplinary public health risk issues 
that are further associated with uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. 
 
 
2.5 Expertise 
Technical experts play an important role in helping the public make sense of the risk faced 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) both in the technical analysis of the risk, and in the social or 
normative evaluation that weighs in other social concerns. Technical experts are 
important in the communication of risk to the public and policy makers for two reasons. 
Firstly, scientific expertise is often perceived as a credible source and is therefore are 
more likely to be believed. Although, this does not always translate into public uptake of 
scientific advice, as ‘known sources’ are also powerful sources that impact upon public 
uptake of risk information (Adekola et al., 2017). Secondly, technical experts help the 
public process risk signals or scientific information, as they often have the requisite 
knowledge to decode the meaning embodied in scientific ideas. While this is 
advantageous in terms of aiding end users in making sense of the risk information, the 
negative implication of this is that where there are vested interests or reputational issues, 
risk information may be subjected to distortion, amplifying or reducing certain aspects to 
suit the receiver, hence impacting on the manner in which the risk message is decoded 
and how the risk is perceived. As a result, technical experts are influential actors in 
shaping the understanding of risk since they play central roles in identifying, negotiating 
and communicating risk.  
 
Technical analysis of risk entails an inter-disciplinary process that combines several 
scientific disciplines and techniques (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). However, the weight 
given to technical analysis of risk over the social evaluation of risk privileges (or 
amplifies) scientific perspectives and its experts over other non-scientific perspectives or 
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groups within risk communication (Jasanoff, 1996). The suggestion here is that, there are 
different types of experts (e.g. technical experts and local experts). However, most 
definitions of experts in the literature favour a scientific expert who is not necessarily 
expert in lay knowledge. A scientific expert has been defined as a performer who “no 
longer relies on an analytical principle (rule, guideline, and maxim) to connect 
understanding of a situation to an appropriate action” (Benner, 1984 p.127) and who is 
able to recognise underlying principles, rather than focussing on the surface features of 
the problem (Cross, 2004). For Neils Bohr, an expert is a person who has made all the 
mistakes there are to make in a very narrow field, cited in (Otway, 1987). While expertise 
commonly describes the report of an expert on a subject-specific problem, it also means 
the knowledge-ability of the particular expert in question (Kleimann, 1996). The issue of 
contention within the arena of expertise lies in the manner in which scientific evidence is 
interpreted and communicated. Debates relating to evidence and interpretation are 
discussed below while those relating to communication are discussed in section 3.5. 
 
2.5.1 Evidence and Scientific interpretation of risk signal 
Within the literature, a number of important issues has been raised that may influence the 
manner in which evidence or risk signals is interpreted by experts, such that a certain 
perception of risk may become amplified or reduced. These include conflicting and 
longitudinal disciplinary practice; domain specificity; paradigm blindness; vested interest 
and bias; and institutional, structural and organisational culture or conditions. 
 
Conflicting and longstanding disciplinary practices 
 
Many public health risks are interdisciplinary risk issues that encounter problems in 
relation to competing, differing and conflicting longstanding disciplinary practices and 
norms. This may bring about epistemological and ontological differences that may 
influence the nature of the scientific disputes that are brought to bear in risk 
communication. The potential outcome in such scenarios is conflicting and contradictory 
scientific argument and interpretation that may lead to endless technical debate. 
Moreover, there is the increasing recognition that expertise is domain specific (Schneider 
et al., 1989, McGraw and Pinney, 1990, Smith and McCloskey, 2000, Castel et al., 2007), 
which means that any use of expertise outside its specific domain can be deemed 
questionable and disputable (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). 
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Domain specificity  
 
The exercise of technical expertise outside the appropriate domain may lead to error, and 
costs associated with the understanding of the nature of the risk due to ‘intrusions’ (Castel 
et al., 2007) and a lack of understanding and knowledge. Intrusion is interpreting domain-
related information that may be unrelated with the risk concerned (Castel et al., 2007). 
This may involve amplifying (or attenuating) certain aspect of the risk with domain-
related information. There is also the issue around experiential expertise (the citizen 
science argument) versus more traditional academic expertise. For example, local 
expertise may suffer from the manner in which such local assumptions are tested and 
validated by domain-specific (and technical) expertise. For example, Wynne (1992) 
describes how the local expertise of Cumbrian sheep farmers was undermined in the 
reports of government scientists who were involved in radioactive contamination 
assessment of the region. The implication of this is that where the expert knowledge does 
not fit with the real life experiences of those in close proximity to (or who experience) 
the risk, such expertise or expert advice may be undermined or even ignored (i.e. risk 
attenuation). When knowledge is taken from a specific (or static) domain such as the 
laboratory and applied within a ‘real world’ setting, such knowledge is bound to be 
confronted by other intervening variables (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010). However, 
when this is combined with ‘intrusions’, it is bound to generate uncertainty about cause 
and effect relationships. The implication of this is that it may lead to inadequacies or 
errors in the understanding of the nature of risk that could be problematic for risk 
managers in managing the risk and its emergent properties. 
 
 
Paradigm blindness 
 
There is the issue of ‘paradigm blindness’ and how this affects the nature of interpretation 
brought to bear on risk signals by technical experts. Paradigm blindness is described as a 
situation where experts are unable or unwilling to accept and act on the challenges made 
to their worldview (Edelsky, 1990, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The issue of interest here 
is how experts are able to accept challenges towards their worldview and how paradigm 
blindness can prevent experts from accepting such challenges (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). 
This raises the question of - are experts able or willing to frame their risk interpretation 
in a way that accounts for such challenges to their paradigm and are such contentions 
highlighted in policy decision relating to risk by policy makers?  Collingridge and Reeve 
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(1986) have suggested that an expert’s worldview is often left unaltered as long as 
evidence exists to support it. The danger here is that where such views are combined with 
the politicization of evidence, this prevents experts (who are an important sense aiding in 
risk communication) from seeing (or attenuating the significance of) other alternative 
worldviews beyond their own. This is significant because of the emergent properties of 
public health risk and the implication that may have for public health and safety. 
 
Vested interest and bias 
 
Other factors, such as vested interests, may impact on the expert judgement and 
interpretation brought to bear on risk signals (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Where there is 
a vested interest, motivational bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1974, Slovic, 1999, Shrader-
Frechette, 1996) may arise to cloud an expert’s judgments (Kunda, 1990, Garthwaite et 
al., 2005). Vested interests also expose an expert to powerful interest groups that may use 
them to their own advantage, especially as many public health risk debates occur in 
situations of uncertainty. The importance of this lies in the perceived credibility of 
expertise and the weight given to technical expertise in risk assessment.  
 
Institutional, structural and organisational culture or conditions 
 
There also is also a debate about how expertise is organized and developed, and the 
organisational culture or conditions that affect how evidence is interpreted (Fischbacher-
Smith, 2012). Fischbacher-Smith (2012) for instance, argue that expertise exists within a 
range of overlapping networks of professional, organizational, national and international 
dimensions and each of these agencies will have an impact on the ways in which experts 
are trained, validated and developed over their careers. Experts who function in such 
overlapping networks may be conditioned by institutional or organisational rules and 
principles that shape their behaviour, worldview and the attitude they take to risk. The 
danger here is that, where there is vested interest, institutional or organisational rules and 
principles may be intentionally positioned to produce certain effects in the worldview, 
attitude and behaviour of experts, and hence, the interpretation they bring to bear on risk. 
 
The above scenario suggests that the interpretation of risk signals by technical experts 
may be shaped by numerous factors (as discussed above) that may bring about social 
amplification (or attenuation) of risk. This raises a fundamental question; to what extent 
should technical expertise should be trusted and relied upon in public health policy. This 
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question is significant in situations of risk and large residual uncertainty where there is 
little or no scientific understanding of the risk. Consequently, this highlights the need to 
improve the accountability of technical expertise in public health risk communication 
especially in new (or emergent forms of risk) and where the science is contested. It is at 
this juncture that other expertise such as local expertise (or experiences) may play a 
significant role in enhancing the accountability of technical expertise in risk 
communication. 
 
2.5.2 The alternative view - categorizing expertise 
The alternative option in situations of risk and uncertainty is to view technical expertise 
as one form of expertise in the midst of many in risk communication and policy inquiry 
relating to risk, rather than, one taken as absolute in the judgement of risk that shapes the 
policy perspective taken to it. Moreover, there is the so called ‘citizen’s science argument’ 
(Irwin, 2015) that highlights the importance of experiential knowledge and expertise in 
shaping the understanding of risk, especially where there are gaps in scientific knowledge. 
This is in no way to undermine the significance of technical expertise in public health risk 
communication, but rather to emphasise that the health risk policy arena is by no means 
reliant on any singular form of expertise. This undermining of technical expertise can be 
seen in some recent global political events where influential and powerful voices are 
challenging intellectualism and where ‘technical expertise’ is seen as the game of a liberal 
intellectual elite, out of touch with the popular view of what everyday people think, need 
and want. For instance, the UK’s former justice secretary Michael Gove’s, remarks in 
public campaigns leading up to Britain’s referendum about whether to exit from European 
Union (BREXIT), and in the aftermath of the decision illustrate that intellectualism and 
the role of technical experts is far from uncontested. Gove suggested that “people in this 
country (Britain) have had enough of experts” (Brown, 2016) focusing his argument on 
the failure of economists and economic organisations to predict the financial crisis 
(Mance, 2016). His contention was fiercely and immediately challenged because those 
with technical expertise have skills and capabilities essential for critical analysis and the 
evaluation of ideas and events (Suleiman, 1977), which cannot be undermined when 
dealing with intellectual and risky challenges facing society and communities. Besides, 
there is a recognition that the value of careful, evidence based argument, and reflection, 
and the capacity to be open to contrary views has allowed humankind to explore who we 
are and to better understand the physical, social, political, and economic forces that shape 
the world around us (Muscatelli, 2016). 
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This study argues that there is a place for technical expertise and also other forms of 
expertise (such as experiential expertise) in public health risk communication (as long as 
these are not over-arching). Technical expertise can be relied upon when confronted by 
‘knowns’ (although, there are ‘unknown unknowns’), and in static and predictable 
situations (assuming the stakes are not high). This is not necessarily the case in new and 
emergent forms of risk, where the knowledge about the nature of a risk and its emergent 
properties are largely unknown. Such a scenario will require a socio-technical approach 
to risk assessment and policymaking where the input of all stakeholders (including 
ordinary citizens) is equally valued and weighted in the policy decision-making. Of 
importance is the need for the different stakeholders to understand the inevitable trade-
offs or compromise in minimizing risk (Adekola et al., 2017)  hence, reducing the chances 
of vested interests while encouraging democratic participation, transparency and opening 
up science for public scrutiny (Stilgoe et al., 2006a). This study therefore takes the view 
that an expert is a qualified or experienced individual who has knowledge or experience 
of a particular domain and who is able to translate this knowledge and to determine its 
significance in every day societal settings. This definition de-emphasises the focus on 
technical expertise and recognises the value of every day experiential knowledge and 
expertise. Consequently, it becomes important to consider different forms of expertise in 
the literature and what this means for public health risk communication (see section 9.6). 
 
2.5.3 The different categories of expertise 
 
Hoppe (2010) makes a distinction between a technical expert and a public expert 
(technocrat) that forms the first two categories of expertise. According to Hoppe (2010), 
‘technical expert’ is an expert recognised as qualified scientist who works within the 
rigour of scientific methodology in a specific field and who has received specialised 
training in an institution of higher education (Suleiman, 1977). ‘Public expert’ (or 
technocrat) on the other hand, is a technical expert who works in public offices or 
government institutions (e.g. Chief Scientific officer) whose role is to support 
government in achieving its aims and objectives. The third category of expertise is 
‘industry experts’. This group is those technical experts who work for corporations or 
industry (e.g. a chemist working for the tobacco industry), and whose interest is in 
protecting the interest of the corporation or industry for which they work. The final 
category of expertise is termed ‘citizen’s scientist’ (Irwin, 1995b) or experiential 
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expertise. This form of expertise is based in the daily life experiences of individuals or 
groups. This may include local farmers, mothers or those in close proximity to risk 
location or hazard. These categories are summarised in Table 2.1 below. 
 
Table 2.1 The different categories of expertise 
 
Having distinguished these four categories, it must be noted that there is the possibility 
that one person may fit into all these four categories. Spruijt et al. (2014) suggested that 
the role of experts is influenced by context, type of problem and personal values. This 
means that the platform in which an expertise is expressed (either as technical, public, 
and industry or local expertise) may determine the nature of interpretation brought to bear 
on risk signal or evidence. It is therefore important to declare affiliation when interpreting 
risk signals, and this should be taken into consideration during associated policy making. 
Nevertheless, it has been suggested that technical experts (e.g. doctors, academics and 
independent scientists) are often trusted by the public; environmental and interest groups 
are somewhat trusted, while government ministers and industry scientist are the least 
trusted (Petts et al, 2001).  
 
2.6 Summary of Key Points/Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this chapter was to set the discussion of risk and risk communication 
further within the policy context. In this chapter, it was highlighted that a non-linear 
approach to policy development is a more appropriate way of reflecting modern day 
evolutionary and interactive policy making. Therefore, a socio-technical model of public 
health risk communication that enables interactive policy making was deemed more 
Technical 
Experts 
(Ziman, 2002) 
Public Expert/ 
Technocrat 
(Hoppe, 2010) 
Industry/Corporate 
Experts 
(Collingridge and 
Reeve, 1986) 
 
Local/Experiential 
expertise 
(Alan Irwin, 1995) 
Authoritative 
or recognised 
scientists who 
work in 
knowledge 
institution.  
 
Scientists who 
work in public 
offices (e.g. 
Chief Scientific 
Officers) 
Scientists who 
work for 
corporations (e.g. a 
chemist working 
for a 
pharmaceutical 
company) 
Ordinary citizens 
who are experts in 
their daily routine 
(e.g. local farmers, 
mothers) 
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appropriate in situations of large residual uncertainties and where there exits ambiguity 
and uncertainty. With science and technical experts playing a dominant role in policy 
inquiry relating to risk, a number of debates (such as domain specific and different 
disciplinary practices) question the rationality of relying largely on technical expertise 
when dealing with inter disciplinary risk or situations of large residual uncertainty. In 
such a context, it was determined that technical expertise was only one form of expertise 
and that the value of other forms of expertise (such as local or experiential knowledge) 
was essential. The chapter concludes by highlighting different forms of expertise that 
exist in the literature, categorizing them into four distinct groups of expertise. The study 
argues that there is a place and important role for both technical expertise and other forms 
of expertise in public health risk communication (as long as none is over-arching). The 
implication of this is further discussed in chapter eleven as a means of improving public 
health risk communication. 
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3 The Social Amplification of Risk Framework and 
Power  
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3.1 Introduction 
 
This study is concerned with understanding the role of power and expertise in public 
health risk communication. Social amplification of risk framework is a key framework 
that provides a useful lens in examining how a risk argument becomes amplified in a 
policy context; therefore, the SARF is central to this study. This chapter thus, provides an 
account of the social amplification of risk framework (SARF) and explores key concepts 
within the literature that can inform the critique of the framework that led to the 
development of a new and an enhanced understanding of social amplification (or 
attenuation) in public health risk communication. Specifically, the chapter teases out the 
role of power and expertise, and then communication and trust in shaping social 
amplification (or attenuation processes) in public health risk communication.  
 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first section begins by reviewing the SARF 
and identifying its key elements. The strength and weaknesses of the framework is also 
unpicked. Ways in which the framework can be improved are then suggested. The second 
part of this chapter reviews existing literature in relation to the weaknesses identified in 
existing conceptualisation of SARF. The final part of this chapter ties back insight from 
the reviewed literature into social amplification of risk framework (which is further 
developed into an advanced conceptualisation of the SARF in chapter ten).     
 
3.2 Social Amplification of Risk Framework  
 
The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) proposed by Kasperson et al. (1988) 
provides a perspective on risk communication (Renn, 1991b) for selecting, ordering and 
classifying social phenomena relevant to risk communication and the perception of risk 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). SARF incorporate findings from psychometric and cultural 
research and describes how events seen by technical experts as relatively of low risk based 
on statistical significance becomes a focus of social and political concern (i.e. risk 
amplification), while others, adjudged by experts to be more highly perceived risks 
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receive comparatively little attention in the social and political arena (i.e. risk 
attenuation). The social amplification of risk starts from a risk-related ‘event’. However, 
how the ‘risk event’ is presented and then portrayed in both media and other sources 
interacts with psychological, social, institutional, and cultural processes. By so doing, 
they might amplify (increase) or attenuate (decrease) the perception of the risk and, 
through this, shape behaviour (Kasperson et al., 1988).  
 
The social amplification of risk framework is based on the analogy of “dropping a stone 
in a pond” This is a situation whereby some events seem to create ripple effects with 
secondary and tertiary impacts which can spread beyond the initial effects of the hazard 
or event and impact upon previously unrelated technologies or institutions. Such impacts 
may include financial losses, regulatory actions, loss of institutional trust, stigmatisation 
and organisational change (Figure 3.1). This implies that the amplification also occurs 
even in its transmission in a way that may be linked with issue-attention cycle. 
 
Figure 3.1: Social amplification of risk framework  
Source: (Kasperson, 2012a) 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 describes how social amplification and attenuation of risk occurs. SARF uses 
communication theory (Lasswell, 1948, Shannon and Weaver, 1949, Shannon and 
Weaver, 2015) to illustrate the ‘amplification’ metaphor describing how risk signals are 
received, interpreted and passed on by a variety of social and individual stations. These 
signals are subject to changes or distortion as they filter through the ‘amplification’ 
stations and this may be individuals, social groups or organisations such as individual 
scientists, policy makers, government agencies, corporate organisations and, pressure 
groups (Kasperson, 2012b). Within this, the information sources, information channel, 
social/individual stations and, institutional/social behaviour are seen as key elements of 
the social amplification. There are also feedback and iteration processes that shape social 
amplification of risk. These elements are subcategorised under a higher order category 
contextualised by Kasperson (2012a) in two stages of social amplification of risk: the 
information mechanism and response mechanism to risk.   
Central to the information mechanism are - the sources of information, the channel of 
information and the transmitters of the information (individual and social stations). 
Within this, factors that may shape the amplification process are the - extent of media 
coverage, the volume of information provided, the degree to which the information is 
disputed, the extent of dramatization and the symbolic connotation of information 
including how the risk information is framed, and discourse enlisted, in depicting and 
characterizing the risk (Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996, Kasperson, 2012b). They see 
the ‘media’ as the main amplification station. Institutional and social behaviours are 
elements within the SARF identified as shaping the response mechanism of social 
amplification processes (Kasperson, 2012a). Four pathways were identified to be 
particularly critical within response mechanism of social amplification of risk; these are 
- heuristics and values, social group relationship, signal value and stigmatisation. In 
addition to these, trust (Frewer, 2003), culture (Masuda and Garvin, 2006) and emotions 
(Morganstern, 2016) are suggested also to shape the response mechanism of social 
amplification of risk.  
 
The SARF has been tested empirically both in the US and the UK see (Machlis and Rosa, 
1990, Renn et al., 1992, Kasperson, 1992, Freudenburg, 1993, Burns et al., 1993, 
Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996, Petts et al., 2001, Pidgeon and Barnett, 2013). Some 
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studies suggest that the framework is able to explain some of the underlying factors that 
shape social responses to risk (Machlis and Rosa, 1990, Freudenburg, 1993, Renn et al., 
1992, Burns et al., 1993, Kasperson, 1992, Kasperson and Kasperson, 1996). However, 
the secondary and tertiary ripple effects were identified to be more difficult to prove 
(Metz, 1996, Pidgeon, 1999). The framework has been recognised for making a genuine 
attempt at providing theoretical coherence to the field of risk communication and 
perception (Pidgeon and Henwood, 2010) and is believed to offer a comprehensive multi-
disciplinary structure that assists in selecting, ordering and classifying social phenomena, 
and in interpreting empirical data and theoretical insight (Renn, 2011). Table 3.1 depict 
the elements of the information and response mechanism of the SARF as adapted from 
the literature. 
 
Table 3.1: Elements of Social Amplification  
Source: Adapted from extant literature 
 
Information Mechanism Response Mechanism 
 Communication processes – the 
sources, channel and the transmitters, 
receiver of risk information. 
o Media coverage 
o Volume of information provided,  
o Degree of information dispute,  
o Extent of dramatization  
o Symbolic connotation of 
information (including frames and 
discourse) 
 Institutional and social behaviours  
o Heuristic and Values 
o Social group relationship 
o Signal values 
o Stigmatisation 
o Trust  
o Culture 
o Emotions 
 
 
From Table 3.1, what can be observed in the information mechanism of the SARF is its 
emphasis on ‘who’ (that is, sources, channels and transmitters) especially ‘the media’ and 
the nature of risk information itself such as media coverage and volume of information 
available. While this is valuable in shedding light on the amplification (or attenuation) 
processes, it ignores how underlying factors shape the elements of this information 
mechanism of the SARF. From this point of view, several weaknesses of SARF 
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(especially around the information mechanism that influences upon the response 
mechanism) are discernible (see  
Table 3.2). 
Table 3.2: Weaknesses of SARF 
 
Context Weaknesses 
Central to information 
mechanism of social 
amplification of risk are 
extent of media coverage, 
volume of information 
provided, degree of 
information dispute, extent 
of dramatization, symbolic 
connotation of information. 
 
Ignores underlying factors that shape these elements of the 
information mechanism of SARF and risk information 
sharing.  For example, SARF is unable to account for 
structural and institutional factors that shape risk 
communication (Taylor-Gooby, 2004) and for undermining 
the role of power in risk communication (Petts et al., 2001). 
SARF acknowledges the 
importance of frames and 
discourse in characterising 
the risk.  
Science and its experts play an important role in making 
sense of risk issues (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 
1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) and shaping the discourse 
around risk. However, SARF pays too little attention to the 
issues that surround expert interpretation of evidence or risk 
signal (discussed in previous chapter 2). 
 
The SARF uses the basic 
elements of communication 
process to describe how risk 
signal is received interpreted 
and passed on by individual 
or social position.  
While the SARF recognises the feedback mechanism as 
depicted in Figure 3.1, the model tended to conceptualise 
risk communication as a one-way transfer of information 
(Pidgeon and Henwood, 2010), that is, from risk-related 
events, to sources, through transmitters, and then on to 
receivers. Risk communication is an interactive, multi-
dimensional and multi-channel process (Fischbacher-Smith, 
2012). It is conceptualised as an arena of struggle amongst 
stakeholders over meaning and definition of risk (Petts et al., 
2001) and where power dynamics shape risk communication 
processes and where meaning is continually negotiated and 
refined through everyday conversation and argument.  
 
The model also pays little attention to how the language used 
in the communication process may inhibit or enhance risk 
amplification or attenuation. 
 
Sees media as the main 
amplification station (Petts 
et al., 2001). 
The media is suggested to be a reflection of public mood, 
framing and interpretation of risk (Petts et al., 2001). 
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Table 3.2, identifies some of the weaknesses of the SARF. One apparent failure of the 
framework is that it pays too little attention to underlying or salient factors that shape risk 
information and communication. For example, it ignores the roles of power and processes 
around expertise (discussed in chapter two) that shape how risk information is encoded, 
transmitted, decoded and fed back in risk communication. Besides, it has been argued that 
the issue of risk communication is not the amount of information provided (e.g.) by the 
media, but whose interpretation of the risk is legitimised (Petts et al., 2001) and who 
controls the policy agendas (Majone, 2006), deciding what risk issues enter into the risk 
arena for debate. In addition, the translation of knowledge to use in risk communication 
via ‘expertise’ (Pender, 2001, Power, 2007) and associated calculative practices, points 
other weaknesses of the SARF. Science (and its experts) is largely relied upon as a means 
whereby the public make sense of the risk faced (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 
1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Therefore, the manner in which expertise is brought to 
bear on risk has implications for how a risk signal is interpreted in the public 
understanding of the risk. Furthermore, the centrality of science and its experts in making 
sense of risk issues for other non-scientific stakeholders’ groups raises questions around 
the language in use and especially as risk communication involves an interactive process 
between experts and lay public.  
 
Having stated this, it becomes essential that this study (which focuses on power and 
expertise) first attempt to address the critique of the SARF in other contexts for this 
framework to provide a useful and robust lens with which to understand how power and 
expertise shape the manner in which a risk argument becomes amplified in public health 
risk communication so as to inform the transition of risk argument within a policy context. 
This is particularly important in the policy context where the policy perspective taken to 
risk has far-reaching health, social and political consequences. Accordingly, one way to 
improve on the existing conceptualisation of SARF is to: 
 
a) Examine how power shapes social amplification (or attenuation) processes in 
public health risk communication.  
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b) Investigate how expertise shapes social amplification (or attenuation) processes 
in public health risk communication.  
c) It will also be important to draw on debates about communication and 
trust/credibility, to stress the importance of communication and trust, in public health risk 
communication. Communication has been highlighted as an important part of risk 
communication (Smith, 1988, Smith, 1990) and trust is now generally accepted as a 
critical underpinning factor that shapes behavioural responses to risk information (Renn 
and Levine, 1991, Kasperson et al., 1992, Slovic, 1993, Casiday, 2005, Earle and Siegrist, 
2008). 
 
This understanding will advance existing knowledge of social amplification of a risk 
framework and make it possible to draw out best practices for public health risk 
communications and its associated policy development (see chapter eleven). As a result, 
to fill the gap made by the weaknesses of SARF requires understanding of power, 
expertise, communication and trust. 
 
3.3 Power and Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework 
A review of literature on power has suggested that there is no consensus on how power 
should be defined (Sharp, 2000) and this has given rise to various dimensions of power. 
Early conceptualization of power such as (Dahl, 1957, Bachrach and Baratz, 1962, Lukes, 
1974) tended to focus on the power one has over another when the one is able to dominate 
or produce certain effects over the other (Russell, 2004, Morriss, 2006). However, recent 
conceptualizations have emphasized that power is rather more diffused (Foucault, 2008) 
even if it is in the form of resistance and focused on ‘power to’ affect outcomes (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005).  
 
3.3.1 Four Dimensions of Power 
Barnett and Duval (2005) identify four dimensions of power after reviewing the accounts 
of Dahl (1957), Bachrach and Baratz (1962) and Lukes (1974). These include 
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compulsory, institutional, productive and structural dimensions of power. In compulsory 
power, one actor directly controls another, akin to the conceptualisation of power of Dahl 
(1957). With institutional power, actors indirectly control others by setting rules and 
controlling the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962). With productive power, domination 
is achieved by capturing people’s thought processes through the control of information, 
mass media and processes of socialisation (e.g. language, education) (Lukes, 1974, 
Lukes, 2004). With structural power, actors control others by virtue of a membership of 
a social group and by means of social relationships (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). Using the 
terms offered by Barnett and Duval (2005) in the present discussion, risk communication 
can be argued as a process embedded within institutional, productive and structural 
powers such that social amplification or attenuation of risk is allowed to thrive. This is 
especially so in a democratic society where compulsory power is not prevalent in risk 
communication, and to stress that the emphasis here is on ‘salient’ dimensions of power 
that may be exercised through elements of the communication process in a risk arena.  
 
Within public health risk communication, institutional power (Bachrach and Baratz 
(1962) enables some individuals or groups (mostly those in charge of managing the risk 
or a resourced stakeholder group) to control the risk agenda, deciding what risk issue is 
put forward for policy debate and consideration. The ability of some group to set rules 
and control the policy agenda puts them in a position of power when compared to other 
stakeholder groups. This is especially the case where the debate relating to identifying 
policy priorities and risk agendas is limited to a few elite groups and not subjected to 
wider public debates. The danger here is that policy priorities relating to risk may then 
become a reflection of only a few elite group members, and that risk concerns expressed 
by other groups (or larger sections of society) may be unwittingly neglected or 
consciously excluded from the risk agenda. In such a scenario, the significance of issues 
that make it onto the risk agenda is then enhanced (i.e. risk amplification) and that of 
those concerns that fail to make it to the policy agenda reduced (i.e. risk attenuation). The 
importance of this is amplified where an individual or group interest is prioritised at the 
expense of public health and safety. A typical example where group interest is put before 
public health, is an instance in United States (US), where Tobacco industry Chief 
Executive Officers (CEO) testify before the US congress that cigarettes are not addictive, 
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despite (hidden) knowledge that they actually are (Hilts, 1994) to the detriment of public 
health and safety.  
 
Productive power in public health risk communication is exercised by controlling 
people’s thought process (e.g. through the media and control of information and 
expertise) in translating meaning to use. There is a productive power associated with 
media communication. For example, media communication allows certain views to be 
shared with the larger population and therefore, have greater propensity to shape public 
risk discourse. The media is an important channel of information for two reasons: (1) they 
provide access to the majority of society and, (2) they help the public make sense of risks 
faced (sometimes by calling upon experts in the meaning making). Media sources such 
as television and newspapers remain an established channel where expert opinions are 
shared, negotiated and exchanged (Petts et al., 2001), and has been largely relied upon by 
the public to make sense of the risks it faces. Therefore, the airing of expert interpretation 
and framing through this medium cannot be undermined (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). 
However, recent advances in communication technologies (e.g. social media) are 
redistributing the power associated with media communication (Riedlinger and Rea, 
2015). For example, with the increasing popularity of social media and Internet sources, 
interested members of the public are able to seek knowledge, engage in public debates 
relating to areas of interest, or even seek opportunities to disrupt existing states of 
knowledge by challenging existing assumptions. Such technological advances are shifting 
the balance of productive powers within public health risk communication such that the 
extent to which risk information is controlled and exploited is reduced. However, there is 
a problem that comes with the rise of social media and Internet sources, as it has become 
even more challenging when dealing with public health risk issues to differentiate 
between credible arguments from propaganda. 
 
Productive power may also come from the control of risk information and expertise (that 
is, who, when, where, and how much is information is made available or concealed) that 
shapes the knowledge, argument and burden of proof brought to bear on the risk 
communication. For example, resourced individuals or groups who have exclusive access 
to valuable risk information or expertise can use such knowledge as a means to frame 
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their argument and back up their worldview or interest while accessing evidence or 
expertise to effectively refute the arguments of the opposition. Technical expertise has 
long been regarded as a source of power in literature as it is seen as ‘indispensable’ but 
also ‘a suspect’ (Suleiman, 1977) p.36. Those who do not have access to such ‘classified’ 
information, or to the necessary expertise, have to rely mostly on third party sources for 
such information. The danger here is that the information provided may be distorted, 
incomplete or costly to access by less resourced groups such that disadvantages (i.e. 
attenuates) their perspective or ability to mount an effective challenge to the powerful 
interests that lie behind information resource exploitation (Adekola et al., 2017). Such 
disadvantages are reduced where such information is within the public domain. 
 
In terms of what Barnett and Duval (2005) call structural power, individuals or groups 
(e.g. scientists) can be argued to have the ability to shape risk communication by virtue 
of their membership of a professional body or by means of social relationships (Barnett 
and Duvall, 2005), despite recent objections to intellectualism see (Keyes, 2004, 
Pazzanese, 2016, Flood, 2016). Power here may come from rules and regulation around 
how expertise is constructed, developed including the surveillance put in place to ensure 
conformity of such professional practices that creates tension between professional 
expertise and deliberative policy making (Fischer, 2000). Such avenues of power may not 
be a direct consequence of been a member of a network but are generated temporally or 
spatially through institutions or formal norms that can influence the outcome of public 
health risk communication without any direct interaction with it (Garton et al., 1997). 
They are however relevant because they shape risk assessment practices and how risk 
signals are interpreted by experts. Direct social and professional interaction between 
stakeholders’ groups is also a place where structural power may be exercised.  
Table 3.3 itemises how these dimensions of power shape public health risk 
communication.  
 
Table 3.3: Power in risk communication 
 
Power in risk 
communication 
 
Manifestation mechanism 
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Institutional 
Power  
 Control of risk agenda 
o Who decides what issues makes it to the policy agenda 
 
Productive 
power 
 
 Technical expertise 
o How expertise is constructed, trained and developed that 
shapes how evidence is interpreted. 
 Media sources 
o How risk is framed and covered in media and mediated 
sources 
 Control of risk information  
o Who, where, when and how much is revealed or concealed 
 
Structural 
power 
 Long standing disciplinary practices 
o Rules and regulations that determines how risk is assessed 
 Social and professional relationship 
 
 
 
In addition to the four dimensions of power provided by Barnett and Duval (2005), 
another perspective of power significant within the context of risk communication is 
Foucault (1978)’s notion of resistive power. He argued that "where there is power, there 
is resistance, and yet, or rather consequently, this resistance is never in a position of 
exteriority in relation to power” (p.95). It would be wrong therefore to ignore resistance 
as a form of power in public health risk communication. Such a form of power is often 
displayed by less resourced or disadvantaged groups that feel their perspectives of risk 
has been ignored and therefore, challenge the dominant or legitimised risk perspective, 
even if in the form of protest, rallies and boycotts. Such action has been seen in the past 
to influence or change policy strategy taken to mitigate public health risk. A typically 
example where such resistive power has proven to be effective in the policy domain, was 
the scenario where the Canadian government had to reduce the increase in cigarette tax 
(initially aimed at curtailing smoking). This reduction was due to a rise in the illegal sale 
of tobacco on the black market or easy access to cheap contraband tobacco products 
(Gabler and Katz, 2010) that were equally, and perhaps more dangerously, detrimental to 
public health. The revision of the tax increase was based on the assumption that while 
such taxes discourage smoking to some extent, they create powerful incentives to buy and 
sell contraband tobacco products (Gabler and Katz, 2010). This means resistive power 
may be exercised as an opposing force to any of the other forms of power. This makes 
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the exercise of power a double-edged process that may tilt the balance of power in any 
stage of the communication process. In other words, risk debates and the exercise of 
power are not one way - they occur within the scientific community and between the 
scientific community and lay public. 
 
Having discussed power and how it shapes social amplification (or attenuation) processes 
in risk communication, other important factors are highlighted by the critique of the 
existing conceptualisation of the SARF and these are expertise, communication and trust. 
These factors are discussed in the following section unpicking how they may exert 
influence upon social amplification (or attenuation) in risk communication. 
 
 
3.4 Expertise 
 
As noted earlier in chapter two, expertise plays a significant and dominant role in policy 
inquiry relating to risk as it is often the conduit by which a risk signal is interpreted and 
framed (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Hence, technical experts largely shape public 
understanding of risk and the policy perspective taken to it. However, there are a number 
of contentions (previously discussed in section 2.5) such as paradigm blindness, intrusion, 
vested interest and organisational culture or conditions that may impact on expert 
judgement and interpretation brought to bear on risk signal and that may amplify (or 
reduce) a certain perspective of risk. There are also institutional and structural issues 
around expertise that may influence social amplification of risk, especially around how 
the development of expertise is rooted within a range of overlapping networks of 
professional, organizational, national and international dimensions (Fischbacher-Smith, 
2012) that will have an impact on the manner of interpretation brought to bear on risk 
communication. This means that expertise is a social construction that is effectively 
developed by powerful and resourced stakeholders’ to actualise certain interpretation of 
risk. The danger here is the perceived credibility of expertise and the weight given to 
technical expertise in public health risk assessment. These issues around expertise were 
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discussed in greater detail in the previous chapter (two) and will therefore be given little 
attention here.  
 
The following section will now consider emerging debates around communication and 
trust in risk communication. This is to stress the importance of (Smith, 1988, Smith, 1990) 
and trust (Renn and Levine, 1991, Kasperson et al., 1992, Slovic, 1993, Casiday, 2005, 
Earle and Siegrist, 2008) in public health risk communication and that these will have on 
social amplification (and attenuation) of risk. 
 
3.5 Communication and Social Amplification of 
Risk Framework 
 
Understanding the nature of risk faced by the public often involves communication 
between experts across multiple disciplines and between technical experts and other non-
scientific groups. However, the way in which risk information is communicated is known 
to play a key role in influencing how that information is perceived or used by individuals 
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1984). This raises important issues around the nature of 
language in use, in particular, the specific forms of language code or frames of reference 
used by the different stakeholders’ groups engaged in the risk communication (Smith, 
1988). Basil Bernstein’s work on ‘language codification’ identifies two general type of 
codes relevant to information reception: “elaborate” or “restricted” codes (Bernstein, 
1971). Bernstein (1977) used the terms “elaborated code” (to refer to the language of 
experts) and “restricted code” (to refer to the language of others not familiar with the 
knowledge field). The relevance of Bernstein’s (1977) work for the present discussion is 
that it highlights how language could severely inhibit effective transfer of information 
where the receptor group has little knowledge of, or is unable to decode the meaning 
inherent in the risk information (Adekola et al., 2017). Jasanoff (1998) for example, 
describes how professional languages can operate to privilege technical and authoritative 
perspectives to the detriment or exclusion of other valid viewpoints.  
 
The use of elaborate code to a non-scientific audience has implications for risk 
communication, as (a) it might prevent some groups within the public (e.g. lay public) 
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from engaging in the public health risk communication by serving as a barrier. (b) it might 
push some groups within the public to those groups where less elaborate codes are used 
and (c) the use of unfamiliar (or technical) terms may be ‘intentional’, designed to keep 
those who do not understand these codes outside of the debate and deny them the 
opportunity to make valuable contributions to risk communication processes (Adekola et 
al., 2017). The danger here is the ‘distortion’ that comes from filling in ‘gaps’ in 
knowledge and recoding the message (in the case of third person transmitter) for the end 
users. Having stated this, the interactive nature of communication brought about by 
advances in information and communication technology (ICT) would be an area for 
further investigation within the social amplification and attenuation context. Furthermore, 
the fact that vested interests cannot be ruled out highlights the importance of trust and 
credibility in public health risk communication. 
 
 
3.6 Trust and Social Amplification of Risk 
Framework 
 
Trust is believed to affect judgement of risk and benefit, and risk acceptability (Siegrist 
et al., 2003) and has been long recognised in the literature as a key element in risk 
communication (Kasperson et al., 1992, Löfstedt and Horlick-Jones, 1999, Frewer, 2003). 
The effect of trust in risk communication can be seen in how the lay public often defer to 
experts in sense making such that makes them immediately vulnerable to the 
interpretations of experts in their understanding of risk. This vulnerability paradigm has 
been highlighted in several definitions of trust. For example, Mayer et al. (1995) describes 
the willingness of one party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party, based on the 
expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the one, 
irrespective of the ability of the one to monitor or control the other. It is a willingness to 
make oneself vulnerable to the views, decisions or actions of another person or an 
organisation (Kjærnes et al., 2007). As such, risk information from a trusted source is 
believed to contribute to the way an individual perceives and responds to such information 
(Frewer et al., 2003). Flynn et al., (1992) explains that the more trustworthy a source (all 
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other factors being equal), the more the information from this source will resonate with 
the audience. The opposite holds when the source of information is not trusted.  
 
Petty and Cacioppo (1984) identify two routes by which a risk message can be decoded - 
the central route and the peripheral route. Trust plays a key role in determining which 
route is used in decoding the meaning inherent in the risk information received. The 
central route is where the receiver of risk information carries out an intense scrutiny of 
the risk information received. Here, external clues do not influence how the information 
is processed; the receiver carries out in-depth analyses of the risk information, in way that 
may serve either to reassure the decoder, attenuating risk concern, or amplify the risk, 
especially where uncertainties or gaps in the knowledge are high. The peripheral route 
utilizes those external clues e.g. the credibility of the source of information, an expert or 
known source, the timing and how the message is codified. These external cues allow the 
receptor of the risk information to make simple inferences and judgements about the 
merits of its content without any elaborate or in-depth processing. The danger here is that 
errors, distortion and gaps in risk messages are received without scrutiny. This may lead 
to a false perception of risk that may either amplify or attenuate the perspectives taken to 
risk. Insight from the work of Petty and Cacioppo (1984) suggests that the central route 
in decoding risk information is more likely to be used where there is absence of trust and 
credibility in the information source. The peripheral route is most likely to be used in 
situations of trust and credibility.  
 
Trust may also impact on the nature of the feedback process, which is recognised as 
essential for effective communication (Shannon, 1961). Trust is believed to encourage 
openness, transparency, responsiveness and a willingness to consult with one another 
(Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010). A receiver who trusts the sender of the message is likely 
to be more inclined to have an honest conversation than with a source that is mistrusted 
(Gabarro, 1978), where difficult feelings and concerns can be shared and understood in 
such a way that can be dealt with appropriately. This reduces the pressure towards 
increased risk concern created by other factors. Fischbacher-Smith et al. (2010) argue that 
where the qualities of openness, transparency, responsiveness and willingness to consult 
with one another are absent, there will be a greater likelihood of risk intensification.  
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3.7 An Alternative Perspective to Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework  
 
The insight drawn from the above literature on power, expertise, communication and trust 
provides new insight for the SARF.  
 
Table 3.4 ties these factors back to the SARF, describing how they shape social 
amplification or attenuation and influence public health risk communication. This is 
discussed here within the context of information mechanisms and response mechanisms 
of the SARF. A more in-depth account of these new advances to SARF using empirical 
evidence from this study is presented in chapter nine.  
 
 
Table 3.4: Factors shaping social amplification (or attenuation) processes  
 
Information Mechanism Response Mechanism 
Power  
o Setting the risk agenda 
o Evidence and interpretation 
o Control of risk information 
o Long standing professional practices 
o Media access 
o Social/professional group relationship 
Expertise  
o Too much weight attributed to 
technical expertise 
o the construction and development of 
experts 
o Domain specificity 
o Paradigm blindness 
Communication  
o Language in use 
o Interactive and quality of feedback 
process to clarify meaning and discuss 
sensitive issues 
Trust and credibility 
o Source of information 
(experts vs. known source) 
o Transparency and openness 
o Inclusiveness 
 
Power (resistance) 
 
Culture and signal value  
 
Emotion 
o Distribution of cost and 
benefit 
o Gains and losses 
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This new insight of the SARF aligns with the assumption that social amplification of risk 
is a multi-dimensional and multi-channel process (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) in public 
health risk communication; a view to which this study subscribes to (see chapter ten for 
a more detail and modified account of the SARF). 
 
3.7.1 Information mechanism 
From the critical review of the above literature, power, expertise and communication can 
be said to be factors shaping the information mechanism of social amplification of risk. 
In terms of power, institutional power is exercised by shaping policy priorities and risk 
agendas. Productive power is exercised through media sources that may privilege a 
certain perspective of risk. Productive power may also be exercised through the control 
of risk information and access expertise. Expertise may become an avenue of power by 
means of the nature of the interpretation and framing brought to bear on risk, and in 
particular, the weight given to technical assessment of risk over other social concerns. 
Structural power may be exercised by means of social and professional relationships. 
Other avenues of structural power are long standing disciplinary practices that guides the 
construction and development of expertise that shape experts’ thinking and behaviour. 
Together, these dimensions of power bring about social amplification (or attenuation) of 
risk in public health risk communication. This view aligns with the suggestion that social 
amplification of risk is not only about media coverage, volume of information provided, 
degree of information dispute, extent of dramatization, symbolic connotation of 
information (Taylor-Gooby, 2004). However, the ability of these factors to shape social 
amplification of risk is contingent upon institutional, productive, structural factors 
brought to bear on risk communication. 
 
Expertise may become an avenue for social amplification of risk by means of the nature 
of interpretation and framing brought to bear on risk. This includes the unequal weight 
given to technical assessment of risk over social evaluation; disciplinary, epistemological 
and ontological differences that may create differences or disagreement in 
interdisciplinary risk issues; the fact that expertise is domain specific and that therefore 
bias or paradigm blindness may bring about errors (amplification or attenuation) in the 
understanding of risk. Also important within the information mechanism stage are 
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communication processes. Communication may become an avenue for social 
amplification of risk by means of the language used in the communication of risk, in terms 
of language use and the interactive and quality of feedback that may enhance or inhibit 
effective risk communication and allow for clarification of meaning and discussion of 
sensitive issues, hence reducing the potential for amplification or attenuation. 
 
3.7.2 Response mechanism 
Within the response mechanism, trust has in particular been recognised as shaping 
behavioural responses to risk (Renn and Levine, 1991, Wynne, 1992, Slovic, 1993, Smith 
and McCloskey, 1998, Frewer, 2003, Earle and Siegrist, 2008) in particular, by the 
manner in which risk information is processed and decoded, and whether the central route 
and the peripheral route is used to bring about social amplification of risk. Culture 
(Masuda and Garvin, 2006), signal value (Kasperson, 2012a) and emotions (Morganstern, 
2016)  are other factors identified within the literature that shape behavioural responses 
to public health risk communication. Resistance (as a means of challenging dominant or 
legitimised perspectives) is also important in shaping social and policy responses to risk 
and its emergent properties. 
 
This advancement to the SARF provides valuable insight into the present discussion on 
how power and expertise shapes risk communication. It also strengthens the potential of 
the framework and the ability of this study to use it as lens to understand the negotiation 
of risk argument between over critical and under critical models in the policy domain. 
The next step will involve using this insight to create theoretical coherence of public 
health risk communication within the policy context. The aim is to help address the study 
research question set out in chapter one which seeks to understand - how a set of risk 
arguments evolve such that a particular risk perspective becomes dominant in a policy 
context? This new understanding of social amplification of risk now makes it possible at 
this point to state the following hypothesis: 
 
Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the negotiation of public health risk 
arguments between the over critical model and under critical models in a science-policy 
relationship. 
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This hypothesis will be theoretically evaluated in chapter four. 
 
3.8 Summary of Key points and Empirical 
Evaluation of the Proposed Framework 
 
This chapter has critically reviewed the social amplification of risk framework by 
identifying areas of strength and limitation within the context of public health risk 
communication as it relates to its policy making. The critique of the framework formed 
the basis of the literature review that followed in this chapter. In this chapter, it was argued 
that public health risk communication is embedded within institutional, productive and 
structural dimensions of power. Power, expertise and communication were seen as critical 
underlying factors shaping the information mechanism of social amplification of risk. 
Trust was identified as critical in shaping the response mechanism of the SARF. 
Therefore, it was concluded that social amplification of risk is a multi-channel and multi-
dimensional process (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The review of literature carried out in 
this chapter led to the hypothesis that Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the 
negotiation of public health risk arguments between the over critical model and under 
critical models in a science-policy relationship. The next chapter builds on the insight 
from this chapter to theoretically illustrate how a set of risk arguments evolves from a 
risk event to its policy formulation. The aim is to understand theoretically the research 
question presented in chapter one. 
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4 Public Health Risk Debate and Policy Making – A 
Theoretical Perspective 
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4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter theoretically describes how a set of risk arguments evolves from the 
occurrence of a risk event to a policy formulation. The aim is to explicitly address the 
research question set out in chapter one – how does risk argument evolve such that a 
particular argument becomes dominant in a policy context? The chapter begins by 
illustrating the evolution of a risk argument from its anecdotal stage of risk communication 
to the technical verification of the risk and policymaking stages. It describes the ‘bias’ 
against anecdotes within the arena of contested knowledge, unpacking its relevance in 
shaping public understanding of health risk. The chapter sheds light on the relationship 
between public concern, and technical and policy debates in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policy making. 
 
Later on in the chapter, emphasis is placed on the transition of risk arguments between 
technical and policy debates. This is the arena in which it is hoped this study will make a 
theoretical contribution. With emphasis in this arena, the synthesis of the alternative 
perspective to social amplification of risk (set out in chapter three) and the over critical 
and under critical model (see chapter two), led to the development of policy evaluation 
risk communication (PERC) framework. The PERC framework describes how an 
argument within a set of risk arguments becomes dominant in a policy context. This 
framework is founded on the proposal set out in the previous chapter that the social 
amplification of risk is a driver behind the negotiation of policy arguments between the 
overcritical model and under critical models in a science-policy relationship.  
 
In chapter one of this thesis, it was noted that an understanding the transition of policy 
arguments between over critical and under critical models in public health risk 
communication is essential. This is because it expands on how policy decisions relating 
to health risk are made, where there is a weak evidential base and where multiple 
interpretations, power dynamics and values are brought to bear on the communication 
process. It also sheds light on how policy ideologies are formed. 
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4.2 Public concern (Anecdotes) 
 
Public health risk communication (debate) often begins from personal or group anecdotes 
after an incident or the identification of a hazard, based either on observation or subjective 
interpretation of a physical event (such as an accident), or the recognition of a hazard 
(Kasperson et al., 1988). These may be narratives of witnesses, or a doctor reporting an 
observation such as an increase in incidences of lung cancer amongst smokers (Kasperson 
et al., 1988).  It may also be a mental construction based on perception of harm (Aven 
and Renn, 2010, Renn, 2010). In contemporary society, anecdotes are typically seen as 
providing poor quality evidence or even regarded as ‘bad science’ (Aronson and Hauben, 
2006) in the face of gaps in or contested knowledge or expertise. They are often 
discounted either as a primary source of risk information (Roth, 2003) or as the basis of 
forming a rational argument within the policy domain (Stilgoe, 2004). The assumption 
that ‘if science does not validate it, then it is not a generally accepted claim’ has pervaded 
public risk discourse to the extent that any arguments that cannot lay claim to be scientific 
are often discounted or even rejected on the basis of weak evidential base. For instance, 
the mobile phone legal case filed by David Reynard in the US court in 1992 claiming that 
mobile phones pose a health hazard and were the cause of his wife's fatal brain tumour 
was dropped on the basis that there was no sufficiently reliable and relevant scientific 
evidence to support such a claim (Foster and Moulder, 1992). Similarly, parents’ claims 
that the Measles, Mumps and Rubella (MMR) vaccine damaged their children were 
dismissed within scientific communities and policy domains for lack of credible scientific 
evidence (Wakefield et al., 1998). 
 
Scientific evidence has become the measure increasingly used in society to verify and 
validate risk claims (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012) and has been largely relied upon as a 
means to cope with uncertainties (Renn, 2008) and to ease the burden of proof 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The fact that society looks to science for answers creates a 
seeming ‘tacit’ risk communication practice that undermines any knowledge constructed 
outwith scientific boundaries, curtailing the boundary of their relevance within public 
health risk communication. Consequently, such ‘tacit’ risk communication practice 
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amplifies the significance of risk arguments that function within scientific boundary. 
There are however scholars who contend that anecdotes play a central role in shaping 
both the public perception of and the policy perspective taken to risk, even if it is only in 
the form of providing hypotheses for scientific research (Moore and Stilgoe, 2009). 
 
4.3 Expert Speculation and Media Attention 
Concerns around public health risk issues coupled with anecdotes and negative tales of 
personal or group experiences often attract media (Bromley and Segerson, 2012) and 
public attention to create issue attention (Shih et al., 2008). Issue attention is where a risk 
issue suddenly becomes a focal point of media and public debate for a period of time 
(Downs, 1996). This may create enough political pressure (Downs, 1996) to form the 
basis of a political action to further assess the risk. Before the formal report of any risk 
assessment and in the absence of available evidence, gaps in knowledge or information 
are often filled in by seeking out sources of expert speculation (Kandlikar et al., 2007). 
There are however different levels of acceptability when moving from anecdote to expert 
speculation. For instance, unlike anecdotes, a technical expert’s estimate (even if 
unscientific) is often received with greater degree of credibility, since technical experts 
are seen to have the requisite mandate and authority to speak in certain domains of risk 
and uncertainty. The advantage of this is that, it makes the accountability of expertise 
possible where such experts can be held responsible for their claims. However, such 
privileges allow the domination of technical expertise (even if anecdotal) over other ‘non-
scientific’ or experiential expertise in public health risk communication.  
 
In a new or emergent form of risk where there are large residual uncertainties, an expert 
is expected to qualify his/her risk estimate, stating clearly the best and worst case 
scenarios (Athanassoglou and Bosetti, 2015). However, the credibility of such a 
qualification is reduced and disputable owing to the fact that there is little or no scientific 
evidence to support such an assertion (Imwinkelried, 1992). The danger here is that other 
stakeholders may dwell on the worst-case scenario as if it were the final outcome of a 
technical analysis of the risk. In such an instance, conspiracy theory cannot be rejected 
where there are vested interests and where something of human value is a stake. The 
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debate prior to formal technical verification is important because it links public concern 
of risk (anecdotes) with technical and policy debates around public health and safety.  
 
4.4 Technical Debate 
Technical verification of public health risk is essential for rationalising policy decisions 
and risk mitigating strategies that are already in place (Pendrill, 2010). The verification 
process involves the use of scientific methodology in determining areas of knowns 
(Fischer, 2003) and whether identified areas of uncertainties are of significance to public 
health and safety (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990). Evidence from the technical verification 
of risk shapes the state of knowledge, and the manner in which this is communicated may 
continually shift the burden of proof amongst competing stakeholders (Funtowicz and 
Ravetz, 1990). Technical verification is often conducted by technical experts and informs 
the way expertise and knowledge are incorporated into the policy process (Fischer, 2009). 
The dominant role played by experts in the technical verification of risk means that some 
perspectives or stakeholder groups are immediately removed. As a consequence, non-
scientific groups take a back seat, becoming spectators to experts engaged in the exchange 
and negotiation of the so called ‘credible’ public health risk communication (Murdock, 
2010). 
 
The technical verification process is often confronted by objections about what constitute 
evidence and how accepted evidence should be interpreted (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 
2010, Fischer, 2003). Problems may arise from inter-disciplinary conflict around 
knowledge creation because of epistemological and methodological differences (Bella 
and Williamson, 1976) with regard to facts, rigor, causal explanation and research goals 
(Brister, 2016). Professional disciplines (e.g. medicine, public health, environmental 
science) often differ in their disciplinary practices. Such differences may become a source 
of conflict in the development of knowledge and interpretation of evidence that may lead 
to endless technical debates. For example, natural scientists often use positivist 
philosophy in data collection, interpretation and analysis (the quantitative approach). 
Social sciences, on the other hand, are more inclined to use interpretive philosophy and a 
social constructionist orientation in the collection, analysis and interpretation of data (the 
64 
 
 
 
 
qualitative approach). These competing/differing paradigms may lead to different 
conclusions, thereby creating ambiguity and tension in the manner by which risk is 
identified and framed around policy debates, risk tolerance and acceptability (Bradbury, 
1989). Risk tolerance is the extent to which there is a willingness to accept uncertainty 
when making decisions relating to risk (Klinke and Renn, 2010). Risk acceptability is 
where there is no need for additional risk reduction effort due to the fact that its occurrence 
has been reduced to a minimal level (Klinke and Renn, 2010). 
 
Within the policy context, the ability of experts to shape the policy perspectives taken to 
risk is further conditioned by those whose expertise is called upon to verify and pass 
judgement on the technical analysis of risk as it relates to policy making (Morgan, 2014). 
It is here that the dominant ideology (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986) and core belief 
(Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith, 1993) of technical experts combines with their relationship 
with powerful interests (e.g. policy makers) to heighten the potential of powerful (and 
expert) influence on the policy perspective taken to the risk (Leahy, 2013).  
 
4.5 Policy Debate: Science and Policy 
Relationship 
Collingridge and Reeve (1986) suggest that the outcome of technical verification is either 
an under critical or overcritical model. The under critical model accepts evidence without 
much scrutiny; this may be because it fits with existing policy ideology and interests or 
because the argument is already institutionalised, even though it might be uncertain. It 
may also be suppression of other scientific conjectures which threaten policy consensus 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). The overcritical model describes situations where 
disagreements exist within the scientific community, and where those with economic 
power cannot supress or constrain other perspectives, which leads to endless technical 
debates (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). For Collingridge and Reeve (1986), the effect of 
science within policy making is determined by the absence and presence of ‘power to’ 
influence the outcome of the risk assessment and the resulting interpretation taken to the 
risk. Several factors have been highlighted that could potentially influence the transition 
between an under critical and over critical model. These include the interdisciplinary 
nature of risk problem (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986), power of elites involved in the 
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debate, information availability, location of hazard and processes around policy making 
in its wider political context (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). Others are, the privileged 
interaction amongst certain public groups (Sutton, 1999), the discourse characterisation 
of the risk (Kasperson, 2012a) and the manner in which trust and credibility are brought 
to bear of the risk. Within this are processes around expertise and power, and 
communication and trust that shape the shift of policy argument between the over critical 
and the under critical model. The outcome of technical verification (either over critical or 
under critical model) may then influence debates around risk tolerability and 
acceptability. This is deemed one of the most controversial aspects of public risk debates 
(Smith, 1990, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).  
 
4.6 Policy Ideological choices 
Regardless of the presence or absence of conflicting risk arguments, policy makers are 
required to develop arguments within the context of public health and safety in order to 
develop appropriate risk mitigating strategies (Funtowicz and Ravetz, 1990).  It is in this 
arena that a stakeholder’s relationship plays a crucial role in shaping the policy ideology 
taken to public health risk. The interaction and communication between certain 
stakeholders’ groups allow privileged access to exclusive information and policy makers, 
which enable such groups to discuss and express certain political opinions that can have 
powerful influences on policy-choices (Sutton, 1999). Policy framing of public health 
risk is essential as it is often followed by risk reduction actions (Korn et al., 2003) that 
bring about the desired behavioural responses.  
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Figure 4.1: Different stages of risk communication (debate) model 
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Figure 4.1 depicts the different stages of an evolving risk debate (as described above), 
from the initial anecdotal stage to the formulation of policy. While Figure 4.1 shows a 
linear flow from public concern to policy debate, in reality, risk debate may begin at any 
stage, moving forward or backward, and public health risk arguments may emerge at all 
stages at the same time. The relationship between technical evaluation of risk and policy 
debate is highlighted by a box in Figure 4.1; this is the arena to which it is hoped this 
research henceforth will make a theoretical contribution. Fischer (2003)’s policy 
evaluation framework already sheds light on the (horizontal) transition between 
technical evaluation and policy choice (see section 2.4.1). However, there is little or no 
technical understanding of the (vertical) transition between the over critical and under 
critical models (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The importance of understanding the vertical 
transition (as depicted in Figure 4.1) is that, it expands on how policy decisions relating 
to health risk are made where there is a weak evidential base and where multiple 
interpretations, power dynamics and values are brought to bear on the communication 
process. It also sheds light on how policy ideologies are formed. 
 
 
4.7  Understanding the Negotiation between 
Over-critical and Under-Critical Model in 
Public Health Risk Communication  
 
In order to shed light on the understanding of the negotiation of policy arguments 
relating risk between the over critical and under critical models, the research draws 
insights from chapters one to four of this thesis. In particular, it will use the insight from 
the previous chapter (three) on the social amplification of risk framework, and attempts 
to use this to understand this negotiation, in unpicking the role of power and expertise 
and also communication and trust in the risk communication process within the policy 
context (see  
 
 
Figure 4.2).  
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Figure 4.2 attempts to advance the understanding of how a particular public health risk 
argument becomes dominant in a policy domain, synthesizing this study perspective of 
social amplification of risk and the over critical and under critical models. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Policy Evaluation Risk Communication (PERC) framework   
 
   
 
 
The Policy Evaluation Risk Communication (PERC) model illustrates the underlying 
factors that influence how policy makers reach certain policy perspectives to risk, where 
there are multiple perspectives, strong power dynamics and values are at play. The 
PERC framework is based on the assumption that social amplification of risk is the 
driver behind the transition of risk arguments between over critical and under critical 
models. The framework identifies power, expertise, communication and trust as key 
factors shaping the amplification (or attenuation) of certain risk perspectives within the 
policy context. In addition, the evolving nature of information, evidence and knowledge 
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is likely to shape the nature of the power, expertise, communication and trust that is 
brought to bear in risk communication, and this may further shift a risk argument 
forward or backward between the two models. Each of these driving factors is discussed 
below.  
 
 
 
Power 
 
Policy arguments relating to risk are embedded within institutional, productive, 
structural and resistive forms of power, which suggest that power is fluid and creates 
imbalances of power in ways that enhance or inhibit certain stakeholder groups in 
shaping public health risk communication. Power in public health risk communication 
within the policy context may be exercised by shaping the policy agenda relating to risk 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), the control of risk information and expertise (Lukes, 
2005), the establishment of stakeholders relationships (Barnett and Duvall, 2005), and 
also boycotts and protests (Foucault, 1982) that challenge dominant worldviews or 
arguments.  
 
By shaping the risk agenda and prioritising policy objectives, policy makers or risk 
regulators are able to curtail or enhance certain issues or perspectives from 
consideration, thereby shaping the direction of the risk debate and what issues are 
deliberated upon. The ability to control risk information and expertise and to decide 
what, when or how much information or expertise is made available or concealed, may 
also drive or create the amplification (or attenuation) of certain policy arguments relating 
to risk. In addition, there is the power that comes with a stakeholder relationship (e.g. 
technical experts and policy makers) that allows an exchange of views and political 
opinions and how that brings about hegemony and domination of certain risk discourse. 
In addition, risk communication practices (Power, 2007) that view science as superior 
to other forms of knowledge and expertise and which shape how risk is accessed, 
interpreted and communicated are further avenues for social amplification (or 
attenuation) of public health risk. Considering the interactive nature of risk 
communication, there is also the resistive power by which stakeholders are able to 
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contest dominant views and perspectives. Such power may be exercised through protest, 
boycotts or even through research sponsored by other stakeholder groups. Together, 
these factors drive the amplification (or attenuation) of risk, driving argument between 
the under critical model and over critical models. Where power or the influence of power 
is absent or reduced, the chances for over critical model to prevail are enhanced.    
 
 
 
Expertise  
 
Another important factor driving the amplification (or attenuation) of a particular risk 
argument within the policy domain is how evidence is interpreted and framed by means 
of expertise. The important issue here concern questions of what constitute evidence and 
whose expertise is called upon, believed and legitimised. There is the debate around 
experiential knowledge and expertise (Irwin, 2008) versus more traditional technical 
expertise. However, the latter seems to enjoy more ‘credibility status’ than the former 
so that technical expertise is often called upon, believed and legitimised within the 
policy context. However, several problems around the use of technical expertise have 
been identified to impact on the manner in which evidence is interpreted and risk signals 
framed that may allow the amplification (or attenuation) of a certain risk argument 
within the policy domain to thrive. These include the domain specificity of expertise 
that reduces the validity of expertise beyond its domain, considering the 
interdisciplinary nature of public health risk and paradigm blindness that influences the 
manner in which experts acknowledge challenges to their worldview in their 
interpretation. Given the weight attributed to technical expertise over experiential 
expertise, the importance of this is amplified. This scenario is further amplified given 
that technical expertise is a social construction in its training and validation (considering 
powerful and vested interests).  
 
It is important that other forms of expertise are considered especially the experience of 
those who are in close proximity to the risk to improve on the robustness of evidence 
(Stilgoe 2007) and ease the burden of proof (Fischbacher-Smith, 2009). 
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Communication 
 
How the risk is communicated between the various stakeholder groups is another factor 
that shapes how a particular risk perspective in a policy context becomes amplified 
(Smith, 1988). Using language relevant to all stakeholders (including policy makers) 
involved in risk communication (Adekola et al., 2017) is essential in terms of translating 
the language of an expert in a way that is usable by decision or policy makers (Choi et 
al., 2005, Aitsi-Selmi et al., 2016), while highlighting uncertainties where they exist 
(Smith, 1988). The use of language where the receptor cannot decode the meaning 
reduces or amplifies the significance of such expert proposition and how it is used for 
decision-making. The use of inappropriate language might also push information users 
to adopt expert perspectives that are well understood so as to justify their behavioural 
response.  
 
What is also important is the quality of the feedback in the communication that may 
allow sensitive issues to be addressed and dealt with appropriately. One-way risk 
communication may heighten tension around risk acceptability, as it does not allow for 
clarification of meaning or discussion of sensitive issues. Furthermore, there is the issue 
of whether language of certainty or uncertainty is used. Where the language of 
uncertainty is used, the ability of stakeholders to refute or undermine damaging 
arguments is enhanced. It may also increase speculations and the operating theories that 
are brought to bear on risk and drive a risk argument towards an over critical model. 
Where science or experts use languages of certainty, the potential of moving a risk 
argument towards an over critical model is enhanced. 
 
Trust and credibility  
 
Evidence from the literature has highlighted the importance of trust on perceived 
credibility of the source of risk information (Mayer et al., 1995). Risk information from 
sources that are seen as credible contribute to the way such messages resonate with the 
audience (Frewer et al., 2003), hence increasing the likelihood of driving risk argument 
towards an under critical model. Distrust, on the other hand, contributes to heightened 
resistance in risk argument that often lead to distortion of the risk message. It may also 
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lead to increased contentions around risk mitigating strategies (Kasperson et al., 1992, 
Petts, 1992, Flynn and Slovic, 1993, Löfstedt and Horlick-Jones, 1999) therefore 
moving risk argument towards the over critical model. However, under circumstances 
where there is trust, the receiver of risk information may even become a “walking and 
talking advertisement” where he actively shares the views of the other actors among his 
social network that may bring about hegemony of risk discourse in the policy domain. 
 
Information, evidence and knowledge 
 
What is also important is how power, expertise, communication and trust are contingent 
upon the evolving nature of information, evidence and knowledge and how that can 
potentially shift risk arguments forward and backward between under critical and over-
critical models (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). As information, evidence and knowledge 
becomes available, the balance of power may shift between the different stakeholders 
and potentially impact on the nature of power and expertise brought to bear on the risk 
in terms the interpretation and frame of the argument used. It influences the nature of 
communication and trust within the process that determines whose risk argument is seen 
as credible and who is to be trusted. As risk arguments move closer to the under critical 
advisory state, policy decisions are made and risk mitigating strategies are put in place. 
It is the contention of this study that the time scale between policy consensus (under 
critical model) and institutionalised policy mitigating strategies is dependent on the 
ability of interest group to muster their power to shape the debate (as will be argued later 
in chapter nine). 
 
Behavioural response to institutionalised policy perspective 
 
Policy strategy designed to mitigate public health risk often prompts individual or group 
behavioural responses to the legitimised risk perspective. Critical response mechanisms 
here are: the nature of social trust in policy makers and public health institutions (Renn 
and Levine, 1991); the ability of individuals or groups to resist (power) a legitimised 
risk perspective; signal value (Kasperson, 2012a); and, distribution of costs and benefits 
that can steer (positive or negative) emotional responses (Adekola et al., 2017) to 
institutionalised policy perspectives. Undesired behavioural responses or emergent 
problems may compel the government to change its policy and risk mitigating strategy, 
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like the case of the revision of the tax increase in Canada because of a rise in the sale of 
contraband tobacco products that are detrimental to public health (Gabler and Katz, 
2010). This is akin to Foucault’s resistive power (Foucault, 1978) but not necessarily 
change deep core policy ideology or belief (Sabatier, 1988) in relation to the risk. 
Sabatier and Jenkins‐Smith (1993) categorised policy belief systems into three 
hierarchical organisations in order of decreasing resistance to change: the deep core 
belief (the most resistant to change); near (policy) core; and the secondary and 
instrumental aspect (the least resistant to change).  
 
Behavioural responses may also create emergent problems due to emergent properties 
of risk, which may not initially have been envisaged or taken into account in the initial 
policy considerations. This may raise new areas of uncertainty that raise new research 
questions or challenge existing policy assumptions or mitigating strategies. These 
emergent problems can potentially shape both behavioural responses and the policy 
strategy put in place. Furthermore, new research questions and new evidence following 
a technical verification may move risk arguments towards over critical model so that the 
debate may begin all over again.  
 
The PERC framework is based on the argument that policy debates relating to risk arise 
from, and are conducted within a public space in which there are multiple interactions 
between power and expertise that enhance or inhibit risk communication, create or 
destroy trust and credibility, and privilege certain social and professional relationships 
over others. As such, a degree of bias can arise from the asymmetries of power 
underpinning these interactions and processes that in turn, perpetuate the domination of 
certain risk perspectives and/or shape the prioritisation of issues and debates in the 
policy domain. 
 
4.8 Summary of Key points and Empirical 
Validation of the Proposed Framework 
This chapter addressed theoretically the research question set out in chapter one: how 
does a risk argument evolve such that a particular argument becomes dominant in a 
policy context? The chapter considers the relationship between public debate 
(anecdotes), technical debate and policy debate and sheds light on the transition of 
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policy argument between under critical and over critical models. The synthesis of the 
alternative perspective to social amplification of risk and the over critical and under 
critical model led to the development of the policy evaluation risk communication 
(PERC) framework that describes how a particular risk perspective becomes amplified 
in risk communication relating to its policymaking. The PERC framework is based on 
the hypothesis that social amplification of risk is a driver of the negotiation of policy 
related risk arguments between the over critical and under critical models.  
 
Testing the policy evaluation risk communication (PERC) framework is an essential 
part of its development in order to examine its robustness and usefulness, and to check 
for errors. This will require the use of the framework as lens to investigate empirical 
cases of public health risk communication and its policy development. The next chapter 
(five) discusses the methodology used in this research, showing how it was developed 
in line with the research question, and how the methodology used has contributed to the 
insights that follow in chapters seven to ten. Chapter six, seven and eight present the 
case studies and findings. Chapters nine and ten discuss the findings through the lens of 
the PERC framework and social amplification of risk framework respectively. In 
conclusion, chapter eleven summarises the thesis and sets out a benchmark for best 
practice risk communication and its policy development.   
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5 Methodology and Methods 
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5.1 Introduction 
Chapters one to four of this thesis have established the rationale for the research, set out 
the research aim and research questions, drawn on relevant literature to inform the 
critique of social amplification of risk framework, and developed a policy evaluation 
risk communication (PERC) framework. The PERC framework is a lens through which 
to analyse the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication as it 
relates to policy making. This chapter discusses the methodology used in the research, 
showing how it aligns with the research question, and how the methods used contribute 
to the insights that follow in chapters six to ten. The chapter justifies the approach taken. 
It also explains how the analysis was undertaken and the ways in which such large 
quantities of published data was handled. 
  
5.2 Methodology – Qualitative study and 
Deductive Approach 
 
This research characterizes the different dimensions of an empirical public health risk 
communication (debate). This will require the selection of a research methodology that 
aligns the mode of enquiry and research aims and objectives (Edmondson and 
McManus, 2007). Research methodology is the set of principles that guide research 
practices in identifying problems and seeking answers (Taylor et al., 2015). It provides 
an account of why a particular method is used and what counts as the knowledge that 
informs research. There are two dominant research perspectives in social science 
research; qualitative or quantitative research perspectives, and a third research 
perspective that combines both perspectives (Creswell, 2013, Yin, 2015). According to 
McCracken (1988) the difference between qualitative and quantitative research is that 
“quantitative research isolate[s] and define[s] categories as precisely as possible before 
the study is undertaken, and determine[s], again with great precision, the relationship 
between them. Qualitative research, on the other hand, isolates and defines categories 
during the process of the research. For one field, there are well-defined categories as the 
means of the research, for another, they are the object of research” (P.16).  
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Since this study is exploratory, it fits the qualitative paradigm. This is because, the aim 
of the study will involve an inquiry process of understanding a social phenomenon, 
which will consist of building a complex and holistic picture of the problem through the 
collection of data in the form of words and detailed reports of the views of participants 
(Creswell, 2003). Qualitative research is characterized by the use of words (instead of 
numbers) as data, and seeks to understand and interpret meaning, recognizing that data 
reside within contexts. It also generates detailed and complex data, tends to seek patterns 
while exploring differences and similarities within data, and often follows an 
interpretivist stance in making sense of the data (Braun and Clarke, 2013). This makes 
it possible for the researcher to identify underlying concepts shaping public health risk 
communication and the relationships that exist between them (Frankfort and Nachmias, 
1996). Qualitative research has been chosen because the research aim and question is 
best answered by this mode of inquiry; it will allow understanding of how a certain 
perspective or argument becomes amplified in public health risk communication within 
its policy context.  
 
A Deductive Approach 
 
There are two dominant research approaches to creating new knowledge. These are 
inductive and deductive reasoning (Saunders et al., 2011). Inductive reasoning entails 
theory building commencing from observations of specific phenomena in establishing 
generalizations about the issues being investigated (Saunders et al., 2011). Deductive 
reasoning, on the other hand, is a theory testing process that begins by establishing a 
theory and applying it to specific instances (Cavaye, 1996) in order to confirm or refute 
an hypothesis derived from the theory (Hyde, 2000). Yin (2015) advocates the use of a 
deductive approach in case study research. A deductive research is chosen in this study 
because a critical review of extant literature led to the development of an hypothesis and 
PERC framework, an this can be used as a lens to analyse the data collected, pointing 
out areas for improvement (Yin, 2015).  
 
5.3 A Case Study Approach 
This study requires a research approach that allows the study of complex risk issues 
within their real life contexts. A case study research is defined as “an empirical enquiry 
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that investigates a contemporary phenomenon that is set within its real-world context 
especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly 
evident” (Yin 2009, P.18). It is a preferred research approach when “how” or “why” 
questions are asked (Yin, 1994)  or where questions asked are intended to shed light on 
the process of a phenomena (Hyde, 2000). A case study is advantageous because it 
enables understanding of a complex set of issues or objects in real life setting (Crowe et 
al., 2011). It can also extend experience or knowledge to what is already known through 
previous research (Yin, 2013). According to Cavaye (1996a), case study research 
captures ‘reality’ and emphasises detailed contextual analysis of events or conditions 
and their relationships. In addition, case study research can be used to explain, 
describe or explore events or phenomena in the everyday contexts in which they occur 
in such a way that allows broad coverage of multiple and complex issues relating to the 
case (Yin, 2009). However, there are several disadvantages of case study research. 
These include the fact that a small number of cases can offer no grounds for establishing 
reliability or generality of findings (Takona, 2002). This suggests that the greater the 
number of cases that is able to show replication, the greater the rigour with which a 
theory can be established (Rowley, 2002). Moreover, there is also the issue of lack of 
trust in the credibility of case study research, however, by using systematic procedures 
in data collection and analysis, such concerns can be adequately addressed (Yin, 2011). 
Furthermore, there are reductionist viewpoints which regard the case study as suitable 
only for exploratory research (Zainal, 2007). These views however ignore the fact that 
a case study allows exploration of every aspect of a case scenario without requiring the 
use of another method (Yin (2009)).  
 
For this study, in order to really test for the robustness of the PERC framework and the 
study hypothesis, it was necessary to consider multiple public health risk 
communication (debates). A single case study was deemed not to be sufficient a basis 
on which to develop a theory or test the robustness of the PERC framework. The object 
of study, as with research relating to controversy or debate, is often defined as issues 
emerge or evolve (Stilgoe, 2004). Therefore, a chronological presentation of the 
evolving event was deemed essential to help develop a holistic picture of the cases under 
examination. It was also determined that a social constructionist viewpoint and an 
interpretist approach are more appropriate in understanding the various stakeholders’ 
perspectives within the risk debates. 
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5.3.1 Social Constructionist and Interpretivist Approach 
Social constructionism has been defined as a process where the social realities of the 
world are shaped and perceived (Gergen, 1999). It is an enquiry into the ways objects 
are seen through different worldviews and how these are interpreted and understood, a 
process typically carried out through an interpretivist method of enquiry (Schwandt, 
1994). A social constructionist view and an interpretivist epistemological approach are 
utilised in this study in order to understand how different stakeholders make sense of 
the risks they face in a risk arena. It is a methodological approach that distances itself 
from objective knowledge and promotes social experiences as a basis of understanding 
human phenomena (Lincoln and Denzin, 1994, Denzin and Lincoln, 2002, Alvesson 
and Sköldberg, 2009). An interpretivist epistemological approach assumes that people 
and the worlds they live in are inextricably linked by common social experience (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1991, Gadamer, 1994). Therefore, two individuals living in one world 
will encounter different experiences. An interpretivist philosophy is adopted because 
the study examines the ways in which scientific facts, perceptions and risk experiences 
are constructed. The advantages of this approach are that it allows the researcher to 
capture the individuals’ and groups’ social experience of their reality. This is essential 
because risk perception and the experience of individual or public groups are assumed 
to be shaped by their historical, cultural, ideological, understanding of reality (Sandberg, 
2005). 
 
5.4 Selection of Cases 
There were several public health risk debates that were considered during the selection 
of cases for study in this thesis. Three cases where thought to be a better fit in enabling 
the study to examine the role of power and expertise in risk communication. These cases 
were also found to match more closely with the identified selection criteria. These 
criteria are based on four core considerations:  
 
a) A risk communication case study that prompted public health risk debate in United 
Kingdom. The domain of public health risk was chosen as this is of interest to the 
researcher, and also because it is one of the most fiercely contested arenas where risk 
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acceptability is debated (Fischbacher-Smith et al., 2010). The scope of the debate was 
limited to United Kingdom to avoid any political or geographical issues that may have 
implications for the conclusions drawn.  
b) A case study with contested science and evidence that yet requires policy 
considerations or action. The aim is to tease out the relationship between science and 
policy and to understand how a particular risk perspective or issue becomes dominant 
in a policy context. 
c) A case study where multiple legitimate worldviews and values are brought to 
bear on the public health risk issues. 
d) After full consideration has been given to the first set of criteria, the last 
criterion is that the case involves the delivery of drugs into the human body. Many 
studies on scientific debates are focused on other public health issues such as 
nanotechnology, zoonosis, nuclear weapon and climate change. Little attention has 
been given to public health risk debate relating to the delivery of drugs into the human 
system.  
 
Some of the cases initially considered were debates relating to genetically modified 
food, smoking, climate change, bovine spongiform encephalopathy, horsemeat, measles 
mumps and rubella (MMR), phone and phone masts and electronic cigarettes. After 
much reflection and a pilot review of some of the cases in order to discern which would 
best allow a good understanding of the issues under investigation, potential cases were 
narrowed down to four: (1) smoking debate; (2) measles mumps and rubella (MMR) 
debate; (3) phone and phone mast debate; and, (4) electronic cigarette debates on the 
first three aforementioned criteria. The fourth criteria allowed the elimination of the 
phone and phone mast debate from the choices of cases. The first three case studies were 
considered sufficient to test the study hypothesis (in chapter two) and the PERC 
framework (set out in chapter four). Therefore, the cases in this study were carefully and 
systematically selected to provide a rich evidence base with which to address the 
research aims and questions outlined in chapter one. 
 
The following section therefore, provides brief background information to the cases 
used in the study. These are the smoking and vaping debates and the measles, mumps 
and rubella (MMR) debate. 
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5.4.1 Smoking and Vaping risk debate 
A brief summary of the smoking and vaping debates are presented here as one case 
study. 
 
 The Smoking debate 
Concerns about the risks of smoking were raised as a result of increases in the number 
of lung cancer cases; especially in males of about 45 years, with some research 
estimating up to a six-fold increase (Berridge, 2006). The initial thought was that these 
increases were due to better diagnoses and record keeping. But studies by (Kennaway 
and Kennaway, 1947) helped eliminate occupational and environmental factors pointing 
to a connection with cigarette smoking. In the 1950’s, three key epidemiological studies 
provided the first powerful links between smoking and lung cancer. In May of 1950, 
Morton Levin and his colleagues published a study linking smoking to lung cancer in 
the JAMA issue (Levin et al., 1950). In the same issue, Ernst L. Wynder and Evarts A. 
Graham, in their study found that out of 684 people interviewed in their study in the 
United States, 96.5% were moderate and heavy smokers. In the UK, the first large 
epidemiological study published in the British Medical Journal in September by Doll 
and Hill established a statistical link between smoking and lung cancer (Richard and 
Bradford, 1950).  
 
Discussions between the Ministry of Health (MH) and the Medical Research Council 
(MRC) in the late 1940s led to the organisation of an informal conference on cancer of 
the lung in February 1947 by the Council (Berridge, 2006). The MRC initiated a large-
scale statistical study of the past smoking habits of those with cancer of the lung and of 
two control groups. This was led by Professor Bradford Hill and Dr. Richard Doll of the 
Statistical Research Unit at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
(LSHTM). The result published in the British Medical Journal (BMJ) in 1950 concluded 
that there was a ‘real association’ between carcinoma of the lung and smoking (Doll and 
Hill, 1950b). The research found tobacco to be an important factor in the production of 
carcinoma of the lung. Other studies such as (Richard and Bradford, 1956, Wynder and 
Hoffmann, 1964, Doll and Hill, 1966, Doll and Hill, 1999) found smoking to be also a 
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primary cause of preventable cancer diseases of smokers below the 40 years of age. The 
events that followed Doll and Hill’s (1950) publication led to a fiercely contested public 
health risk debates around the relationship between smoking and cancer. There were 
also arguments around passive smoking, smoking amongst young people and women, 
smoking and addiction, and marketing tobacco to developing countries. However, to 
limit the boundary of this analysis, emphasis will be placed on the smoking-lung cancer 
debate to allow a thorough and an in-depth analysis of the issues. 
 
In the 1950s, smoking was a socially accepted practice; 80% of men and 40% of women 
smoked in United Kingdom (Peto et al., 2000). Smoking was considered a natural and 
sophisticated thing to do and was allowed everywhere including in offices, pubs, 
restaurants, cinema, and all transport systems (Peto et al., 2000). In 2013, ASH UK 
estimated that 80% of lung cancer and bronchitis and emphysema deaths could be 
attributed to smoking, including 17% of deaths from heart disease. 25% of all cancer 
(lung, mouth, lip, throat, bladder, kidney, pancreas, stomach, liver and cervix) deaths 
were also attributed to smoking (ASH Factsheet, 2013).  
 
The UK government and Tobacco Control Policy 
 
The UK Health policy on tobacco control is largely formulated and implemented by the 
devolved administrations of each of the member countries of the United Kingdom 
(Keating et al., 2002). However, as tobacco falls within the remit of a number of 
different government departments: e.g. Treasury, Business, HMRC as well as Health 
(ASH, 2013b, Barber and Conway, 2014), tobacco control policy is partly determined 
at UK-wide level and partly by the devolved administrations. The four nations of 
England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have responsibility for promoting public 
health, a UK-wide policy and law applies to taxation, smuggling, advertising, and 
consumer protection issues (e.g. the policies guiding health warnings on tobacco 
packaging). Some of these measures are also determined by European Union legislation. 
Procedures for enforcement may vary between the administrations to reflect the 
differing legal systems (Barber and Conway, 2014). The tobacco industry is of huge 
economic benefit to the UK government; it is estimated that it earned £12bn in revenue 
from tobacco duties for the financial year 2011-2012 (ASH, 2013b). According to ASH, 
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77% of the price of a premium pack of cigarette consists of taxation. The UK tobacco 
industry employs around 5,000 people. 
 
 Electronic Cigarette – Vaping risk debate 
 
In September of 2008, World Health Organization (WHO) raised concern that electronic 
cigarettes were being marketed as a safer alternative to tobacco cigarettes, despite an 
inadequate understanding of the safety and efficacy of electronic cigarettes at the time. 
WHO made clear that there was a lack of sufficient scientific evidence of the safety and 
efficacy of ECs and therefore asked retailers to immediately remove any claim that ECs 
are a safer alternative, or an aid to stopping smoking from their websites and information 
leaflets (WHO, 2008). They argued that any health claim would require scientific 
verification. ECs were initially marketed as a consumer product and they can be 
purchased in most retail shops in the UK. In 2014, it was estimated that 2.1 million 
adults use an electronic cigarette in the UK according to a survey conducted and 
published by ASH UK (ASH, 2014). The report estimates that about 700,000 of these 
users were ex-smokers with a majority (estimated at 1.3 million users) using electronic 
cigarettes in combination with tobacco cigarettes. The use of EC amongst never-
smokers was found to be insignificant in this report.  
 
Electronic cigarettes (ECs) are battery-powered devices that heat a liquid into an 
inhalable form (Siegel et al., 2011). ECs originated from China and were first 
introduced to Europe around 2007 (Bates, 2015). ECs are designed to deliver nicotine 
and other flavourings into the body system. However, unlike tobacco cigarettes, ECs 
do not emit tobacco tar but vaporised liquid nicotine. Evidence from tobacco smoke 
suggests that while people smoke for the nicotine, they die from the tar (Russell, 
1976). However, toxins and carcinogens, such as tobacco-specific nitrosamines, 
diethylene glycol, that are harmful to human health were detected in some EC devices 
(FDA, 2011). Likely harmful effects are increase in lung flow resistance and decrease 
in FENO concentrations (Vardavas et al., 2012). Since ECs also contain some toxic 
chemicals, some groups of experts fear that ECs may pose similar health risks to 
tobacco cigarettes. Many of the chemicals in conventional cigarette smoke causes 
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chronic inflammation, which leads to chronic diseases like bronchitis, emphysema, 
and heart disease (Stoller, 2002). 
 
The Regulation of Electronic Cigarette 
 
ECs were new products in 2008, so they were largely unregulated. However their rapid 
uptake in the UK drew the attention of public health officials. At the moment ECs are 
currently being regulated under the EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD). This 
occurred as a result of the public consultation carried out in 2010 on whether to bring 
nicotine-containing products (NCPs), including ECs, within the medicines licensing 
regime (MHRA, 2010, Bryan). This was the contentious aspect of the debate that drew 
different arguments from different stakeholders. The regulation of ECs came into effect 
in May of 2016. According to the directive, ECs containing up to 20 mg/ml of nicotine 
will be regulated by the TPD. Manufacturers and importers may decide to opt for 
medicines regulation, which will require ECs to be authorised by the Medicines and 
Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) as over the counter medicines, in the 
same way as nicotine replacement therapy (NRT) (EC, 2014). Whether this regulation 
will change following the British exit from the European Union (BREXIT) vote remains 
unclear at the point of writing up this thesis. 
 
5.4.2 Measles Mumps and Rubella public health risk debate 
The public health concern around MMR vaccination in United Kingdom originated from 
a study led by Dr. Andrew Wakefield (Wakefield et al., 1998). The paper described 
twelve children aged between three and ten, suffering from developmental regression 
and gastrointestinal problems. The publication in The Lancet suggested the possibility 
of a link between MMR vaccine and regressive behavioural disorders. According to the 
publication, nine of the twelve children examined had become autistic. The paper points 
to a possible environmental trigger and explained that the parents of eight of the twelve 
children associated the onset of these problems with MMR vaccination (Wakefield et 
al., 1998). The triple measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine was introduced into 
routine UK childhood vaccination programmes in October 1988 (Miller and Reynolds, 
2009), replacing the single measles vaccine (Hilton et al., 2007), and becoming part of 
the established vaccination protocol in 1988, after successful use in the US since 1971 
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(Miller and Reynolds, 2009). MMR vaccines contain live, attenuated strains of measles, 
mumps and rubella viruses (Peltola and Heinonen, 1986, Usonis et al., 1999). The first 
routine involves giving the vaccine to infants between the ages of 12-15 months. A 
second MMR injection was added to the schedule, as a pre-school booster in October of 
1996 (MRC, 2001b). In the United Kingdom, MMR vaccination coverage for 2-year-
old children was over 90% in the early 1990’s (Speers and Lewis, 2005), with cases of 
measles being recorded at historic low levels at this time (Hilton et al., 2007). Routine 
childhood vaccination programmes are often viewed as bringing about significant 
improvement in morbidity and mortality (Leach, 2005) and they extend back to the 
nineteenth century. Childhood vaccination programmes have seen successful 
eradication of diseases such as small pox in the UK and brought under control other 
diseases such polio, diphtheria, whooping cough, and meningitis (PHE, 2014). 
Vaccination is voluntary in the UK, and as such, public education and trust has been 
relied upon (Leach, 2005) as a means to maintain high uptake to ensure herd immunity 
(Burgess et al., 2006). 
 
The Nature of the Problem 
 
Autism, a condition at the centre of the MMR vaccine debate, is widely regarded as one 
of the most severe childhood psychiatric conditions (Frith, 1989, Baron-Cohen and 
Bolton, 1993). It is a set of neurodevelopmental disorders that affects a person’s 
communication and interaction (Frith, 1989). Wing and Gould (1979) developed the 
concept of an autistic spectrum and note that the condition covers a range of ability 
levels and severities, and is characterised by qualitative impairments in social, 
communicative and imaginative development. Today, autism is recognised as one of a 
number of related ‘pervasive developmental disorders’, which also include Asperger’s 
disorder, childhood disintegrative disorder, and Rett’s disorder (MRC Report, 2001)2. 
The MRC report suggests that the autism spectrum includes children and adults across 
wide ranges of severity and intellectual ability. A third of children with autism appear 
to lose skills in their second year, around the time the MMR vaccination is given (MRC 
Report, 2001). Before the 1990s, autism was thought to be very rare, affecting 2 to 4 
                                                 
2 MRC refers to Medical Research Council 
 
86 
 
children per 10,000 but that has changed, putting figures at an estimated rate of 60 per 
10,000 in the 1990s (MRC Report, 2001). The cause of the rise remains uncertain but is 
thought to be linked to increased professional awareness, better diagnosis, and changes 
in the prevalence of causal factors (Wing and Potter, 2002).  
Table 5.1 provides details of stakeholders engaged in each of the selected case study. 
Table 5.1: Stakeholder’s mapping  
 
Public groups/ 
Stakeholders 
Smoking debate Vaping debate  MMR debate  
The core debate Is smoking a cause 
of cancer? 
How should 
electronic 
cigarette be 
framed and then 
regulated with the 
public health 
context?  
Is MMR vaccine 
linked to autism 
and safe for use 
on young 
children? 
Policy makers 
/risk regulators/ 
Public experts 
E.g. UK 
governments, 
public health units 
such as department 
of health, WHO, 
European union 
government. 
E.g. UK 
governments, 
public health 
units such as 
department of 
health, WHO, 
European union 
government. 
E.g. UK 
governments, 
public health 
units such as 
department of 
health.  
Scientific 
committees  
Scientific 
Committee on 
Tobacco and 
Health (SCOTH), 
Standing Advisory 
Committee on 
Cancer and 
Radiotherapy etc. 
E.g. Expert 
Committee 
commissioned by 
public health 
England  
E.g. Central 
Health Services 
Committee 
(CHSC), Standing 
Advisory 
Committee on 
Cancer and 
Radiotherapy. 
Technical experts Prof. Doll and Hill 
and other scientists 
within scientific 
community. 
Prof. McNeill 
Brose and other 
scientists within 
scientific the 
community. 
Wakefield and 
other scientists 
within scientific 
community. 
Industry/corporat
e representatives 
Tobacco industry 
representatives. 
Electronic 
cigarette industry 
representatives. 
Representatives 
of MMR vaccine 
manufacturers. 
Media sources UK media sources 
such as BBC, Daily 
Mail, The Guardian  
UK media 
sources such as 
BBC, Daily Mail, 
The Guardian. 
UK media 
sources such as 
BBC, Daily Mail, 
The Guardian. 
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Local experts/ 
individual close 
to source of risk. 
Individual or 
groups in close 
proximity to source 
of risk and the 
general public. 
Individual or 
groups in close 
proximity to 
source of risk and 
the general 
public. 
Individual or 
groups in close 
proximity to 
source of risk and 
the general 
public. 
Non-profit 
organisation 
E.g. Action on 
Smoking and 
Health, UK. 
E.g. Action on 
Smoking and 
Health, UK. 
E.g. Justice 
awareness and 
basic support - 
jabs parent group. 
Court of law 
(legal discourse) 
The UK judicial 
system 
The UK judicial 
system 
The UK judicial 
system 
 
 
5.5 Using Published Sources in a Qualitative 
research  
This study relied on published sources that are mainly secondary data. Secondary data 
are increasing becoming a standard source used in much social science research to 
answer complex questions, especially regarding behaviour (Davis‐Kean et al., 2015) 
that is often shaped by perception. This study is about understanding the arguments and 
actions of various stakeholders engaged in debates relating to public health risk. 
Therefore, published sources, were relied upon in this study because it was decided that 
published sources that captured stakeholder inputs, reflected the debates, and drew 
differentially on evidence and experts, would provide greater insight to each of the 
cases, and would be more readily comparable across cases. Published sources were also 
not prone to the type of selective or post-hoc reflections that might be inherent in 
interviews. There are other advantages associated with the use of published data, 
including saving cost and time (Cowton, 1998) and they are often readily available and 
easy to obtain (Davis‐Kean et al., 2015). However, the use of published data does not 
come without disadvantages. These include reduced control over the data generation, 
which requires extra effort in understanding the nature and production of the data 
(Cowton, 1998). Also the issue of bias (deliberate or unintentional or due to intrusions) 
may arise, as there is the danger of misinterpreting the data and drawing unwarranted 
conclusions. However, by taking extra care in making interpretations (Stewart and 
Kamins, 1993), and considering data within the contexts in which they were generated, 
this issue was adequately resolved in this study. 
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5.5.1 Sources of Data 
The data collected in this study were retrieved from archival and documentary records. 
Archival and documentary records were used because they contain the exact information 
about names, references, date and details of events, and also have broad coverage from 
a long time span of many events and contexts (Yin, 2011, Yin, 2013). However, the 
nature of this data entails that the evidence used was not created for the specific purpose 
of this study. Documentary data sources also enable the identification of key features of 
event that unfolded within the debate, and to establish and test the validity of 
interpretations (Briggs et al., 2012). It also provides the correct context and culture in 
which information is generated (Briggs et al., 2012); this is essential in making careful 
interpretations and drawing conclusions. The sources of evidence used include 
published peer reviewed articles, press releases and statements, official documents from 
government departments and organisations, reports from non-profit organisations, 
scientific committee reports, official statements and announcements of public health 
institutions, media sources and newspaper publications.  
 
The data collected for the analysis of smoking covered the periods between 1950 and 
1998. The data collected for the analysis of vaping risk covered the period between 2008 
and Month 2016 as the vaping debate was still ongoing as at the time of the study data 
collection. The MMR debate was examined from the period of 1998, following the 
publication of (Wakefield et al., 1998) until 2003. The dates varied because the period 
of interest within each of the debates is the period between the emergence of the risk 
debate until a policy consideration (or formulation). Therefore, the period of 
consideration of each case study varied. The data gathering took place between April 
2014 and May 2016.  
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Table 5.2: Sources of Data Collected  
 
Source Smoking and Vaping Case Study MMR Case Study 
E.g. of some of the Authors Type of information 
sourced 
No of 
source
s used 
E.g. of some of the Authors Type of 
information 
sourced 
No of 
source
s used 
Peer 
Reviewed 
Literature 
-Doll and Hill, 1950  
-Fisher, 1958 
-Peto and Beral, 2010 
-Bullen et al., 2010 
-McCauley et al., 2012 
-Scientific study  
-Scientific study  
-Expert Narratives 
-Scientific study  
-Scientific study  
 
> 50 -Wakefield et al., 1998 
- Taylor et al, 1999 
-Elliman and Bedford, 2001 
-Farrington et al., 2001 
-Fitzpatrick, 2004 
-Scientific study  
-Scientific study  
-Expert narratives  
- Scientific study 
-expert narratives 
>14 
No peer 
reviewed 
literature 
-Tobacco publicly 
available document e.g. 
memorandum, statements, 
and announcement 
-Notes of a Meeting at 
London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine 
-Industry annual report 
-Report of the WHO 
Expert Committee on 
Smoking Control 
-Industry Narratives 
 
 
-Narratives 
-Expert Narratives 
  
>10 -Press release and statements 
-Cassidy 2005 
 
-Deer 2004 
-Expert Narratives 
-Citizens / expert 
 
-Expert narratives 
>6 
Electronic 
and print 
media 
-BBC news  
 
-Daily times 
 
-Guardian 
 
-Mail UK 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
 
>20 -BBC news  
 
-Daily times 
 
-The Telegraph 
 
-The times UK  
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
-Citizens / expert  
Narratives 
 
>15 
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Govt. 
document
s and 
Gazettes 
-Department of Health 
reports (online) 
-Central Health Services 
Committee (CHSC) report 
-Standing Advisory 
Committee on Cancer and 
Radiotherapy report 
-Scientific Committee on 
Tobacco and Health 
(SCOTH) Review  
Medical Research council 
report 
-Government Directives, 
Act, Regulations 
European Union 
Directives, Act and 
Regulations 
UK government white 
paper on tobacco  
-Action on smoking and 
health (ASH) UK Reports 
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
 
- Policy Narratives 
 
 
-Public and expert 
Narratives 
 
>19 - Medical Research Council 
(MRC)  
-(Medicines Control Agency 
and Department of Health, 
2001 
-Central Health Services 
Committee (CHSC) report 
-Committee on Safety of 
Medicines report 
-Standing Advisory 
Committee on Cancer and 
Radiotherapy report 
-Department of Health 
reports 
- Policy statements and 
announcements 
 
- expert  Narratives 
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives  
 
- expert  Narratives 
 
 
- expert  Narratives 
- expert  Narratives 
>10 
Total no. 
of sources 
  >100   >45 
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Table 5.2, provides details of the sources of data collection and the nature of 
information collected from them. All the data collected in this study were collected 
online using the Google search engine, with word search. The search words used for 
the smoking and vaping debate include: smoking debate, smoking controversy, 
tobacco controversy, UK smoking debate, UK smoking news, policy response on 
smoking debate, UK electronic cigarette controversy, vaping debate on the news, UK 
policy response on vaping debate. The search words used for the measles, mumps and 
rubella (MMR) debate include: MMR debate, UK MMR controversy, MMR on the 
new, Dr. Wakefield, Justice, Awareness and Basic Support and Brain Deer and MMR.  
 
The data collected in this study were rich and extensive; it was possible to draw on 
rich accounts from published arguments and the worldviews of the assorted 
stakeholders (identified in  
Table 5.1) engaged in the public health risk debates. Some of the views used in this 
study are analyses and interpreted accounts of third parties (e.g. researchers) - this has 
been referenced accordingly. In addition to archival and documentary evidence, the 
researcher attended workshops and seminars where investigating scientists discussed 
the emerging evidence in particular relating to the vaping debate, as the controversy 
was on-going at this time.   
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Table 5.3 describes the key themes probed in the collection of the data, and explored 
the role of power and expertise in risk communication in United Kingdom. These 
questions will be used to structure the analysis of the case study chapters.   
 
  
 
93 
 
Table 5.3: Data Collection Protocol 
Themes: 
 
1. How did the risk debate emerge and evolve? 
2. Who were the key stakeholders involved (elaborate on their nature, size, 
and resources)? 
3. Upon whom lies the burden of proof? 
4. Whose questions where asked in the policy inquiry relating to the risk? 
5. Whose expertise was called upon in the policy inquiry relating to the risk?  
6. How did the various stakeholders frame the risk? 
7. What was the nature of language used in the risk communication? 
8. What were the nature, source and availability of information, evidence, 
and knowledge? 
9. What risk perspective was legitimised, who made the decision and where 
did the power come from? 
10. What policy strategies were put in place?  
11. What events occurred to enhance or curtail trust and credibility? 
 
 
5.6 Analysing Published Data Using 
Documentary Analysis 
In analysing the data collected, close attention was put to the sources, description and 
scope of published sources used, sampling frames, and summaries of data collection 
procedures etc. Data were analysed within the rich and complex context of the 
knowledge sought, typically known as document analysis. Document analysis is a 
social science analysis method used for reviewing or evaluating both printed and 
electronic material (Bowen, 2009). Similar to other methods of textual interpretation, 
like content analysis, document analysis requires that the data be examined and 
interpreted in order to elicit meaning, gain understanding, and develop empirical 
knowledge (Corbin and Strauss, 2008, Rapley, 2008). 
 
The process of presenting and analysing data in this study initially involved the 
researcher familiarising herself with evolving events and gaining a good 
understanding of each case study (Elo and Kyngäs, 2008). As case study research often 
examines research over time; evidence provided in this study is presented in 
chronological order (Sandelowski, 2000, Baxter and Jack, 2008) so as to explore the 
selected public health risk debates as they occur. However, one danger highlighted by 
Yin (2013) in using this structure of data presentation is the often disproportionate 
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attention given to the different stages of the evolving case study where the earlier part 
typically receives most attention, and the latter part the least attention. However this 
problem can be overcome with systematic planning and drafting the cases in actual 
and reverse order (Yin, 2013). This was not a simple process but involved multiple 
reiteration processes and this allowed the researcher to determine what was relevant 
or not to the research theme.  
 
This study involved collection of information (data) regarding the evolution of events 
from published sources that were not designed for the purpose for this study, which 
meant that there was a large amount of rich, complex data to be explored. One way of 
managing this complex set of data was to examine each event and how it related to the 
research themes under study. Effort was made to analyse each in the context in which 
it occurred and to interpret evolving events within the study research themes. A key 
task in this study is to highlight how power, expertise, communication and trust shape 
social amplification (or attenuation) processes in public health risk communication 
within the policy domain. The period of focus in the evolving event covered the 
emergence of the debate until a policy consideration or formulation. Therefore, the 
period of consideration of each case study varies. Some years may have been excluded 
because of lack of relevant data or difficulty in retrieving data from a credible 
published source. 
 
5.7 Research Ethics 
Ethical considerations of this research are not similar to those encountered in primary 
data collection; there is no need for anonymity or pseudonyms because names and 
information (or data) are already openly available. However, the need to avoid bias 
while striving for the highest ethical standards is critical in conducting scientific 
research (Resnik, 2011). Therefore, this study paid attention not only to the sources of 
information used for data collection but also where possible issues of distortion. One 
way of avoiding distortion in this study was to compare the interpretations made by 
the researcher with the interpretations of others in published sources, which can be 
said to be one of the strength of using published sources. Other issues deemed critical 
in conducting a reliable case study research are avoiding plagiarising or falsifying 
statements, being honest, avoiding deception and accepting responsibility for one’s 
own work (Yin, 2015). In this study, care was taken to refer to relevant arguments 
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within extant literature and this was referenced accordingly. In the interpretation and 
analysis of the data, the researcher was open to contrary findings and was as honest as 
possible stating clearly where the theory and hypothesis matched with the data 
collected and where it did not, and effort was made to avoid deception of any form. 
Ethical standards also involve maintaining a strong professional competence by 
keeping up with related research, ensuring accuracy, striving for credibility and 
understanding, and divulging any necessary methodological qualifiers and limitations 
(Yin, 2015). The researcher kept updating the arguments made throughout this study 
by reading new and recent literature. Finally, the sources of and actual data are 
presented in ways that allow replication to enhance the reliability of the study.  
 
5.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter describes the study design; the methodology and method used to address 
the research aim and objectives – a qualitative case study research that uses a social 
constructionist and interpretivist approach - detailing the rationale behind these 
choices. It explains the significance of reflecting on well-published, internationally 
relevant debates and justifies the approach taken. It was also decided that published 
sources that captured stakeholder inputs, reflected the debates, drew differentially on 
evidence and experts, would provide greater insight to each of the cases and would 
therefore be more readily comparable across cases. Effort was also made to explicate 
how the data or evidence in this study was collected and analysed, considering the 
complex and large quantities of published data available online. 
 
The next three chapters (six, seven and eight) are the findings and analysis chapters of 
this thesis. Chapter nine is the discussion chapter that discusses the findings through 
the lens of the PERC framework set out in chapter four and the implication for risk 
communication is discussed thereafter. Chapter ten is the second discussion chapter 
that provides a detailed account of how power and expertise shapes social 
amplification (or attenuation) in risk communication before the final conclusion in 
chapter eleven.   
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6 The Smoking Health Risk Debate 
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6.1 Introduction  
This chapter is the first result chapter of the thesis. It examines the smoking risk debate 
and assesses evidence on how power and expertise and also communication and trust 
might shape public health risk communication in a policy context. This case study 
particularly evidences how salient power exercised by stakeholder groups may shape 
public health communication and its associated policymaking.  The events that 
unfolded within these debates are presented in chronological order (justified in chapter 
five) and analysed within the context of the research themes. The period examined in 
the smoking risk debate was not evenly subdivided according to the numbers of years 
but on the basis of how the researcher felt and judged that the evolving events were 
significant to the research themes in allowing initial analysis within the presentation 
of the evolving events. The first period examined the UK smoking debate between 
1950 and 1955; the second period covered the debate between 1956 and 1965; and the 
third period examined the unfolding events within the smoking debate between the 
periods of 1966 and 1998. Together, these periods covered the emergence of the 
smoking debate in the UK to the point when concrete precautionary and policy 
measures were put in place.  
 
The chapter begins by presenting the evolving events in the three aforementioned 
phases. The results are then analysed within the context of the PERC framework and 
those findings are highlighted that relate to social amplification (or attenuation) of 
smoking risk within the policy domain 
 
 
6.2 The smoking risk debate (1950 -1955) 
In September 1950, the first large-scale epidemiological study published in the British 
Medical Journal suggested a ‘real association’ between tobacco and lung cancer (Doll 
and Hill, 1950b). Doll and Hill (1950a) examined the relationship between smoking 
and lung cancer and concluded that of the 1,357 men with lung cancer in the study, 
99.5% were smokers. The researchers interviewed 5,000 patients in British hospitals 
and established a statistical relationship between smoking and lung cancer (Doll and 
Hill, 1950b). Earlier that year, two studies published in the issue Journal of the 
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American Medical Association (JAMA) came to similar conclusions (Wynder and 
Graham, 1950, Levin et al., 1950). The initial reaction to Doll and Hill’s (1950a) 
publication of a link between smoking and lung cancer from the scientific and medical 
communities (Lopez, 1999) and even amongst public experts, was one of scepticism. 
Smoking at this point was considered a natural and sophisticated behaviour and was 
allowed everywhere including in offices, pubs, restaurants, cinemas, and all transport 
systems (Peto et al., 2000).  
 
Six months after Doll and Hill’s (1950) publication, two key Government advisory 
groups, Central Health Services Committee (CHSC) and Standing Advisory 
Committee on Cancer and Radiotherapy, accepted Doll and Hills findings and advised 
the government that the link between smoking tobacco and lung cancer was proven 
(CHSC and SACCR, 1951). The groups examining smoking and health reports that  
 
“Professor Bradford Hill and Dr Doll are satisfied that the case against 
smoking as such is proven” (CHSC and SACCR, 1951).  
 
This acceptance of Doll and Hill’s conclusion is evidence of the weight given to 
technical expertise within the policy domain, and highlights the power of stakeholder 
relationships in bringing about hegemony of risk discourse. This acceptance also 
shows how technical expertise and power exercised through stakeholder relationships 
play an important role in shaping the transition of risk argument towards the under 
critical model in a policy context.  In November of 1952, Richard Doll and Bradford 
Hill published a second paper in the BMJ extending their investigation (which had 
been initially limited to the London area) to Bristol, Cambridge, Leeds and Newcastle-
upon-Tyne (Doll and Hill, 1952). This second study reached a similar conclusion to 
the first, establishing a statistical link between smoking tobacco and lung cancer. 
However, in February of 1953, the CHSC received a report from Imperial Tobacco 
Statistical Department attempting to disapprove Doll and Hill’s claims that smoking 
is linked to lung cancer (Teague, 1953). The Chairman of Imperial Tobacco in a 
statement to shareholders stated that  
 
“If it should ever be proved that there exists something harmful in tobacco, 
even in the minutest quantities, which could conceivably make smoking 
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one of the causes of this disease [cancer], we should, I hope, be the first to 
take steps to eliminate it” (Chairman of Imperial Tobacco Statement, 
1953). 
 
The above statement from the representative of Imperial Tobacco Statistical 
Department suggests that the company understood the importance of trust in shaping 
the risk debate as they demanded they should be trusted; this is evidenced by “if….. 
They will be the first to act ….”. Later that year, a statistical panel setup by the Chief 
Medical Officer at the Ministry of Health to look at the relationship between smoking 
and cancer confirmed a statistical connection between smoking and lung cancer.  The 
Ministry of Health stated that  
 
“We are therefore of the opinion that the main conclusion reached by Doll 
and Hill, that there is a real association between smoking and cancer of the 
lung, is firmly established” (Statistical Panel and MoH report, 1953). 
 
It is important to note that the nature of evidence as this point was still statistical. The 
first ever study to show a biological link between tobacco and lung cancer was 
published in December of 1953. The research found that painting cigarette tar on the 
backs of mice created tumours (Wynder et al., 1953). In March of 1955, the CHSC 
advised the Minister for Health to take appropriate action in informing the public of 
the dangers of tobacco and heavy smoking.” (CHSC and SACCR, 1956). They 
asserted that  
 
“It must be regarded as established that there is a relationship between 
smoking and cancer of the lung” (CHSC and SACCR, 1953). 
 
In January of 1954, the UK Health Minister accepted the link between tobacco and 
lung cancer, while being cautious around the fact that evidence of how smoking is 
linked to lung cancer remains weak. In a memo written to the Cabinet Home Affairs 
Committee, the minister stated that  
 
“[I have] come to the conclusion that the statistical evidence does point to 
a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer, but that 
there are important qualifications. There is no precise evidence of how 
tobacco smoking causes lung cancer or indeed of the extent to which one 
causes the other” (Minister of Health, 1954). 
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As more evidence continued to point to a link between smoking and lung cancer, see 
(Hammond and Horn, 1954, Doll and Hill, 1954), a group of leading tobacco 
manufacturers in the UK, including BAT, Gallaher and Imperial, denied a link 
between tobacco and lung cancer. They argued that more biological evidence would 
be needed before any such assertions could be made. The industry offered £250,000 
to aid the research of the Medical Research Council (MRC) and expressed in a 
statement that  
 
“This can only be the case when medical science is able to provide a causal 
proof to the claim” (Statement Issued by the Group of Leading Tobacco 
Manufacturers, 1954). 
 
Despite the strong acknowledgement of the results of Dr Doll and Prof Hill publication 
by the medical and scientific community, and public health experts at this point, the 
evolving events suggest that no immediate action was put in place by the UK 
government to mitigate the dangers of smoking to public health. Aside from the fact 
that smoking was considered a normal thing to do in the 1950’s, the initial response 
by the government (inactivity) can also be said to be partly conditioned by a number 
of factors within this period. Firstly, it involves the role of the tobacco industry and its 
financial importance to the UK government. British tobacco companies paid huge 
taxes and were a source of huge employment in Britain. As such, the government may 
not have wanted to interfere with this (at least until there was an alternative source of 
income and employment). It is possible that for economic reasons, the government 
turned a blind eye to the excesses of tobacco companies and the dangers of smoking 
to public health. Besides, public experts and politicians were concerned about the 
nature of epidemiological evidence as noted above in the Ministers of Health’s 
statement in 1954. Advising a change to such ingrained societal culture or behaviour 
would require evidence and communication over a good period of time to achieve the 
desired behavioural goal.  
 
Table 6.1: UK Tax Revenue from the tobacco 
Source: HM revenue and Custom (HMRC) and Tobacco Manufacturing Association 
(TMA) 
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 presents revenue from sales of all tobacco in the UK including excise duty and taxes 
(between the 1990 and 2011). The table indicates the economic importance of the 
tobacco industry to the UK economy. 
 
 
Table 6.1: UK Tax Revenue from the tobacco 
Source: HM revenue and Custom (HMRC) and Tobacco Manufacturing Association 
(TMA) 
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Table 6.2 (below) summarises and presents the chronology of unfolding events 
relating to the smoking debate during the period between 1950 and 1955. 
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Table 6.2: Chronology of events unfolding in the smoking risk (1950 – 1955) 
 
Year  Event 
1950 i. September - The first large-scale statistical study by Richard Doll and Professor (subsequently Sir) Austin Bradford Hill 
suggested a ‘real association’ between tobacco and lung cancer (Doll and Hill, 1950b). 
ii. Another study carried out in the US had earlier that same year come to a similar conclusion (Wynder and Graham, 
1950). 
1951 iii. March - Central Health Services Committee (CHSC) and Standing Advisory Committee on Cancer and Radiotherapy, 
supports Professor Bradford Hill and Dr Doll’s research findings. (CHSC and SACCR, 1951). 
1952 iv. November - Richard Doll and Bradford Hill publish a second paper in the BMJ extending their investigation (which 
was initially limited to the London area),to Bristol, Cambridge, Leeds and Newcastle-upon-Tyne (Doll and Hill, 1952). 
v. November - Representatives from Imperial Tobacco (John Partridge, Secretary and Director, D. A. Clark and G. F. 
Todd) met with Dr Green from the MRC, and Professor Bradford Hill and Dr Doll. Dr. Green expressed that “It was 
pretty clear to me that Mr Partridge and his colleagues felt that Hill had answered all their queries in a way which left 
hardly any loophole for doubt, though they were reluctant to concede this.” (Green, 1952) (ash.org.uk). 
1953 vi. February - The CHSC received a report from Imperial Tobacco Statistical Department attempting to refute Doll and 
Hill’s claims that smoking is linked to lung cancer (Teague, 1953). 
vii. March - in a statement to shareholders, The Chairman of Imperial Tobacco states that “If it should ever be proved that 
there exists something harmful in tobacco, even in the minutest quantities, which could conceivably make smoking one 
of the causes of this disease [cancer], we should, I hope, be the first to take steps to eliminate it” (Chairman of Imperial 
Tobacco Statement, 1953). 
viii. November - The statistical panel setup by the Chief Medical Officer at the Ministry of Health confirms a connection 
between smoking and lung cancer. The Ministry of Health asserted that  “we are therefore of the opinion that the main 
conclusion reached by Doll and Hill, that there is a real association between smoking and cancer of the lung, is firmly 
established” (Statistical Panel and MoH report, 1953). 
ix. December - A study by Wynder et al (1953) suggested that painting cigarette tar on the back of mice creates tumours 
(Wynder et al., 1953). This study became the first to provide an experimental, biological link between smoking and 
cancer. 
x. The Standing Cancer And Radiography Advisory Committee reporting to the Central Health Services Council, which 
in turn advises the Minister of Health (MH) recommended that the relationship between smoking and cancer of the lung 
must be regarded as established (CHSC and SACCR, 1953). 
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1954 xi. January - UK Health Minister writes a memo to the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee stating that I have “come to the 
conclusion that the statistical evidence does point to a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer, 
but that there are important qualifications. There is no precise evidence of how tobacco smoking causes lung cancer or 
indeed of the extent to which one causes the other” (Minister of Health, 1954). 
xii. February - The Daily Mirror reported that “The great smoking controversy has been flung into the arena of public 
discussion again by yesterday's announcement in Parliament that an apparent link between smoking and cancer of the 
lung has been established.” 
xiii. March - Group of leading tobacco manufacturers in the UK including BAT, Gallaher and Imperial in a statement denied 
that there is any proof that smoking causes lung cancer. They stated that this can only be shown to be the case when 
medical science is able to establish a causal explanation for the claim. They however offered £250,000 to fund MRC 
research in this arena (Statement Issued by the Group of Leading Tobacco Manufacturers, 1954). 
xiv. June - A study published by Cuyler Hammond of the American cancer society and Daniel Horn on 187,766 men aged 
between 50-69, shows that around 65 per cent of smokers died in the 50-54 age range than non-smokers and about 60 
per cent greater in 55-59 and 102 per cent greater in 60-64 age range (Hammond and Horn, 1954) 
xv. June – a study which examined British doctors published by Doll and Hill found that out of 789 doctors who had died 
all were smokers with 35 of them dying of lung cancer (Doll and Hill, 1954).  
1955 xvi. March - CHSC advises the Minister for Health to take appropriate action by informing the public of the dangers of 
tobacco and heavy smoking.”(CHSC and SACCR, 1956). 
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The burden of proof (between the period of 1950 and 1955) lay on the shoulders of 
the tobacco industry and public health authorities. In the 1950’s, the tobacco industry 
mainly produced tobacco cigarettes (and cigars) and would have needed to make a 
case for the continued existence of its business in the face of claims suggesting that 
smoking is a significant factor leading to lung cancer. For the tobacco industry, the 
acceptance of this suggestion would question its very existence; capable of prompting 
mass legal actions, which would be detrimental to the industry’s financial assets. The 
industry largely shared the burden to proof that tobacco cigarettes were safe for public 
consumption because this was not only about profit but also an issue of morality and 
ethics. The UK government and public health institutions also shared in the burden of 
proof as they were charged with the responsibility of protecting and informing the 
public of the nature of risks faced. In addition, the uncertainty about a causal 
explanation meant that before they could advise the public of a change in smoking 
behaviour, more substantial evidence would be needed. Table 6.3 present a sample 
text of stakeholder’s initial reactions to the suggestion that smoking is linked to lung 
cancer (between 1950 and 1955). However due to limited (or lack of) data, it has not 
been possible to retrieve any narratives from ordinary citizens. 
 
Table 6.3 Sample text of stakeholder reaction to the suggestion that smoking is 
linked to lung cancer (between 1950 and 1955) 
 
Stakeholders Sample text 
Scientific 
committees  
“it must be concluded that there is a real association between 
carcinoma of the lung and smoking” (Doll and Hill, 1950b). 
Policy 
makers 
/public health 
institution 
“We are therefore of the opinion that the main conclusion 
reached by Doll and Hill, that there is a real association 
between smoking and cancer of the lung, is firmly established” 
(Statistical Panel and MoH report, 1953). 
Technical 
experts  
 
Excessive and prolonged use of tobacco, especially cigarettes, 
seems to be an important factor in the induction of 
bronchiogenic carcinoma (Levin et al., 1950) p.336. Tobacco 
as a Possible Cause of lung cancer (Wynder and Graham, 
1950). 
The tobacco 
Industry 
representativ
es 
“If it should ever be proved that there exists something 
harmful in tobacco, even in the minutest quantities, which 
could conceivably make smoking one of the causes of this 
disease [cancer], we should, I hope, be the first to take steps 
to eliminate it” (Chairman of Imperial Tobacco Statement, 
1953). 
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Media 
sources 
“The great smoking controversy has been flung into the arena 
of public discussion again by yesterday's announcement in 
Parliament that an apparent link between smoking and cancer 
of the lung has been established.” (DailyMirror, 1954) 
Public -  
 
 
 
6.3 The smoking debate (1956 and 1965) 
The period between 1956 and 1965 saw greater weight of evolving scientific evidence 
giving credence to the claim that smoking is linked to lung cancer (Schwartz and 
Denoix, 1957, Stocks, 1958, Haenszel et al., 1958, Dorn, 1959, Doll et al., 1957, 
Hilding, 1956, Kotin and Falk, Auerbach et al., 1957, Chang, 1957, Leuchtenberger et 
al., 1958, Bock and Moore, 1959, Engelbreth‐Holm and Ahlmann, 1957, Gellhorn, 
1958, Orris et al., 1958, Lyons and Johnston, 1957, Van Duuren, 1958, Wynder and 
Wright, 1957, Wynder et al., 1958); although most studies remained statistical. The 
absence or near absence of any causal proof (biological or experimental evidence) may 
be due to the fact that it is difficult and costly in terms of time and financial resources 
to generate, or even because it was ‘intentionally’ avoided, since a causal proof would 
be too damaging for the tobacco industry. This perhaps, is one reason why 
representatives of the industry were fiercely engaged in undermining the technical 
case linking smoking and lung cancer. They argued that more research is needed 
before any causal association or claim can be established. 
 
The evolving events within this period shows that in February of 1956, a study 
published by Dr Ernest Wynder and his colleagues found a link between the risk of 
developing larynx cancer and an increase in the amount of smoke consumed (Wynder 
et al., 1956). In a letter to Sir John Hawton, Ministry of Health, tobacco industry 
reassures government of their commitment to public health.  
  
“There is no proof at all that smoking causes lung cancer and much to 
suggest that it cannot be the cause” (Partridge, 1956)…“We would regard 
it an elementary duty and responsibility to leave nothing undone that we 
can do to secure the eradication of anything in tobacco which is found to 
be harmful to health” (Partridge, 1956). 
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The above statement again is an indication of the demand for public trust by 
representatives of tobacco industry. However, this demand for trust was complimented 
by a call for moderation in smoking. In a statement to shareholders, the chairperson 
noted that  
 
“Excessive smoking, like excessive eating or excessive drinking - cannot 
be good for anyone; but equally obviously what is excessive to one person 
may be harmless to another” (Imperial Tobacco Company, 1956). 
 
In May, the Minister of Health, Mr. Turton, argued in the House of Commons for the 
government to take a precautionary stance on tobacco control. He explained that:  
 
“Two known cancer-causing agents have been identified in tobacco 
smoke, but whether they have a direct role in producing lung cancer, and 
if so what, has not been proved...The fact that a causal relationship has not 
yet been recognised should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there is, 
statistically, an incontrovertible association between cigarette smoking 
and the incidence of lung cancer…“mortality from lung cancer is twenty 
times greater amongst heavy smokers than amongst non-smokers” 
(Turton, 1956). 
 
However, despite the seeming consensus as noted above (see also Table 6.2, events v, 
viii, x, xi, xvi) and a push by key government official that smoking was linked to lung 
cancer, the evolving events suggest no immediate or considerable action was taken by 
the government at this point. In August of 1956, the Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing 
Committee (TMSC) is formed by British Tobacco manufacturers (TMSC First Annual 
Report, 1956). The establishment of Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee 
(TMSC) increased the industry’s capacity to exercise stronger power over scientific 
evidence and its interpretation.  In June of 1957, the MRC published a five-year report 
“Tobacco Smoking and Cancer of the Lung”. The report, which was accepted by the 
minister of health, links the increase in the deaths of lung cancer with smoking, 
especially cigarettes. The report states that:  
 
“The most reasonable interpretation of scientific evidence is that the 
relationship is one of direct cause and effect”… “The identification of 
several carcinogenic substances in tobacco smoke provides a rational basis 
for such a causal relationship” (MRC Report, 1957).  
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The minister in his statement equated this statistical evidence to a causal proof. 
However, representatives of the tobacco industry immediately challenged his 
contention. A statement from representative of TMSC for instance reads that: 
 
“It has not been established with any certainty whether and to what extent 
there may be a causal relationship between smoking and cancer of the 
lung. At this stage any conclusions are a matter of opinion” (Tobacco 
Manufacturers’ Standing Committee, 1957).   
 
Dismissing the causal proof claim, the TMSC in December of 1957 issued a report 
“Smoking and Lung Cancer - The Conflict of Opinion” stressing the conflicting 
opinions of experts on factors that cause lung cancer. In July of 1958, the evolution of 
the event suggests that another hypothesis has emerged. For instance, Fisher (1958) 
suggested that an individual’s ‘genes’ might predispose such a person to smoking and 
cancer. Fisher who later became a consultant for TMSC argued that the smoking 
causal hypothesis was unproven. He noted that the genetic hypothesis was more 
plausible as supported by new evidence - a result of an enquiry into the smoking habits 
of adult male twin pairs on their list (Fisher, 1958). Fisher in his study examined 51 
monozygotic or ‘identical’ twins (developed from one zygote that splits and forms two 
embryos) and 31 dizygotic or ‘fraternal’ twins (developed from two eggs, each 
fertilized by separate sperm cells) from Tubingen, FrankFurt and Berlin (Fisher, 
1959). He concluded that genotype exercises a considerable influence on smoking 
behaviour and on the particular smoking habit adopted. The study noted that different 
genotype groups would be expected to differ in incidences of cancer. 
 
In discrediting Doll and Hill’s hypothesis, Fisher concentrated on the negative 
correlation between inhaling and lung cancer in their 1950 study. He questioned the 
MRC conclusions of Doll and Hill (1950) study arguing that they were jumping from 
the observation of an association to the conclusion of a causal relationship. To 
emphasise the point, Fisher noted that if the MRC were to jump to a conclusion on the 
case of inhaling, it would lead to a conclusion that cigarettes cause cancer but that 
inhaling cigarettes prevents it. Further study also emerged in support of the genetic 
hypothesis. In 1960, Eysenck criticised the causal hypothesis, noting that smoking has 
ameliorating effects with respect to lung cancer (Eysenck et al., 1960).  
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Royal College of Physicians (RCP) First Report  
 
The Royal College of Physicians (RCP) research committee looking into smoking and 
atmospheric pollution in relation to carcinoma of the lungs and other diseases 
published its first report in March of 1962. The report, entitled “Smoking and Health” 
concluded that cigarette smoking causes lung cancer and bronchitis (RCP Report, 
1962). The report also noted that smoking was the most likely cause of the recent 
worldwide increase in deaths from lung disease. The report says that smoking related 
death was higher in Britain than in any other country in the world, and that lung cancer 
exposes people to the risk of developing chronic bronchitis and coronary heart disease, 
particularly in early middle age. The report recommended restriction on tobacco 
advertising; increased taxation on cigarettes; more restrictions on the sales of 
cigarettes to children and on smoking in public places; and more information on the 
tar/nicotine content of cigarettes. The recommendations from this RCP report became 
the core of tobacco control policies worldwide over the next 60 years (RCP Report, 
2012) and became the origin of many of the arguments that arose within the tobacco 
debate.  
 
The RCP report received widespread publicity on the day of publication, and there 
was a press conference to disseminate the findings - a technique used to announce 
scientific conclusions of high interest to the general public. In 1962, about 70% of men 
and 40% of women in the UK smoked. Smoking was allowed everywhere including 
on trains, buses, at work, even in schools and hospitals. BBC archive footage on the 
Tonight programme, which was aired on the night of the publication, captured public 
opinion on the suggestion that tobacco causes lung cancer (Hughes, 2012). One man 
who smoked between 20 and 25 cigarettes per day says: 
 
“Quite honestly, I think that the end of one’s life is probably more in the 
hands of almighty God you know, than in my own hands or the hands of 
the tobacco manufacturers.” 
 
Another interviewee explains that  
“I think so, yes. If I’m going to die, I’m going to die, so I might as well 
enjoy life as it is now.” 
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A third interviewee mentioned how she tried to quit but was not able to manage beyond 
two days. Another thought that if she didn’t smoke she would be miserable. This 
suggests a deep-rooted smoking culture and societal acceptance of smoking in the 
1950/60’s. In response to the RCP report, G.F. Todd of Imperial tobacco stated that  
 
“there is no denial of the almost certain relationship between smoking and 
cancer of the lung although it is possible this is done in the light to confuse 
the issue” ( G.F. Todd, Comments on the RCP report, 1962). 
 
Days after the RCP report, John Partridge, an executive of Imperial tobacco, was 
interviewed featured on the BBC’s Panorama Programme (BBC panorama TV, 1962). 
He suggested that the RCP report expressed an “unbalanced picture” of existing 
knowledge, and uncertainties regarding smoking.  
 
“I do not believe that you will stop the people of this country from smoking 
…they know the odds are heavily against their coming to any real harm 
from it”.  
 
The Chairman of Imperial Tobacco Company, R W S Clark, in an address to the 
annual general meeting debunked the idea that commercial interest was the main 
motivation for the position of the industry on statistical evidence suggesting a 
link between smoking and other diseases. The Chairman seeking public trust 
said that: 
 
 “It has been said or implied in a number of quarters that the position taken 
up by the manufacturers is heavily biased by the fact our commercial 
interests are involved. I want to say quite categorically that any such 
imputation is completely unjustified and unfair. It is, of course, self-
evident that the industry’s commercial interests are involved, but the 
tobacco manufacturers also fully recognise their responsibility to the 
public …” (Clarke, 1962). 
 
Sir Charles Ellis, from BAT R&D Department in the BAT annual research conference 
suggested that the interpretation given to statistical links between smoking and lung 
cancer was one with an ‘emotional gloss’:  
 
“We who have been immersed in the subject for many years know that this 
report produced no new fact, produced no new arguments, indeed, except 
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for the contribution of an emotional gloss, left the subject untouched. We 
know only too well that there are no conclusive proofs; that there are few, 
if any, cold scientific facts. However emotional conclusions cannot be 
disregarded …” (McCormick, 1962). 
 
In May of 1964, Doll and Hill published their third study on Tobacco and cancer. This 
time, a nationwide prospective survey was carried out on “mortality in relation to 
smoking: 10 year’s observations in British Doctors” (Doll and Hill, 1964). Three years 
earlier, the researchers had sent a short survey to 59,600 men and women whose names 
were on the British Medical Register and who were then resident in the United 
Kingdom. The study found that between 1951 and 1964 about half the UK’s doctors 
who smoked had given up. They also found that there was a dramatic fall in lung 
cancer incidence among those who gave up as opposed to those who continued to 
smoke (Doll and Hill, 1964). Table 6.4 summaries the evolving event between 
(between 1956 and 1965).  
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Table 6.4: Chronology of events in the smoking risk debate (between 1956 and 1965) 
 
Year  Event  
1956  i. February –Ernest Wynder and his colleagues found a link between the risk developing larynx cancer and increase in the 
amount of tobacco consumed (Wynder et al., 1956). 
ii. March – Imperial Tobacco debunks the link between tobacco and lung cancer stating in a letter to Sir John Hawton, 
Ministry of Health that “there is no proof at all that smoking causes lung cancer and much to suggest that it cannot be 
the cause” (Partridge, 1956).  
iii. March – A statement from UK leading tobacco companies states that “The evidence on the possible relationship of lung 
cancer and smoking is conflicting and incomplete”(Statement By A Group of Leading Tobacco Manufacturers in the 
UK, 1956). 
iv. May - In the house of commons, the Minister of Health, Mr. R. H. Turton takes a precautionary stance stating that “the 
fact that a causal relationship has not yet been recognised should not be allowed to obscure the fact that there is, 
statistically, an incontrovertible association between cigarette smoking and the incidence of lung cancer”(Turton, 1956). 
v. August - Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee (TMSC) is formed by the British Tobacco manufacturers 
(TMSC First Annual Report, 1956). 
1957 vi. June – A five year report “Tobacco Smoking and Cancer of the Lung” is published by the MRC. The report links the 
increase in the deaths to lung cancer from tobacco smoking, particularly in the form of cigarettes .  
vii. June – The Health Minister reported to the House of Common with a view that the interpretation of the MRC as the 
most credible interpretation and explanation for the increase in the death of lung cancer (MRC Report, 1957). 
viii. June – The TMSC responds by saying that: “It has not been established with any certainty whether and to what extent 
there may be a causal relationship between smoking and cancer of the lung. At this stage any conclusions are a matter 
of opinion” (Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee, 1957).   
ix. December - The TMSC issues a report “Smoking and Lung Cancer - The Conflict of Opinion” illustrating “the conflict 
of opinion that exits about the factors that may be active in lung cancer.  
1958 x. Other subsequent scientific studies that provided evidence that tobacco may be a link to lung cancer were (Schwartz 
and Denoix, 1957, Stocks, 1958, Haenszel et al., 1958, Dorn, 1959, Doll et al., 1957, Hilding, 1956, Kotin and Falk, 
Auerbach et al., 1957, Chang, 1957, Leuchtenberger et al., 1958, Bock and Moore, 1959, Engelbreth‐Holm and 
Ahlmann, 1957, Gellhorn, 1958, Orris et al., 1958, Lyons and Johnston, 1957, Van Duuren, 1958, Wynder and Wright, 
1957, Wynder et al., 1958). 
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xi. This surge of scientific evidence did not deter other technical experts from criticising the validity of the link between 
smoking and lung cancer see (Berkson, 1958, Fisher, 1959, Hueper, 1955, Berkson, Gilliam, 1955). 
xii. Another scientific hypothesis in the late 1950 suggest that an individual’s ‘genes’ may predispose such a individual to 
both ‘smoking’ and ‘cancer’ (Fisher, 1958).  
1962  xiii. March - The first report by the Royal College of Physicians (RCP) on “Smoking and Health” still of statistical nature 
concludes that cigarette is linked to cancer and other diseases (RCP Report, 1962).  
xiv. March - G.F. Todd of Imperial tobacco in response to the RCP report states “there is no denial of the almost certain 
relationship between smoking and cancer of the lung although it is possible this is done in the light to confuse the issue” 
( G.F. Todd, Comments on the RCP report, 1962). 
xv. March – the Chairman of Imperial Tobacco Company, R W S Clark, addressing the Annual General Meeting states that 
“…It is, of course, self-evident that the industry’s commercial interests are involved, but the tobacco manufacturers also 
fully recognise their responsibility to the public …a general condemnation of cigarette smoking is neither justified nor 
constructive” (Clarke, 1962). 
xvi. July – In the Annual BAT research conference, Sir Charles Ellis, from BAT R&D Department downplays the RCP 
report stating that “…We who have been immersed in the subject for many years know that this report produced no new 
fact, produced no new arguments” (McCormick, 1962).  
xvii. September - The TMSC opens chemical and biological laboratories at Harrogate. The Tobacco Institute issues a press 
release stating that: “The causes of cancer are not now known to science. Many factors are being studied along with 
tobacco. The case against tobacco is based largely on statistical associations, the meanings of which are in dispute” 
(Report of Special Master, 1998). 
1964 
 
xviii. May - Doll and Hill published further report of their study on Tobacco and cancer. This time, a nationwide prospective 
survey was carried out on “mortality in relation to smoking: 10 years' observations in British Doctors” (Doll and Hill, 
1964). Doll and Hill in 1961 sent a short survey sent to 59,600 men and women whose names were on the current British 
Medical Register and who were then resident in the United Kingdom. The study found that between 1951 and 1964 
about half the UK's doctors who smoked gave up and there was a dramatic fall in lung cancer incidence among those 
who gave up as opposed to those who continued to smoke (Doll and Hill, 1964). 
1965 xix. Television advertising of tobacco products is banned in the UK in 1965 under the ‘1964 Television Act’ (ash.org.uk). 
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After much pressure (mainly from the Standing Medical Advisory Committee 
(SMAC), The Central Health Services Council (CHSC), many MPs and the Chief 
Medical Officers at the Ministry of Health) on the government to enforce tobacco 
control, the first Government response came in 1965. Under the terms of the 1964 
Television Act, the UK government, after consultation with the Independent 
Television Authority, banned television advertising of tobacco products (ash.org.uk).  
 
 
6.4 The smoking risk debate (between 1966 
and 1998) 
 
The period between 1966 and 1998 is the largest period under assessment in this case 
study. This is because the evolution of events suggests that politicians and government 
public health departments had formed an ideology in which smoking was considered 
dangerous to health (see above paragraph). However, there was yet to be any concrete 
action from the government in mitigating the risks of smoking. The period between 
1966 and 1998 saw a ban on tobacco advertisement, greater protection of young 
children and a change of voluntary agreement governance (which was circumvented 
in some instances see (Smith, 1982) to legally binding rules in relation to advertising 
and selling tobacco cigarettes.  
 
Within this period, after consulting with the Independent Television Authority, under 
the terms of the 1964 Television Act, the Government banned television advertising 
of tobacco products by 1967 (ash.org.uk). Kenneth Robinson, Minister of Health in 
Parliament expressed the government’s intention of introducing legislation to control 
or ban how tobacco products are promoted (ash.org.uk). However, no immediate 
legislative action was put in place. By 1968, the UK government established Health 
Education Council (HEC), later re-organised as the Health Education Authority 
(HEA) to replace the existing Central Council for Health Education in England and 
Wales. In Scotland, the Scottish Health Education Unit (SHEU, later SHEG, now 
HEBS - Health Education Board for Scotland) was established to cover similar 
activities (McNair-Wilson, 1972) amongst which educating the public on the dangers 
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of smoking. In January of 1971, the second Royal College of Physicians report 
“Smoking and Health Now” was published. The report refers to the death toll caused 
by cigarette smoking as a present day “holocaust” increasing suffering and shortening 
the life of the public” (RCP Report, 1971). The report, like the first also received 
widespread publicity and caused a permanent drop of 5% in cigarette consumption 
(ash.org.uk). The Chief Medical Officer in a statement expressed concern that: 
 
“some 80,000 premature deaths probably occur in England and Wales 
each year and for the whole of the United Kingdom the number must 
approach 100,000 as a result of smoking” (Interdepartmental Group of 
Officials, 1971). 
 
 
The report also suggested a clear socio-economic divide in giving up smoking. Those 
in ‘professional classes’ (e.g. doctors) were giving up smoking; however, people in 
the ‘manual’ and ‘unwaged’ groups maintained their smoking behaviour. This 
suggested that there are distributive inequalities associated with the understanding of 
risk; those in poorer sections of society suffer most from errors in understanding risk. 
Following the publication, Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) was set up under 
RCP. Its remit was to make non-smoking the norm in society and to inform and 
educate the public about the death and disease caused by smoking. In march of 1971, 
the secretary of state for Health, Sir Keith Joseph, restated government position on its 
intention to control tobacco use but through voluntary agreement with the tobacco 
industry (ash.org.uk).  
 
In April of 1971, the first voluntary agreement between the government and tobacco 
industry was proposed. Its provisions included - all cigarette packs for sale in the UK 
should carry the words ‘Warning by HM Government: Smoking can damage your 
health’. All press and poster ads were to carry the reference: ‘Every pack carries a 
Government health warning’. The tobacco industry also agreed to establish a scientific 
liaison committee consisting of industry and Department of Health and Social Security 
(DHSS) nominated scientists to explore less dangerous forms of smoking and to devise 
a way of measuring tar/nicotine levels (ash.org.uk). By May 1971, health warnings 
were put on cigarettes in Britain - “Warning by HM Government: smoking can damage 
your health.” (ash.org.uk). In May of the same year, cigarette advertisements on radio 
were also banned in the UK. 
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In January of 1972, 132 MPs in the house of commons voted in favour of a total ban 
on cigarette advertising, 73 against (ash.org.uk). This signified political support for a 
ban on tobacco advertising and was essential at this point because advertisements for 
tobacco would be counter-productive to the government strategy of informing and 
educating the public on the dangers of smoking. The existing voluntary agreement was 
also extended to include ‘health hints’ on cigarette packs, brand ads at sports events 
and those sent through the post. In May of 1972, Richard Dobson who was to become 
Chairman of BAT, in a press release issued by the Tobacco Institute states that:  
 
“It’s hard to argue that filling your lungs with smoke can be actually good 
for you. But surely it is a question of moderation and I do sincerely believe 
that the tobacco industry, in total, does more good than harm”(ash.org.uk). 
 
By 1975, the UK tobacco industry’s joint research facilities in Harrogate were closed 
down (RJ Reynolds Research Department, 1976). In March, Sir John Partridge, from 
Imperial expressed the opinion that  
 
“As a company we do not make, indeed we are not qualified to make, 
medical judgements. We are therefore not in a position either to accept or 
to reject statements made by the Minister of Health”.  
 
The above statement suggests the industry was tempering its attack on the technical 
case linking smoking and lung cancer, now accepted by politicians and departments 
of government. In January of 1977, The HEC launched a TV campaign focusing on 
the rights of non-smokers and smoking by women. In April, P. L Short, from BAT 
writes a paper on “Smoking and Health: the Effect on Marketing”, commenting on the 
benefits of Smoking. The report found a direct cause and effect relationship between 
smoking and improved behaviour in individual ‘subjects’, in the course of 
experiments. Two months later, The royal college of physicians issued its third report 
on “Smoking or Health” (RCP Report, 1977). According to the report, coronary heart 
diseases are responsible for about half of the total excess deaths among cigarette 
smokers and that the association between smoking and heart disease is largely one of 
cause and effect” (RCP Report, 1977). In May of 1978, a finance bill ‘Clause 1’ which 
provided for extra taxation on high-tar cigarettes was debated and adopted in a 
Parliamentary Committee, despite opposition from the tobacco industry. Also a 
motion tabled by Sir George and signed by 54 MPs, called for a complete ban on 
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tobacco advertising (ash.org.uk). A year later, the World Health Organisation issued 
a report “Controlling the Smoking Epidemic”. The report which received wide 
publicity recommends a total prohibition of all forms of tobacco promotion (Alderson, 
1979). In November, the Operating Procedure Codes (OPC) report showed a drastic 
increase in the number of women dying within the last decade. In January of 1980, Dr. 
Green from BAT wrote a paper on Cigarette Smoking and Causality. In the paper, he 
stated that:  
 
“The cigarette industry has made a great issue of cause and effect 
relationships in response to the many published studies associating 
smoking with various diseases. Some might say that the industry has led 
the anti-smoking forces up the garden path by emphasising so much the 
issue of causality; in fact scientific proof never has been, is not and should 
not be the basis for political and legal action on social issues; the test is 
‘What would a reasonable man do faced with the evidence?’ Nevertheless 
many have been led or misled successfully with ‘scientific proof” (Green, 
1980). 
  
In April of 1980, Patrick Sheehy, former chairperson of BAT wrote to BBC Panorama 
about the continuing controversy in scientific circles regarding causation. He wrote 
that:  
 
“Scientists are [by] no means unanimous regarding smoking and health 
issues … we would therefore ask you to ensure that the programme 
disassociates the views of the scientist in question [Dr Green] from those 
of this company by making an appropriate statement to this effect in the 
programme” ( P. Sheehy, Letter to the BBC, 1980). 
 
BBC Panorama programme aired its report on the tobacco industry, revealing that the 
chairperson of the Tobacco Advisory Council is on the Sports council. It also showed 
in-depth how the industry refuses to acknowledge publicly that smoking kills. On the 
programme, Dr. Green, now retired from BAT, admitted that smoking is a major factor 
in lung cancer. Meanwhile, Alan Long, President of Santa Cruz, a BAT subsidiary in 
Brazil stresses that: 
“Medical evidence remains of a statistical nature as no evidence has been 
produced to establish a causal relationship between smoking and any of 
the diseases with which it has been associated” (BBC TV, 1980). 
  
In November, the fourth report of the Royal College of Physicians “Smoking still 
kills” was published. The report urged the government to reverse its present attitude 
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of inactivity and even of encouragement towards the tobacco industry to tackle this 
hidden holocaust (Taylor, 1984). That month an RJR (Tobacco Company) 
advertisement proclaimed that: 
 
“It has been stated so often that smoking causes cancer, it's no wonder 
most people believe this is an established fact. But, in fact, it is nothing of 
the kind. The truth is that almost three decades of research have failed to 
produce scientific proof for this claim ... in our opinion, the issue of 
smoking and lung cancer is not a closed case. It's an open controversy” 
(Report of Special Master, 1998). 
 
In March of 1982, the Presidents of the UK’s eight Royal Colleges of Medicine 
(Physicians; Surgeons of Edinburgh; General Practitioners; Pathologists; 
Obstetricians and Gynaecologists; Radiologists; Physicians and Surgeons of Glasgow; 
Physicians of Edinburgh) wrote to the UK Government stating that cigarette smoking 
is the single most important preventable cause of death and disability in the UK 
(Smith, 1982). The letter in the BMJ highlighted concerns of sports sponsorship by 
tobacco interests stating that tobacco sponsorship of sport is one method of 
circumventing the legal ban on the advertising of cigarettes on television. The letter 
recommended a complete ban on tobacco sponsorship of sport (Smith, 1982). That 
same month, the biggest percentage rise since 1947 in cigarette tax was implemented 
with an increase of 14 pence on a packet of 20 in the year's main Budget. The tax rise 
was passed on to smokers with the aim of discouraging them from smoking by 
increasing the price. 
 
By October of 1982, a new voluntary agreement to regulate advertising and promotion 
with the tobacco industry was announced by the government. Its provisions included 
display of health warning on cigarette parks and regulation of advertisements at point 
of sale (ash.org.uk). The industry agreed to reduce expenditure on poster ads and 
cinema ads by almost 50% and offered to pay £11 million over a three and a half year 
period to fund health related research except anything to do with tobacco use. The 
agreement received widespread criticism from both the public and media (ash.org.uk). 
In March of 1984, a study “The Smoke Ring” revealed how the tobacco industry 
contrives to remain powerful and in business despite widespread evidence of the health 
dangers of its product (Taylor, 1985). The study published the following year received 
massive publicity as a BBC Panorama programme screened it on the day of its 
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publication (Taylor, 1985). This raises an interesting question in relation to the ability 
of the government to protect public health and safety in the face of powerful 
stakeholders with vested interests when something of human value including human 
lives and health is put a stake. 
 
In January of 1985, churches and health organisations were drawn into the controversy 
and were embarrassed after the BMA’s report showed that they had investments in 
tobacco companies (ash.org.uk). A study by (Alderson et al., 1985) further implicates 
tobacco smoking by discovering reduced cases of lung cancers amongst ex-smokers. 
In April, the HEC TV campaign told women that lung cancer kills as many women as 
breast cancer (Pollitt et al., 2014). Communicating the scientific underpinning of the 
smoking risk remained relevant in this debate. As noted by (Renn, 1991a), the 
information was framed for each audience in a different manner to assure the attention 
of each. In this case, the HEC launched a campaign targeted at women where the 
argument framed by saying that lung cancer kills as many women as breast cancer. 
Breast cancer is of course a major cause of death among women and is dreaded.  
 
In November of 1985, a report by the Health Education Council (HEC) reveals that 
UK television broadcast over 330 hours of tobacco sponsored programmes a year 
(HEC, 1985). In December, George Foulkes, Labour MP, introduced a Private 
Member's Bill designed to urge employers to increase non-smoking places or facilities 
in the workplace (ash.org.uk). In December of same year, the BMJ condemned the 
Health Promotion Research Trust funded by the tobacco industry as ‘taking money 
from the Devil’. It was suggested that sponsored research often favours the sponsors 
(ash.org.uk). In January of 1986, HEC announced it would withhold grants from 
researchers and academics who receive funds from the tobacco industry supported 
Health Promotion Research Trust (ash.org.uk).  
 
Flurry of Events 
 
In March of 1986, Clive Turner, Tobacco Advisory Council, stated that tobacco 
advertising does not aim at recruiting new smokers. He stated that: 
 
“tobacco advertising or sponsorship has absolutely no influence 
whatsoever in persuading or motivating a purchase” (Turner, 1986). 
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In April, the UK Government passed the “Protection of Children (Tobacco) Act”. 
Henceforth it became illegal to sell any tobacco product to anybody under 16 years 
old. Previously, this applied to only loose tobacco products (Pollitt et al., 2014). In 
November, a study which combined data from 13 smaller studies on passive smoking 
concluded that passive smoking caused lung cancer (Wald et al., 1986). Other studies 
such as the (US Department of Health and Human Services, 1986), (Hakama et al., 
1986) and (National Research Council, 1986) also came to similar conclusions. That 
same month, a report from WHO suggested that Britain had the highest rate of lung 
cancer (Pollitt et al., 2014). In February of 1987, Independent Television (ITV) stops 
the transmission of all tobacco-sponsored sports events on its programmes (BBC, 
2009). In September, the European Commission launches “Europe Against Cancer”, 
a three-year awareness campaign of risky behaviour such as smoking and dietary 
habits (ash.org.uk). By winter that year, a study into Tobacco Advertising and 
Consumption (Tye et al., 1987) remarked that brand-switching alone, could not justify 
the amount of effort, time and money spent on advertising and promotional 
expenditures of the tobacco companies. The study concluded that advertising and 
promotion increased smoking, and the resulting disease and death, was sufficiently 
compelling a reason to warrant societal and government action. In February of 1988, 
the HEA launched "Smoking and Me", which was aimed at educating 12-13 year olds 
on the dangers of smoking (ash.org.uk). Government figures, which compared 
smoking trends between 1984 and 1986, revealed a decline in prevalence of smoking. 
However, no significant decline was found in the number of women smoking (Pollitt 
et al., 2014).  
 
In October, the Frogatt report emphasised that passive smoking increased non-
smokers’ risk of developing lung cancer by 10-30 per cent (Froggatt, 1988). An 
inquest into the deaths of 31 people in the King's Cross Underground station fire in 
November 1987 suggested that the fire was probably caused by a smoker's discarded 
match (ash.org.uk). In February of 1989, Mrs J. Swift, Public Affairs Manager of 
Imperial Tobacco revealing the economic impact of ban on tobacco advertising said 
that:  
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 “Foreign low-cost brands would have an additional competitive edge over 
UK produced brands and adversely influence UK industry jobs” (Tobacco, 
1989). 
 
In March of 1989, in a poll survey, 79% of smokers think that ‘National No Smoking 
Day is a good idea and about 5 million smokers indicated they would attempt to give 
up smoking (Macalister, 1992). In May, the Chairman of the Virgin Group, Richard 
Branson, banned all forms of tobacco advertising and promotion from his companies, 
at a cost of £2 million over the subsequent five years (ash.org.uk). By October, the 
European Council issued Directive 89/552/EEC, which outlawed tobacco advertising 
across Europe. This would ban cigar and pipe tobacco commercials from British TV 
(Directive 89/552/EEC, 1988). In November, despite Britain’s opposition, the 
European Council of Health Ministers voted for stricter, larger health warnings on 
tobacco packs and advertising throughout Europe. Also, tar level in cigarettes was set 
at 15mg by the end of 1992 and 12mg by the end of 1997 (ash.org.uk). In January of 
1990, a coalition of MPs, TV and radio personalities, activists and members of the 
public launched ‘Parents against Tobacco’ to press for more effective legislation to 
protect children from tobacco. Its founder members included Esther Rantzen and 
Richard Branson (Pollitt et al., 2014). In March, the European Parliament voted in 
favour of banning tobacco advertising (ash.org.uk). The following month, a Bill drawn 
up by ‘Parents against Tobacco’ and presented by MP Joe Ashton proposed to tighten 
laws against selling cigarettes to children (ash.org.uk). In August, a talk given by a 
Senior BAT Executive at Chelwood outlined that  
 
“On the issue of scientific evidence, a statistical association between the 
habit of smoking and certain diseases has been claimed in epidemiological 
studies. However, the mechanisms of these diseases are not understood 
and it has it [not] been established what role, if any, smoking plays in the 
initiation or development of the diseases. It is the view of BAT that further 
research is required on this complex subject. A statistical association alone 
is not proof of causality” (TMDP, 1990). 
 
P. Sheehy, Chairman of BAT, was also of the view that 
 
“BAT’s policy on smoking is very clear. Our view is that smoking has not 
been established to be the cause of disease” (Simpson, 1990). 
 
In November a bill designed by ‘Parents against Tobacco' received a boost as the first 
MP (Andrew Faulds, Labour MP for Warley East) named in the ballot for Private 
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Members' Bills took it up (ash.org.uk). In January of 1991, a report published by ASH 
revealed that around seven million women between the ages of 15 and 24 are exposed 
to cigarette advertising in the pages of women’s magazines (ash.org.uk). This was 
despite the voluntary agreement aimed at preventing such exposure. In April of 1991, 
the Government announced a new voluntary agreement to replace the one which ended 
in 1989 (ash.org.uk). In June of the same year, the Government published a Green 
Paper, ‘The Health of the Nation’ which proposed to reduce overall smoking by one 
third, to 22% in men and 21% in women, as well as a reduction by 30% of deaths from 
coronary heart disease and stroke in under-65's by the year 2000 (Akehurst and Hutton, 
1991). That same month, the Children and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco 
Act) 1991 was introduced. This increased the penalties for the sale of tobacco to 
persons under the age of 16 years and banned the sale of unpackaged cigarettes. This 
protection act also made it a requirement to publish warning statements in retail 
premises (Children and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco) Act, 1991).  
 
The following month, a coalition of 29 organisations representing virtually all the 
UK’s 85,000 doctors launched Doctors for Tobacco Law. Their aim was to push for 
government endorsement of the proposed EC advertisement ban directive in 
collaboration with existing tobacco control agencies (Moxham and Munro, 1995). Its 
first activity was to stage a widely reported demonstration outside Rothmans 
International's AGM. They provided data showing that for every Rothmans smoker 
who dies during the year from smoking related illness, the company makes a profit of 
£35,250. The government also announced a series of new, larger health warnings for 
tobacco packaging, in line with EC requirements. This increase included health 
warnings from one to two (i.e. “Smoking kills” and “Protect children: don't make them 
breathe your smoke”) on cigarette packs (Feldman and Bayer, 2009). This was the first 
time that health warnings were brought under legal control rather than covered by 
voluntary agreements.  
 
By October of 1991, a new voluntary agreement, The Tobacco Products Labelling 
(Safety) Regulations 1991 came into force in line with legally required new health 
warnings on advertisements. Other provisions covered tighter control on other forms 
of promotion, including direct mailing and magazines (Paliamentary.UK, 2000). In 
November of 1991, the UK tobacco industry sued the UK government, concerned 
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about the size of the new health warnings on cigarette packs (ash.org.uk). From the 
strategic point of view, this bought the tobacco industry time but may also have been 
an exercise of economic power designed to cause delay in policy intervention. That 
same month, HEA published ‘The Smoking Epidemic’ and revealed that tobacco-
related diseases in the UK claim 111,000 lives every year (ash.org.uk).  
 
In July of 1992, the White Paper - ‘The Health of the Nation’ was published by the 
UK government. It received widespread criticism for failing to recommend a ban on 
tobacco advertising (DoH, 1992). The paper however offered a higher target of 
prevalence reduction (to 20% in both men and women by 2000) and a 40% reduction 
in cigarette consumption by the same year. It also promised to introduce legislation to 
allow licensed taxi drivers to ban smoking in their vehicles (DoH, 1992). The month 
after, Margaret Thatcher, former Prime Minister, became an advisor to Philip Morris, 
assisting in the company’s strategy in developing countries, including Eastern Europe. 
Her action was condemned by the public and those she worked with (Watts, 1992). In 
May of 1997, The Queen’s speech at the opening of the new British Parliament 
included a bill to ban tobacco advertising. Advertising had previously been controlled 
by a voluntary agreement between the tobacco companies and the government (Queen 
Speech, 1997). Tessa Jowell, UK Minister of State for Public Health, speaking after 
the Queen’s speech announced that the government intends to ban tobacco advertising, 
said that  
 
“The Government is fully committed to banning tobacco advertising. This 
is an essential first step in building an effective strategy to deal with 
smoking” (Jowell, 1997). 
 
 
By December of 1998, a White Paper on Tobacco is presented to Parliament by the 
Secretary of State for Health and the Secretaries of State for Scotland, Wales and 
Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty. The White paper was the first policy 
statement on tobacco control published by any UK government. This happened over 
four decades after the seeming consensus in government in 1957. The report declared 
that government had a clear role in tackling smoking and a responsibility to protect 
children from tobacco; and that government intended to ensure that those who do not 
smoke are protected from those who do, and that the number of people smoking in 
Britain falls (The UK Government White Paper, 1998).  
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Table 6.5 (below) summaries the chronology of events that occurred between the 
periods of 1966 and 1998. 
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Table 6.5: Chronology of events relating to the smoking risk debate (between the periods of 1966 and 1998) 
 
Year  Event  
1967 i. Government expresses intention of introducing legislation to control or ban how tobacco products are promoted 
(ash.org.uk).  
1971 ii. January – The second Royal College of Physicians report “Smoking and Health Now” is published. The report refers to 
the death toll caused as a result of cigarette smoking as a present day “holocaust. (RCP Report, 1971).  
iii. The Chief Medical Officer expresses concern that “some 80,000 premature deaths probably occur in England and Wales 
(Interdepartmental Group of Officials, 1971). 
iv. Action on Smoking and Health (ASH) is set up to make non-smoking the norm in society and to inform and educate the 
public about the death and disease caused by smoking (ash.org.uk).  
v. March – The secretary of state for Health, Sir Keith Joseph, restates government intention to control tobacco use through 
voluntary agreement with the tobacco industry (ash.org.uk). 
vi. April – The first voluntary agreement between the government and tobacco industries is proposed (ash.org.uk). 
vii. May - Health warnings are put on cigarettes in Britain (ash.org.uk).  
1972 viii. January – In the house of commons, 132 MPs vote in favour of a ban on cigarette advertising, 73 against (ash.org.uk).  
ix. The Health Education Council (HEC) is established for Health Education England, Wales and Scotland (McNair-Wilson, 
1972). 
x. May - Richard Dobson who is to become Chairman of BAT states that “It’s hard to argue that filling your lungs with 
smoke can be actually good for you ... But surely it is a question of moderation …”(ash.org.uk). 
xi. July - The Chief Medical Officer describes cigarettes as “the most lethal instrument devised by man for peaceful 
use”(ash.org.uk) 
1977 xii. January - The HEC launches a television campaign focusing on the rights of non-smokers and smoking by women. 
xiii. April – P. L Short, from BAT writes a paper on “Smoking and Health”, commenting about the benefits of Smoking.  
xiv. June - The Royal College of Physicians issues its third report on “Smoking or Health” (RCP Report, 1977).  
1978 xv. May – A finance bill ‘Clause 1’ which provides for extra taxation on high tar cigarettes is debated in Parliamentary 
Committee and adopted despite opposition from the tobacco industry (ash.org.uk). 
1980 xvi. January - Dr. Green from BAT writes a paper on cigarette smoking. He noted how tobacco industry has made “a great 
issue of cause and effect relationships in response to the many published studies associating smoking with various diseases” 
(Green, 1980). 
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xvii. April - Patrick Sheehy, former chairperson of BAT writes to BBC Panorama about the continuing controversy in scientific 
circles regarding causation. He writes that “scientists are [by] no means unanimous regarding smoking and health issues 
… we would therefore ask you to ensure that the programme disassociates the views of the scientist in question [Dr Green] 
from those of this company by making an appropriate statement to this effect in the programme ( P. Sheehy, Letter to the 
BBC, 1980). 
xviii. April - BBC Panorama programme reports on the tobacco industry, revealing that the chairperson of the Tobacco Advisory 
Council is on the Sports council. It also shows in-depth how the industry refuses to acknowledge that smoking kills. On 
the programme Dr. Green, now retired from BAT, admits that smoking is a major factor in lung cancer.” (BBC TV, 1980).  
1981 xix. November - The fourth report of the Royal College of Physicians “Smoking still kills” is published (Taylor, 1984). The 
report urges the government to reverse its present attitude of inactivity and tackle what it describes as a ‘hidden holocaust’. 
1982 xx. March - The Presidents of the UK’s eight Royal Colleges of Medicine write to the UK Government stating that cigarette 
smoking is the single most important preventable cause of death and disability in the UK. They also highlight concerns in 
the arena of sports sponsorship calling for a complete ban on tobacco sponsorship of sport” (Smith, 1982). 
xxi. March – The biggest percentage rise in cigarette tax since 1947 is implemented in the year's main Budget. 
xxii. October – The government announces a new voluntary agreement with the tobacco industry. Its provisions include display 
of health warning on cigarette parks and regulation of advertisement at points of sale (ash.org.uk). 
1985 xxiii. April - The HEC's TV campaign tells women that lungs cancer kills many women as breast cancer (Pollitt et al., 2014). 
xxiv. November – HEC reveals that UK television broadcast over 330 hours of tobacco sponsored programmes a year (HEC, 
1985). 
xxv. December - George Foulkes, Labour MP introduces a Private Member's Bill to urge employers to increase non-smoking 
places or facilities in the workplace (ash.org.uk). 
xxvi. December- The BMJ condemns the Health Promotion Research Trust funded by tobacco industry (ash.org.uk). 
1986 xxvii. January - HEC to withhold grants from researchers and academics who receive funds from the tobacco industry 
(ash.org.uk). 
xxviii. March - Clive Turner, Tobacco Advisory Council expresses the opinion that tobacco advertising does not aim at recruiting 
new smokers (Turner, 1986). 
xxix. March - Tobacco adverts are banned in UK cinemas (ash.org.uk). 
xxx. April - Protection of Children (Tobacco) Act is passed making it illegal to sell any tobacco product to anybody under 16 
(Pollitt et al., 2014).  
1987 xxxi. February - ITV stops the transmission of all tobacco sponsored sports events on their programmes (BBC, 2009).  
xxxii. September - The European Commission launches “Europe Against Cancer”, a three-year awareness campaign of risky 
behaviour such as smoking and dietary habits. 
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1988 xxxiii. February - The HEA launches "Smoking and Me", which is aimed at educating 12-13 year old on the dangers of smoking 
(ash.org.uk) 
xxxiv. February - Government figures comparing smoking trends between 1984 and 1986 reveal a decline in prevalence of 
smoking. However no significant decline was found in number of women smoking (Pollitt et al., 2014). 
1991 xxxv. January – A report published by ASH reveals that around seven million women between the ages of 15 and 24 are exposed 
to cigarette advertising in the pages of women's magazines, despite the voluntary agreement aimed at preventing such 
exposure (ash.org.uk). 
xxxvi. March – The Chancellor raises cigarette tax by approximately 16p in the Budget. He says that “There are strong health 
arguments for a big duty increase in tobacco” (ash.org.uk). 
xxxvii. April – the Government announces a new voluntary agreement to replace the one which expired in 1989 (ash.org.uk). 
xxxviii. June – The Government publishes a Green Paper, ‘The Health of the Nation’ to reduce overall smoking by one third, to 
22% in men and 21% in women (Akehurst and Hutton, 1991). 
xxxix. June - Children and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco Act) 1991 is introduced, increasing the penalties for the sale 
of tobacco to persons under the age of 16 years. (Children and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco) Act, 1991).  
xl. July - A coalition of 29 organisations representing virtually all the UK's 85,000 doctors launches Doctors for Tobacco Law 
(Moxham and Munro, 1995).  
xli. July - The government announces a series of new, larger health warnings for tobacco packaging, in line with EC 
requirements (Feldman and Bayer, 2009). This is the first time that health warnings subject to legislation as opposed to 
covered by voluntary agreements.  
xlii. October – A new voluntary agreement comes into force in line with the new legally required health warnings on 
advertisements. (Paliamentary.UK, 2000). 
xliii. November - The UK tobacco industry sues the UK government about the size of the new health warnings on cigarette 
packs (ash.org.uk). 
1992 xliv. The White Paper - ‘The Health of the Nation’ is published by the government. It receives widespread criticism for failing 
to recommend a ban on tobacco advertising (DoH, 1992).  
xlv. Royal College of Physicians report on Smoking and the young states that 17,000 hospital admissions in a single year of 
children under 5 are due to their parents’ smoking (RCP Report, 1992).  
1994 xlvi. A forty years study carried out by Doll et al. (1994) concludes that the long term effects of smoking have been undermined, 
that 50% of regular smokers will eventually die of the habit, and that Smokers are three times more likely to die. 
1997 xlvii. Queen Elizabeth II's speech at the opening of the new British Parliament includes a bill to ban tobacco advertising 
(ash.org.uk). 
  
 
128 
 
xlviii. The Government announces that UK tobacco advertising will be banned from 1st November 2000 under the European 
Union’s Directive (ash.org.uk). 
1998 xlix. A White Paper on Tobacco is presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Health and the Secretaries of State for 
Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland by Command of Her Majesty (The UK Government White Paper, 1998). 
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6.5 Analysis of the Smoking Debate  
The result of the evolving events within the UK smoking debate (between 1950 and 
1998) shows that the main thrust of the debate centred on: (a) the nature of evidence 
(which was largely statistical) linking smoking and lung cancer: (b) how the evidence 
should be framed within the public health context: and, (c) disagreements about 
precautionary measures put in place to mitigate the dangers of smoking to health. In 
the UK, the smoking debate emerged following Doll and Hill’s (1950) study in which 
they suggested a statistical link between smoking and lung cancer. This suggestion 
puts the burden of proof on the shoulders of the tobacco industry, as well as public 
health institutions or officials charged with the responsibility of communicating and 
informing the public of the health risks they face. In this study, the smoking debate is 
examined in three phases. The first period covered between 1950 and 1955, the second 
period covered the smoking debate between 1956 and 1965; and the third period 
examined the unfolding events between the period of 1966 and 1998. 
In the first phase, analysis of the evolving event suggests that evidence linking 
smoking and lung cancer was in its embryonic state at this point and the initial debate 
centred on the nature of evidence. Although public health officials accepted at this 
point Doll and Hill’s publication, they were cautious of the nature of the evidence. 
This is evidenced in a memo written to the Cabinet Home Affairs Committee, where 
the then Minister of Health noted that, “there is no precise evidence of how tobacco 
smoking causes lung cancer”. However, he concluded that the statistical evidence 
does point to a causal relationship between tobacco smoking and lung cancer. 
Representatives of the tobacco industry at this early stage can be seen to be seeking 
out public trust when they said, “if it should ever be proved that there exists something 
harmful in tobacco… [They] will be the first to act ….” (Chairman of Imperial 
Tobacco Statement, 1953). In addition, they rejected and challenged the technical case 
made against smoking (pointing to uncertainties and gaps in knowledge). Within this 
period, the government took no steps or initiative to mitigate smoking risk. This initial 
lack of response from the government can be linked to many factors, including the fact 
that smoking was considered a normal activity, and the statistical nature of the 
evidence, but it may also be for economic reasons that the government ignored the 
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dangers of smoking. Other similar studies have also raised other potential reasons, 
including electoral concerns over interfering in mass public behaviour and the dangers 
of creating further pressure over the air pollution debate in the 1950’s (Berridge, 
2006). 
 
With reference to the PERC framework, power, expertise, communication and trust 
can be seen to shape the smoking debate within this period. In terms of power, both 
institutional power (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) and structural power, Barnett and 
Duvall (2005) seem to be relevant here. Institutional power is seen in the ability of the 
medical research council and ministry of health to put the smoking risk issue on the 
health policy agenda in the 1950s. The consideration of lung cancer and its relationship 
to smoking cigarettes led to the sponsorship of Doll and Hill’s research, which raised 
awareness of and triggered the direction of the debate on the risk to health from 
smoking in such a way that smoking policy became a public health priority. Structural 
power as described by Barnett and Duvall (2005) can be observed in the exercise of 
stakeholders’ (social/professional) relationships. In this case, there was a professional 
relationship between technical experts (such as Doll and Hill) and policy makers, 
which allowed for contact and exchange of views that brought about the hegemony 
within government departments as early as the mid-1950s, of a risk discourse in which 
smoking is linked to lung cancer. Such a stakeholder relationship privileges this kind 
of technical expertise over other forms of expertise (e.g. experiential expertise) in the 
policy perspective taken to risk. This stakeholder relationship provided the platform 
where interaction and exchange of views with policy makers was possible. 
Stakeholder relationships create power imbalances in the nature of the influence 
certain stakeholder groups are able to bring to bear in public health risk 
communication within the policy context. 
 
In terms of expertise, technical ‘expertise’ was the means by which public health 
officials made sense of rising incidences of lung cancer, and the role of smoking was 
made explicit through technical experts’ interpretation of evidence (even if it was only 
statistical in nature). The interpretation of a ‘real association’ between smoking and 
lung cancer would have resonated with policy makers and the manner in which they 
responded by accepting this association (see events iii, v, viii, x) signifies the 
importance of technical expertise in policy inquiry and policy development relating to 
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risk. In addition, the policy perspective of government departments of public health 
was aided by the advice and recommendation of expert technical committees and 
advisory bodies. This observation is line with the view that sees science and its experts 
as a sense making aid to risk issues within the policy domain (Collingridge and Reeve, 
1986, Jasanoff, 1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012).  
 
It is also important to note how the tobacco industry demanded a causal (biological) 
proof of a link between smoking and lung cancer. By highlighting this uncertainty and 
gaps in knowledge, this created doubt in the public consciousness and raised questions 
about the validity of the technical case against smoking and its relation to lung cancer. 
It could also have been a way to divert attention from the real health concerns 
associated with smoking. Trust and credibility also seem to be relevant here as relevant 
public health authorities such as CHSC and SACCR accepted Doll and Hill 
interpretations and urged the government to inform the public of the dangers of 
smoking. This acceptance was an indication of trust in the credibility of Doll and Hill’s 
conclusions. This was also captured in the words of Dr. Green (see Table 6.2, event v) 
who, after a meeting between a representative of the tobacco companies and Richard 
Hill, expressed the view that “It was pretty clear to me that Mr Partridge and his 
colleagues felt that Hill had answered all their queries in a way which left hardly any 
loophole for doubt…” (ash.org.uk). Representatives of the tobacco industry also 
understood the importance of trust when they demanded public trust in their corporate 
social responsibilities. 
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Table 6.6 (below) links the evolving events relating to the smoking debate (between 
1950 and 1955) to the study research theme on how power, expertise, communication 
and trust shape public health risk communication. 
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Table 6.6: Linking smoking risk events (between 1950 and 1955) to research theme evidence from Table 6.2 
 
Power (to effect outcome) Expertise (interpretation and 
framing) 
Communication (language of 
uncertainty) 
Trust 
MRC and MoH ability to put 
the smoking risk issue on the 
policy agenda. 
 
Stakeholder relation between 
technical experts (e.g. doll and 
Hill) and policy makers. 
 
Event xiii: Group of leading 
tobacco manufacturers in the 
UK offered £250,000 to aid 
MRC research (Statement 
Issued by the Group of 
Leading Tobacco 
Manufacturers, 1954). 
 
Event i: Doll and Hill suggested a 
‘real association’ between 
tobacco and lung cancer (Doll and 
Hill, 1950b). 
 
Related events – event iii, vi, ix, 
xi.  
 
 
Event xi: UK Health Minister -
There is no precise evidence of 
how tobacco smoking causes lung 
cancer or indeed of the extent to 
which one causes the other” 
(Minister of Health, 1954). 
 
Event xiii: Group of leading 
tobacco manufacturers in - this can 
only be the case when medical 
science is able to provide a causal 
proof to the claim. (Statement 
Issued by the Group of Leading 
Tobacco Manufacturers, 1954). 
 
 
Event iii: CHSC and SACCR 
supports Professor Bradford Hill 
and Dr Doll research findings. 
(CHSC and SACCR, 1951). 
 
Event v: Dr. Green expressed that 
“It was pretty clear to me that 
Mr Partridge and his colleagues 
felt that Hill had answered all 
their queries in a way which left 
hardly any loophole for doubt…” 
(Green, 1952) (ash.org.uk). 
 
Event vii: The Chairman of 
Imperial Tobacco states that “If it 
should ever be proved that there 
exists something harmful in 
tobacco, even in the minutest 
quantities, which could 
conceivably make smoking one of 
the causes of this disease [cancer], 
we should, I hope, be the first to 
take steps to eliminate it” 
(Chairman of Imperial Tobacco 
Statement, 1953). 
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The second phase of the smoking debate (between 1956 and 1966) analysed in this 
study saw the state of scientific evidence evolve from an embryonic state. Evidence at 
this stage (although still largely statistical) continued to link smoking and lung cancer. 
It was in this period that the industry heightened its demand for a causal link. Using 
its own technical experts, the industry launched a fierce attack on the technical case 
made against smoking. The industry aided other research including offering £250,000 
to the research of the Medical Research Council (MRC) stating that a link between 
smoking and lung cancer can only be established “when medical science is able to 
provide a causal proof to the claim” (Statement Issued by the Group of Leading 
Tobacco Manufacturers, 1954). The government response within this period was 
initially aimed at educating and informing the public of the dangers of smoking. This 
saw the established of the Health Education Council (HEC), later reorganised into the 
Health Education Authority in Scotland, England and Wales.  
 
Other competing hypotheses also emerged at this point questioning the validity of the 
case linking smoking and lung cancer see (Berkson, 1958, Fisher, 1959, Hueper, 1955, 
Berkson, Gilliam, 1955). These critics point to environmental factors and factors other 
than smoking that might predispose an individual to lung cancer, for instance genotype 
(Fisher, 1958). Fisher (1958) argued that an individual ‘gene’ may predispose such a 
person to both ‘smoking’ and ‘cancer’. However, such alternative arguments (e.g. 
environmental factors and the genetic hypothesis) received little attention in the policy 
domain. The technical case linking tobacco to lung cancer was boosted following 
pressure from elite groups, personalities and public health experts for stricter tobacco 
control by the government. 
 
With reference to the PERC framework, communication (in terms of the language in 
use) featured very strongly at this point in shaping the smoking debate. Public health 
authorities can be seen to use negative frames to qualify the dangers of smoking to 
health, including “mortality from lung cancer is twenty times greater amongst heavy 
smokers than amongst non-smokers”; “the most reasonable interpretation of scientific 
evidence is that the relationship is one of direct cause and effect” and “the most 
credible interpretation and explanation for the increase in the death of lung cancer”. 
These frames signify that public health authorities accepted the suggestion that 
smoking was in fact dangerous to public health and safety. Representatives of the 
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tobacco industry on the other hand, continued to use languages of uncertainty in the 
technical case they made attempting to refute the suggestion that smoking was linked 
to lung cancer (see Table 6.4, events ii, iii, viii ix). They called for more research 
before any causal association can be established.  
 
By using languages of uncertainty, representatives of the industry continually 
highlighted uncertainties and gaps in scientific knowledge. They used frames such as 
“conflicting and incomplete” (Statement By A Group of Leading Tobacco 
Manufacturers in the UK, 1956); “there is no proof” (Partridge, 1956); “it has not 
been established with any certainty” (Tobacco Manufacturers’ Standing Committee, 
1957); “no conclusive proofs” (McCormick, 1962); and “the mechanisms of these 
diseases are not understood” (TMDP, 1990). The use of languages of uncertainty 
undermined the validity of the claim that smoking is related to lung cancer for some 
time, until evidence began to shift the balance of power away from the tobacco 
industry. This also created doubt in the minds of the public and may also have been a 
strategic move to divert attention from the real dangers of smoking to health. This 
discourse of causal proof or causality was corroborated by Dr. Green, the head of BAT 
research unit, in his paper on Cigarette Smoking and Causal Relationships. He noted 
that  
 
The industry has retreated behind impossible demands for ‘scientific 
proof’ whereas such proof has never been required as a basis for action in 
the legal and political fields … It may therefore be concluded that for 
certain groups of people smoking causes the incidence of certain diseases 
to be higher than it would otherwise be” (Green, 1975). 
  
The discourse of causal proof, or the causality frame used by the tobacco industry, 
became a lens by which the industry highlighted the uncertainties surrounding the 
claim that smoking is linked to lung cancer. It also acted as a barrier to timely and 
appropriate policy interventions; even at this time there had been no concrete policy 
interventions. In addition, the discourse of causal proof served to protect the principles 
of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and accountability because until the industry 
accepted a link between smoking and lung cancer, it would be wrong for it to be acting 
in that manner that could be seen as socially irresponsible. Besides the discourse of 
causal proof used by representatives of the tobacco industry, another narrative they 
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used is the notion of ‘moderation’. They used frames such as “… Neither tobacco, nor 
alcohol is harmful, in moderation” (BBC panorama TV, 1962) and “Anything can be 
considered harmful. Apple sauce is harmful if you get too much of it” (Thames 
Television, 1976). 
 
In terms of power and expertise in this phase, the establishment of the Tobacco 
Manufacturers’ Standing Committee (TMSC) increased the industry’s influence and 
ability to exercise power over the production of scientific evidence and its 
interpretation. Error! Not a valid bookmark self-reference. (above), links the 
evolving events within the smoking debate (between 1956 and 1965) to the study 
research theme. 
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Table 6.7: Linking the risk events (between 1956 to 1965) to the study research theme 
 
Expertise (interpretation 
and framing) 
Power (to effect 
outcome) 
Communication (using language of certainty)  Trust 
Event xiv: The first 
report by the Royal 
College of Physicians on 
“Smoking and Health” - 
Cigarette smoking 
causes lung cancer and 
bronchitis and the most 
likely cause of the 
recent worldwide 
increase in deaths from 
lung cancer (RCP 
Report, 1962). 
 
Event v: August - 
Tobacco 
Manufacturers’ 
Standing Committee 
(TMSC) is formed by 
the British Tobacco 
manufacturers (TMSC 
First Annual Report, 
1956). 
 
Event xx:  Television 
advertising of tobacco 
products is banned in 
the UK in 1965 under 
the ‘1964 Television 
Act’ (ash.org.uk). 
 
 
Public Health Officials 
Event iv:  Minister of Health, Mr. R. H. Turton - 
“mortality from lung cancer is twenty times 
greater amongst heavy smokers than amongst 
non-smokers” (Turton, 1956). 
 
Event vii: MRC report - “the most reasonable 
interpretation of scientific evidence is that the 
relationship is one of direct cause and effect”.  
Event viii:  The health minister - the most credible 
interpretation and explanation for the increase 
in the death of lung cancer (MRC Report, 1957). 
 
Tobacco representatives 
Event ii:  Imperial Tobacco - “there is no proof at 
all that smoking causes lung cancer and much to 
suggest that it cannot be the cause” (Partridge, 
1956). 
Event iii:  The leading UK tobacco companies - 
“The evidence on the possible relationship of 
lung cancer and smoking is conflicting and 
incomplete” (Statement By A Group of Leading 
Tobacco Manufacturers in the UK, 1956). Also see 
event v, ix 
Event xv: the Chairman of 
Imperial Tobacco 
Company, R W S Clark, 
addressing the Annual 
General Meeting states 
that “…It is, of course, 
self-evident that the 
industry’s commercial 
interests are involved, but 
the tobacco manufacturers 
also fully recognise their 
responsibility to the public 
…a general condemnation 
of cigarette smoking is 
neither justified nor 
constructive” (Clarke, 
1962). 
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The last phase of the debate (the period between 1966 and 1998) saw a slow but 
gradual implementation of initiatives to mitigate smoking risk from both the tobacco 
industry and departments of public health. This was initially through voluntary 
agreement between the government and the industry on how tobacco should be 
promoted and sold. This signified a shift in the tobacco industry’s power strategy, from 
one of attacking the technical case made against smoking, to one focusing on efforts 
towards influencing policy developments relating to mitigating the risk of smoking. 
This change of strategy perhaps can be linked to the evolved state of evidence linking 
tobacco to lung cancer and how that is influencing the nature of  argument brought to 
bear on the debate. The governance response was initially aimed at educating the 
public, leading to organisations such as the Health Education Council (HEC) in 
England, Wales and Scotland (McNair-Wilson, 1972) and Action on Smoking and 
Health (ASH) set up to educate the public and deglamourize smoking in society 
(ash.org.uk). Subsequently, more concrete action was put into place, including the 
enactment of the Children and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco) Act that 
increased the penalties for the sale of tobacco to persons under the age of 16 (Children 
and Young Persons (Protection from Tobacco) Act, 1991) and the ban on tobacco 
advertising in the UK and European union under the European Union’s Directive 
(ash.org.uk). There was also a significant shift in the nature of language used by public 
health authorities in characterising the dangers of smoking. This saw a shift from the 
use of language of uncertainty to one of certainty.  
 
In terms of the PERC framework, Barnett and Duvall (2005)’s notion of structural 
power exercised by means of social relationships was particularly significant here. 
This can be seen in how the industry focused its effort on pursuing a voluntary 
agreement (see Table 6.5, events vi, xxii, xxxv, xxxvii, xlii) with government officials. 
Through voluntary agreement, the industry negotiated a television advertisement ban 
before 9.00pm (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986), negotiated ways of informing the 
public about the dangers of smoking tobacco cigarettes, including warnings on 
cigarette packs, developing tobacco substitutes and addictive and, the promotion of 
coupons (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986). These negotiations strengthened the 
industry’s political positions by enabling it to delay or make unnecessary the 
establishment of stricter and legally binding rules. For example, the 1971 negotiation 
  
 
139 
 
over health warnings on tobacco products (accepted by the government), killed a 
Private Member’s Bill in the House of Commons, which demanded a much stronger 
warning on cigarette packs (Popham, 1981). Voluntary agreement delayed or made it 
irrelevant any legally binding and perhaps, stricter policy legislation against it. 
 
Voluntary agreement also gave the industry more insight into the government position 
on smoking, enabling it to make more strategic argument relating to smoking policy. 
Because of its economic power the tobacco industry was also able to circumvent the 
advertising ban in the UK, thereby undermining the message that smoking is a danger 
to public health, by sharply increasing its sponsorship of sporting and cultural events. 
In some cases, this involved racing cars bearing the names of cigarettes that could not 
be advertised, see also (WHO report, 2013). The industry also used loopholes in the 
law to delay, restrict or influence government policies on tobacco control. For 
example, in 1991, the UK tobacco industry sued the UK government about the size of 
the new health warnings that were to be printed on cigarette packs.  
 
Evidence also suggests that the industry attempted to influence policy through its 
network of advisors. For example, a BBC Panorama programme also found that the 
chairperson of the Tobacco Advisory Council was on the Sports council. The presence 
of an ally in the sports council meant that the interest of the tobacco industry was 
potentially protected in the policy advice given to the government on sporting issues. 
It also enhanced its ability to gain insight into policy thinking that might advantage its 
strategic positioning. The change of tobacco industry strategy was adequately captured 
by the words of Dr. Jim Green, in an interview after his retirement as the head of BAT 
research unit with which he served for 20 years, 
 
“At the beginning of the sixties the tobacco companies realized there was 
serious evidence connecting smoking and ill health. Their first reaction 
was to spend money on research to see if this was true, in the hope that it 
wasn’t, so they could win the argument. When this failed, the research 
effort was directed to finding a safe cigarette, through the development of 
substitutes. When this flopped in the mid-seventies there was a sharp 
change of direction. New, corporate careerists were now in charge of the 
companies and they had fewer qualms about the business they were in; 
research was redirected to serve the interests of marketing. This 
development coalesced rather well with the attitude that the companies 
had taken towards the health risk and regulation policy. On the advice of 
  
 
140 
 
their PR man, they pursued a ‘tight-rope’ policy on health … and entered 
into voluntary agreements because this bought them time.” (Green, 1972, 
ash.org.uk). 
 
Table 6.8 (below) links the evolving events relating to the smoking debate (between 
1966 and 1998) to the study research theme. 
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Table 6.8: Linking smoking risk events (between 1966 and 1998) to research theme 
 
Expertise (interpretation and framing) Power (to effect outcome) Communication (using 
language of uncertainty) 
Event iii: The Chief Medical Officer - 
“some 80,000 premature deaths probably 
occur in England and Wales each year 
and for the whole of the United Kingdom 
the number must approach 100,000 as a 
result of smoking” (Interdepartmental 
Group of Officials, 1971). 
  
Event ii: The second Royal College of 
Physicians’ report - refers to the death toll 
caused by cigarette smoking as a present 
day “holocaust”. (RCP Report, 1971). 
 
Event xi: The Chief Medical Officer 
describes the cigarette as “the most lethal 
instrument devised by man for peaceful 
use”(ash.org.uk). 
 
Event vi: stakeholder’s relationship - Negotiation of 
voluntary agreement. Other related events that evidenced 
stakeholder’s relationship are – events xxii, xxxv, xxxvii, 
xlii. 
 
Event xxviii: BBC Panorama programme reports on the 
tobacco industry, revealing that the chairperson of the 
Tobacco Advisory Council is on the Sports council. 
 
Event xx: The Presidents of the UK’s eight Royal Colleges 
of Medicine - tobacco sponsorship of sport is one 
method of circumventing the legal ban on the 
advertising of cigarettes in television (Smith, 1982). 
 
Event xxiv: Health Education Council (HEC) reveals that 
UK television broadcast over 330 hours of tobacco 
sponsored programmes a year (HEC, 1985). 
 
Event xliii: The UK tobacco industry sues the UK 
government concerning the size of the new health 
warnings on cigarette packs (ash.org.uk). 
Event xvii: April - 
Patrick Sheehy, former 
chairman of BAT writes 
to BBC Panorama - 
“scientists are [by] no 
means unanimous 
regarding smoking and 
health issues …’ ( P. 
Sheehy, Letter to the 
BBC, 1980). 
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The analysis of the evolving events also reveals that there are negative and real 
consequences associated with the excessive exercise of power (as exemplified by the 
tobacco industry) in public health risk communication and associated policy making. 
Firstly, excessive exercise of power may lead to a delay in policy interventions, which 
may result in taking either over precautionary or under precautionary measures. In the 
smoking debate, the excessive exercise of power by the tobacco industry (made 
possible by its resources) led to delays in the appropriate policy interventions. This is 
evidenced by the fact that the first policy White Paper on tobacco control was 
presented to Parliament in 1998 despite an awareness of the dangers of smoking and 
a seeming consensus in government departments of this from as early as the mid-1950s 
(see Table 6.2, events v, viii, x, xi, xvi). The absence of any concrete smoking 
mitigating strategy over this long span of time undermined the smoking/cancer 
argument, thereby exposing the public to the risk of smoking for much longer than it 
should have been.  
 
 
6.6 Findings relating to Social Amplification 
(or Attenuation) of Smoking Risk within 
the policy domain  
 
Study Hypothesis: Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the 
negotiation of public health risk arguments between the over critical 
model and under critical model in a science-policy relationship. 
 
The analysis of the smoking debate carried out in this chapter suggests that there is a 
strong relation between the ability of stakeholder groups to exercise power (amplified 
by economic resources) and social amplification (or attenuation) in public health risk 
communication and its associated policymaking. The conclusion that can be drawn 
from the evolving events is that powerful interest groups (such as tobacco 
companies) are able to use the economic resources within their means to (a) 
purchase the necessary technical expertise to shape risk debates; (b) enhance 
trust through scientific credibility; (c) control communication by means of 
language used; and, (d) influence policy processes by means of stakeholder 
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relationships. Any or a combination of these factors will shift the transition of 
risk arguments between the over critical and under critical models in the policy 
domain. 
 
What is also interesting is how other stakeholder groups exercised ‘hidden’ power to 
shape the debate around smoking risk. Such power have been expressed by either 
defining policy priorities, determining whose expertise are called upon and whose 
questions are asked in the technical analysis of risk. There was also legitimate power 
expressed through laws that prohibit the sale of tobacco to the under aged and 
restrictions to tobacco sale and advertisement. In addition is resistive power that was 
expressed through boycotts and bans on smoking in public and office spaces. 
 
The next chapter examines the electronic cigarette debate. This involves not only 
contested science and evidence and multiple legitimate worldviews, but also the 
delivery of drugs (nicotine) into the human body.   
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7 Vaping Health Risk Debate  
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7.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the second result chapter of the thesis. It examines the vaping 
(electronic cigarette) debate (between 2008 and 2016) and provides further empirical 
evidence on how power and expertise, including communication and trust, shape 
public health risk communication in a policy context. This case study particularly 
exemplifies how technical expertise shapes public health communication and its 
associated policymaking in the midst of awareness of (and caution towards) powerful 
stakeholders’ influence on risk debates. The assessment of this debate is divided into 
two periods. The first period examined the vaping risk debate between 2008 and 2012; 
the second period covered 2012 to 2016. The analysis of the debate is carried out 
within the UK context, focusing on the emergence of the vaping risk debate until the 
first policy consideration. This chapter begins by presenting the evolving events in in 
the two different phases. The result is then analysed within the context of the PERC 
framework and those findings are highlighted that relate to social amplification (or 
attenuation) of smoking risk within the policy domain. 
 
 
7.2 The Vaping Debate (between 2008 and 
2012) 
The smoking debate resurfaced once again following the introduction of electronic 
cigarettes (EC) into the European market around the year 2006. The use of ECs, 
popularly known as vaping, involves smoking like behaviour and was introduced by 
retailers as a safer alternative to cigarettes. In 2008, WHO raised concerns that ECs 
were being marketed as a safer alternative to tobacco cigarettes despite a lack of, or 
insufficient, scientific understanding of the safety and efficacy of ECs at the time 
(WHO, 2008) since ECs were newly developed products. Unlike the smoking risk 
debate that emerged in the 1950s, the vaping debate occurred in a different societal 
and political context, which has implications for the manner in which the public health 
risk was communicated. There have been significant advances in information and 
communication technology (ICT) that have changed the ways in which the public 
communicates about the risk. Interested members of the public are increasingly able 
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to seek knowledge and engage (where they are more informed) in the debates relating 
to risk using the Internet and other mediated sources and with a much broader 
audience. Within the policy context, there have been significant cultural shifts in 
policy making since the 1950s. Recent times have seen more emphasis on citizens’ 
participation and deliberative policy making. In addition to these, there was the initial 
absence of economically powerful stakeholders who were able to engage their 
resources (as seen in the smoking case study) to shape the public health risk 
communication process. At the time when the vaping risk debate emerged in 2008, 
ECs had been newly introduced into European and UK markets and many of the EC 
companies were still new in comparison to well established and financially resourced 
tobacco companies in the 1950s.  
 
Before the concern was raised by WHO, initial anecdotal reports pointed to issues 
around safety. For example, EC devices can explode with consequences such as facial 
burns and fire outbreaks. The concern raised by WHO put the burden of proof on the 
shoulders of the EC manufacturers who had to show that their product was safe for 
public consumption, and a safer alternative to tobacco cigarettes, as was claimed. The 
burden of proof also lay with institutions charged with responsibility for managing 
public health and safety. Jason Cropper, managing director of an Electronic Cigarette 
company was of the view that  
 
 “They [ECs] are certainly healthier than smoking cigarettes. Tests have 
been done on mice and in the lab and they have shown they are not harmful 
… it had not been possible to carry out human trials as they were too 
expensive. Most of these companies selling these are small companies” 
(BBC, 2008a). 
 
The evolving debate events suggests that the immediate period following the safety 
and efficacy concern raised by WHO saw the emergence of few scientific studies into 
the safety and efficacy of ECs that led to further calls from WHO in 2009. For 
example, a month following this, an industry safety report commissioned by Ruyan, 
found ECs to be a safer alternative when compared to conventional cigarettes with 
only trace toxicants found to be contained in them (Laugesen, 2008). In July 2009, 
WHO raised further concerns that ECs are being targeted at young people and that EC 
packages lack appropriate health warnings (CASSA, 2014). In December of 2009, 
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Ruyan brand in a trial study revealed that ECs containing nicotine reduced the desire 
to smoke, similar to conventional Nicorette nicotine inhalators (Bullen et al., 2010). 
In addition, the study revealed that ECs were rated as more pleasant to use than the 
inhalator and performed significantly better than a placebo EC (Bullen et al., 2010).  
 
By January of 2010, a British Medical Journal (BMJ) publication reviewed three 
reports on EC which largely presented the major available knowledge on the quality 
of ECs (Flouris and Oikonomou, 2010b). Flouris and Oikonomou (2010b) evaluated 
reports of the US Food and Drugs Administration (FDA), Health New Zealand (HNZ), 
a private enterprise and Demokritos, a publicly funded Greek research institute. In 
contrast to HNZ’s findings, that the labelling of different ECs reflected their actual 
nicotine content, the FDA’s report showed variation on the amount of nicotine labelled 
from the nicotine with each puff (between 26.8 and 43.2 micrograms of nicotine per 
100 ml puff). The FDA analysis also found that nicotine was detected in all cartridges, 
including those labelled as containing no nicotine. The FDA report further detected 
diethylene glycol, a highly toxic liquid involved in a number of prominent mass 
poisonings, in one cartridge at a content of about 1%. Furthermore, the FDA detected 
tobacco specific impurities suspected of being harmful to humans, including 
anabasine, myosmine, and β nicotyrine. The three reports revealed similar findings in 
that they identified different harmful constituents of EC liquid content, however, they 
differed in their interpretations. The US FDA raised caution on the potential harm of 
EC liquid content to human health. HNZ recommendation was based on comparing 
the health risk of tobacco with that posed by the EC. The Demokritos report focused 
mainly on the delivery of results, maintaining a neutral position of the safety or 
efficacy of ECs. It must be stressed at this point that while FDA and Demokritos are 
government institutions, HNZ is a private enterprise whose research was funded by an 
EC manufacturer.  
 
In February, the desire to understand the public position on the regulation of the EC, 
led MHRA to open a public consultation on whether to bring nicotine containing 
products (NCPs) including ECs within the medicines licensing regime (MHRA, 2010, 
Bryan). This was a different policy approach when compared to the tobacco debate, 
which was initially focused on informing and educating the public. This signifies a 
shift of power over decision-making by policy makers to the domain of the public. 
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This shift may be linked to lessons learnt from the previous smoking debate that was 
fiercely contested by stakeholder groups and which saw a very slow policy 
intervention over a long span of time.  
 
 In March, Eissenberg (2010) report that ECs were less effective in suppressing 
cravings than conventional cigarettes. The study concluded that unlike other nicotine 
products (e.g. gum, patches), EC delivery systems did not deliver nicotine effectively 
after acute administration. This touches upon on a significant issue that leads to the 
conclusion that ECs may not be an efficient replacement for, or alternative to, tobacco 
smoke as was previously claimed by retailers. Slightly different from the above study, 
another study carried out in April 2010 on the short term effect of an electronic 
nicotine delivery device (EC) on desire to smoke and withdrawal found that the 16 
mg3 Ruyan V8 ENDD4, a model of EC, enabled smokers to tolerate alleviated desire 
to smoke after overnight abstinence (Bullen et al., 2010). The study suggested that 
ECs could be used as an aid to stopping smoking and had potential for long term use 
(Bullen et al., 2010). The emerging evidence up until this point presented different and 
conflicting interpretations of the safety and efficacy of EC. 
 
In a two day conference held in Geneva in May 2010, WHO made a further call for 
research into assessing the safety and efficacy of ECs (World Health Organisation, 
2010). In September of 2010, a study published by Trtchounian et al. (2010) found 
that “EC required stronger vacuums (suction) to smoke than conventional brands, and 
the effects of this on human health could be adverse” (Trtchounian et al., 2010). This 
calls into question the usefulness of the EC as a nicotine delivery device over time 
(Trtchounian et al., 2010). In October of 2010, the first VapeFest was held in UK - an 
event bringing together all stakeholders in ECs for the purpose of informing, 
researching and social networking. 
 
                                                 
316mg is the amount (strength) of nicotine in milligrams for each millilitre of E-Liquid 
in the sampled Ruyan V8 ENDD brand. 
 
4 Ruyan V8 ENDD is a brand of Electronic Cigarette. 
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In September of 2011, the British Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT - 
popularly known as the ‘Nudge Unit’) endorsed tobacco harm reduction in its first 
annual report, with ECs cited as potentially effective substitutes for tobacco (Stratton, 
2011). In the report, it was stated that  
 
“It will be important to get the regulatory framework for these products 
right, to encourage new products. A canon of behaviour change is that it 
is much easier to substitute a similar behaviour than to extinguish an 
entrenched habit (an example was the rapid switch from leaded to 
unleaded fuel). If alternative and safe nicotine products can be developed 
which are attractive enough to substitute people away from traditional 
cigarettes, they could have the potential to save 10,000s of lives a year.” 
(Stratton, 2011). 
 
In February of 2012, according to The Scotsman newspaper (Smith, 2012), Standard 
life, one of Scotland biggest insurance companies, banned EC use on its office 
premises. The corporation said that it had no smoking policy for two decades and 
would not make any exception for ECs. The corporation came under criticism by 
groups who supported the use of ECs. For instance, Forest, a pro-tobacco group states 
that  
 
“It is utterly crazy. A lot of smokers use them to help them to cut down on 
smoking, or to try to quit … If companies don’t want them to go outside 
for extended periods then allowing them to smoke an electronic cigarette 
at their desk seems logical … It is completely ridiculous to ban them. If 
it’s because they look from a distance like cigarettes then they are basically 
treating workers like children.” (Smith, 2012). 
 
Sheila Duffy, chief executive of ASH Scotland contrary to Forest welcomed Standard 
Life’s decision, saying that 
 
“If a company wants to ban EC in their offices that could help avoid 
[giving the] impression that smoking is normal, [it] is a desirable thing.” 
(Smith, 2012)  
 
“Tobacco is not a normal product - it kills half of its customers if used as 
intended. EC are much less harmful than normal cigarettes. However, 
there is still a lot of research to be done on both their safety and on their 
effectiveness.” (Smith, 2012).  
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In March of 2012, consumer groups such as the Consumer Associate for Smoke Free 
Alternative Association (CASAA),  Electronic Cigarette Consumer Association UK 
(ECCA UK), Stelda NL (Netherlands), and other European companies organized the 
first World Vaping Day, calling for their right to vape (CASSA, 2014). CASSA stated 
that,  
 
“Electronic cigarettes are not intended to be used as a nicotine cessation 
product. They are intended to replace tobacco cigarettes by providing an 
alternate source of nicotine and mimicking the familiar behaviours 
associated with smoking, thereby eliminating the user’s exposure to smoke 
and significantly reducing the health concerns related to smoking. By 
eliminating the cigarette smoke but not requiring the user to give up 
familiar habits and nicotine, electronic cigarettes are showing significant 
promise as a highly successful tobacco harm reduction product” (CASSA, 
2012). 
 
In July of 2012, a study carried out by Schripp et al raised the significance of passive 
vaping in the debate. Schripp et al. (2013), concluded that ECs do not produce a similar 
second-hand smoke to conventional cigarettes. Bystanders are exposed to a mist of 
exhaled vapour, which has undergone changes in the human lungs similar to 
deposition and evaporation (Schripp et al., 2013). With consumer groups clamouring 
for the rights of vapers, this study is of serious significance as the right of non-vaping 
bystanders also becomes relevant in the debate. By December of 2012, BAT had 
acquired UK-based Company CN Creative, which specialised in the development of 
EC technologies (BAT, 2014). A tobacco company acquiring a EC company raised a 
lot of suspicion and further fuelled the debate due to historical controversies 
surrounding tobacco smoking. ECs at this stage were still marketed as a consumer 
product and could be purchased in most retail shops in the UK. 
 
By the end of 2012, the evolving events suggest there was also a gradual evolution of 
the state of scientific evidence (but still insufficient to draw any conclusion) in the 
suggestion that ECs were a safer alternative to smoking or an aid to stopping smoking. 
The main issue during this phase of the debate (between 2008 and 2012) was whether 
available ECs were a safer alternative to tobacco cigarettes in terms of quality, or an 
effective aid to stopping smoking. While some studies concluded that ECs are safer 
when compared to tobacco smoking, and an effective smoking cessation aid, other 
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studies raised caution, pointing to passive vaping, inconsistency with labelling and 
actual context, and questioning the long term benefit of vaping, amplified by large 
residual uncertainty. Some of the studies which can be used to support favourable 
arguments towards the use of EC are (Laugesen, 2008, Bullen et al., 2010, Etter, 2010, 
Etter and Bullen, 2011, Dawkins et al., 2012, Wagener et al., 2012, Flouris and 
Oikonomou, 2010a, Polosa et al., 2011, Vardavas et al., 2012, Flouris et al., 2012). On 
the other hand, studies such as (Bahl et al., 2012a, Kim and Shin, 2013, Schripp et al., 
2013, Trtchounian et al., 2010, Eissenberg, 2010) can be used to counter arguments in 
favour of the safety and efficacy claims made on behalf of ECs. This unfolding 
scenario illustrates Collingridge and Reeve (1986)’s over critical model, where the 
science is contested and where multiple interpretations exist about available evidence. 
This period ended with the entry of big tobacco companies into the electronic cigarette 
market. 
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Table 7.1 (below) provides the chronology of events that unfolded relating to the 
vaping risk debate (between 2008 and 2012) following the concern initially raised by 
WHO.  
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Table 7.1: Chronology of events relating to the vaping risk between the periods of 2008 and 2012 
 
Year EC Debate 
 
2008 
 
i. Electronic cigarettes were initially introduced and claimed as a better alternative to smoking. However, in 
September of 2008, World Health Organization (WHO) released a report debunking any of claim (Nebehay, 
2008). They called for further scientific research in this arena before any such claim could be made. 
ii. October - A safety report commissioned by Ruyan  (an e-cigarette company) found ECs to be safe when 
compared to conventional cigarettes with only trace toxicant found to be contained in them (Laugesen, 2008). 
2009 
 
iii. July - WHO raised concerns that electronic cigarettes, may be marketed to young people and lack appropriate 
health warnings (CASSA, 2014). 
iv. December - A trial study reveals that Ruyan brand EC containing nicotine reduced the desire to smoke, similar to 
conventional Nicorette nicotine inhalator (Bullen et al., 2010).  
2010 v. January - Research conducted in Greece by institute Demokritos analysing toxicants in electronic cigarettes 
found no trace of polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbons (Flouris and Oikonomou, 2010b). 
vi. February - MHRA opened a public consultation on whether to bring nicotine-containing products (NCPs) 
including ECs within the medicines licensing regime (MHRA, 2010, Bryan). 
vii. March - A clinical laboratory study carried out by (Eissenberg, 2010) shows that ECs were less effective in 
suppressing cravings than conventional cigarettes.  
viii. April - A study published by Bullen et al. (2010) on the short term effect of an electronic nicotine delivery device 
(EC) on desire to smoke concluded that the 16 mg Ruyan V8 ENDD enabled smokers to tolerate alleviated 
desire to smoke after overnight abstinence.  
ix. May - In a two day conference held in Geneva, WHO made a further call to the scientific community to conduct 
further research into assessing the safety and efficacy of ECs (World Health Organisation, 2010).  
x. September - A study published by Trtchounian et al (2010) found that stronger puffing is needed to smoke most 
brands of EC than conventional cigarettes, and that smoking characteristics like vacuum and density vary 
considerably between brands (Trtchounian et al., 2010).  
xi. October - the first VapeFest is held in UK. VapeFest is an event that brings together all stakeholders in ECs for 
the purpose of informing, researching and social networking. 
2011 xii. March - the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) published the outcome of a public 
consultation on whether to bring nicotine containing products (NCPs) including ECs within the medicines 
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licensing regime. Responses indicated a strong support from the medical and public health communities for the 
application of the medicines regulatory framework.  
xiii. March - Department of Health Tobacco launched the plan to “develop new approaches to encourage tobacco 
users who cannot quit switching to safer sources of nicotine.” (Department of Health, 2011).   
xiv. May - Expert working group was set up under the statutory committee of the Commission on Human Medicines 
(CHM) to advise the UK government on medicines on the nature, quality and safety of unlicensed NCPs 
(MHRA, 2013).  
xv. August – Etter and Bullen (2011) show that an electronic cigarettes is a device used successfully by many 
smokers to quit smoking or substantially cut down the number of cigarettes consumed (Etter and Bullen, 2011).  
xvi. October - Polosa et al (2011) concluded that ECs substantially decreased cigarette consumption without causing 
significant side effects in smokers not intending to quit. 
xvii. October - The British Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT) endorses tobacco harm reduction in its 
first annual report with ECs cited as potentially effective substitutes to tobacco. 
2012 xviii. February –Standard life, one of Scotland biggest companies bans EC use on its office premises (Smith, 2012).  
xix. March - Consumer groups such as the CASAA, ECCA UK, Stelda NL (Netherlands), IGED (Germany) and 
ATACA (Australia) organize the first World Vaping Day, calling for their right to vape (CASSA, 2014). 
xx. April - A study published in ‘Chest’ by MacCauley et al suggested a link between EC use and exogenous lipoid 
pneumonia due to glycerin-based ECs (McCauley et al., 2012).  
xxi. June - A study investigating the short term pulmonary effect of ECs found that there were immediate adverse 
physiological effects similar to that of tobacco cigarettes (Vardavas et al., 2012).  
xxii. July - A study carried out by Schripp et al concluded that ECs do not produce second-hand smoke, like tobacco 
cigarettes. However, bystanders are exposed to mist exhaled by the vaper which undergoes changes in the human 
lungs similar to deposition and evaporation (Schripp et al., 2013).   
xxiii. October - Flouris et al found that complete blood count (CBC) indices remained unchanged during the control 
session of active and passive EC smoking sessions, unlike the tobacco smoke which increased the secondary 
proteins of acute inflammatory load for at least one hour (Flouris et al., 2012). 
xxiv. December - Bahl et al raised concern about pregnant women who use ECs or who are exposed to second hand 
EC mist (Bahl et al., 2012a).  
xxv. December – BAT acquires UK-based company CN Creative, who specialise in the development of EC 
technologies (BAT, 2014). 
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7.3 The Vaping Debate (between 2013 and 
2016) 
 
The unfolding of events suggests that within the period between 2013 and 2016, there 
was more emphasis placed on how ECs should be regulated. The involvement of the 
tobacco industry at this stage also heightened tension and brought about fierce scrutiny 
of evidence and arguments between stakeholder groups around the risk acceptability 
debate, horning the divisions and disagreements between them. The unfolding of 
events shows that in January of 2013, the first television advert for ECs on a national, 
mainstream British channel was launched by the brand E-Lites (Sweney, 2013). 
Adverts for ECs were at that time subject to the general rules of the advertising code. 
In February of 2013, Vype launched a £3.6 million EC promotional campaign in the 
UK. Prof John Britton, Chair, Tobacco Advisory Group, Royal College of Physicians 
who supports ECs says that 
 
“If all the smokers in Britain stopped smoking cigarettes and started 
smoking ECs we would save 5 million deaths in people who are alive 
today. It’s a massive potential public health prize” (Satchell, 2014). 
 
In March of 2013, the Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency 
(MHRA) published the outcome of a public consultation on whether or not to bring 
nicotine-containing products (NCPs), including ECs within the medicines licensing 
regime. According to MHRA report, they received a total of 1,217 responses, 
including consumers of NCPs and patient groups, medical professionals, including 
Royal Colleges, pharmacists, public Health and NHS bodies, Local and Trading 
Standards Authorities, manufacturers/importers of NCPs and the pharmaceutical 
industry (MHRA, 2013). According to MHRA, responses indicated a strong support 
from the medical and public health communities for the application of the medicines 
regulatory framework. Some other public health organisations also thought that an 
immediate medicine regulation would see the disappearance of potentially useful 
products from the market, or that it may lead to the suppression of beneficial 
innovation (MHRA, 2013). Those mainly against the MHRA medical framework 
regulation were importers and users of unlicensed electronic cigarettes (MHRA, 
  
 
156 
 
2013). They feared it could lead to a ban on available products, which would force EC 
users back into smoking tobacco. This indicates a public perception that ECs may be 
beneficial to public health and safety and would therefore require appropriate 
regulation. 
 
In May of 2013, an expert working group was set up under the authority of the 
statutory committee of the Commission on Human Medicines (CHM) which advises 
the UK government on medicines (MHRA, 2013). The scope of the group’s remit 
included advising on the nature, quality and safety of unlicensed NCPs, the actual use 
of unlicensed NCPs in the marketplace, the effectiveness of unlicensed NCPs in 
smoking cessation, modelling of the potential impact on bringing these products under 
medicines regulation on public health outcomes (MHRA, 2013). In June of 2013, 
MHRA announced that the UK Government had decided that it would regulate all 
NCPs, including EC, as medicines in order to ensure the safety of the product and also 
address the issue of distrust about the quality of some EC devices and their content. 
Jeremy Mean, the MHRA’s Group Manager of Vigilance and Risk Management of 
Medicines, states that  
 
“Reducing the harms of smoking to smokers and those around them is a 
key Government health priority. Our research has shown that existing 
electronic cigarettes and other nicotine containing products on the market 
are not good enough to meet this public health priority”. 
 
This announcement came three months after the publication of the public consultation 
report on how ECs should be regulated, in which there was wide support for EC 
regulation within the existing medicines framework. The decision to regulate under 
medical regimes, according to Jeremy, was to ensure both that high quality products 
were made widely available and that smokers had an effective alternative they could 
rely on. This indicates that the regulation and marketing of ECs changed from a 
consumer product not subject to test before being put on sale to the public, to one which 
is regulated under the medicines regulatory framework, requiring manufacturers to 
apply for a medicinal licence from the Medicines and Healthcare products Regulatory 
Agency (MHRA).  
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In July, BAT and China National Tobacco Corporation jointly invested in a subsidiary 
(CTBAT International Limited) launch their first EC product, Vype, in the UK (BAT, 
2014). In February of 2014, the European Parliament approved a revised European 
Union Tobacco Product Directive that regulates as tobacco products ECs with nicotine 
concentrations up to 20 mg/mL, an amount equal to that in a pack of cigarettes 
(Gallagher, 2014). According to the directives, ECs with higher nicotine 
concentrations or intended therapeutic use would be regulated as medical devices. The 
directive stipulated that ECs had to be childproof and that packaging had to include 
information about ingredients, adverse effects, and health warnings. Refillable 
cartridges were allowed as long as their volume did not exceed 2 mL (but could be 
banned by the European Commission if at least 3 member states prohibited them on 
the basis of risk to human health). Marketing and advertising restrictions would mirror 
those of tobacco products (EC, 2014). The European Commission said the new rules 
would “deter young people from experimenting with, and becoming addicted to, 
tobacco” and should lead to a 2% drop in the amount smoked over the subsequent five 
years.  
 
Simon Clark, the director of the pro smoking campaign group Forest, criticised the EU 
ban as a ban on consumer choice that “will do little” to prevent young children from 
smoking (Gallagher, 2014). He also criticised the requirement for plain packaging 
legislation that was being considered in some EU countries, including the UK. Cancer 
Research UK's head of tobacco policy, Alison Cox, supported the new EU directive 
stating that  
 
“The Tobacco Products Directive sets standards on tobacco which will 
bring real benefits for people's health in the UK and across Europe.” 
(Gallagher, 2014). 
 
The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) opened an eight-week consultation to 
look at introducing new rules to clear up ‘concern’ and ‘confusion’ in EC advertising. 
The consultation followed criticism of an EC advert broadcast during ITV's I'm a 
Celebrity … Get Me Out Of Here which prompted more than 1,100 complaints to the 
advertising watchdog (Reynolds, 2014). In March, the European Parliament and 
Council adopted the revised Tobacco Products Directive (EC, 2014). Under this 
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directive, advertising of nicotine-containing devices not licensed as medicines were to 
be prohibited, products would be required to carry health warnings, meet as yet to be 
defined purity and emissions standards, provide data on nicotine uptake, and be subject 
to restrictions on total nicotine content, while suppliers would be required to take full 
responsibility for quality and safety when used under normal conditions (EC, 2014). 
This meant that any EC that was not regulated by MHRA would be governed by the 
revised European Union Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) (EC, 2014). 
 
Another interesting event (within the unfolding event) that signifies a clear scientific 
divide and contradiction in both the scientific and public health communities was 
when, in 2014, 53 specialists in nicotine science and public health policy experts wrote 
to Dr. Margaret Chan, of the World Health Organization (WHO) saying that regulating 
EC in the same way as tobacco products would cost lives by reducing the number of 
people relying on ECs to quit smoking. The letter expressed the opinion that tobacco 
harm reduction strategy is part of the solution to the burden of smoking related disease 
that requires a careful, evidence based approach to its regulation (Dreaper, 2014a). 
They viewed ECs as one of “the most significant health innovations of the 21st century 
– perhaps saving hundreds of millions of lives” asking WHO to “resist the urge to 
control and suppress ECs” (Dreaper, 2014a, Nicotinepolicy.net, 2014). In response to 
this, one hundred and twenty nine (129) public health and medical experts from 31 
countries, representing every WHO region, signed a letter to Margaret Chan, calling 
for new controls on EC and warning of tobacco industry tactics (Aktan et al., 2014). 
The letter expressed the view that “the statement [initial letter signed by 53 experts] 
makes several assertions about ENDS’ marketing, emissions, harms, and use that are 
either contradicted by available evidence or for which no evidence is currently 
available.” They ask WHO to be mindful of tobacco industry tactics in shaping 
arguments around EC regulation.  
 
By 2015, a number of scientific studies providing evidence about the safety and 
efficacy of ECs had emerged. Table 7.2 (below) summarises some of scientific 
evidence for or against the use of EC and the associated safety and efficacy arguments. 
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Table 7.2 Summary of scientific evidence for or against electronic cigarette 
 
Arguments for  Arguments against  
Author Findings and conclusion  Author Findings and conclusion  
 
Laugesen 
(2008) 
Found ECs to be safe 
when compared to 
conventional cigarettes 
and only trace toxicant 
was found to be 
contained in it. 
Eissenberg 
(2010) 
ECs do not deliver 
nicotine effectively after 
acute administration 
unlike gums and patches. 
Bullen et 
al. (2010) 
ECs are rated more 
pleasant to use than the 
inhalator and reduce the 
desire to smoke, similar 
to conventional Nicorette 
nicotine inhalator. 
Trtchounian 
et al. (2010) 
Efficiency of vapour 
production was found to 
decline during vaping 
calling into question EC’s 
usefulness as a nicotine 
delivery devices. 
Etter 
(2010) 
EC found to aid smoking 
cessation.  
Trehy et al. 
(2011) 
Found the nicotine related 
impurities to be present in 
the EC sample tested and 
inconsistencies with 
content labelling found. 
Etter and 
Bullen 
(2011) 
EC aided smokers in 
quitting or reducing 
smoking. 
Bahl et al. 
(2012b) 
Embryonic cells found to 
be more sensitive to refill 
fluid than adult lung cells. 
Flavourings linked to 
toxicity and refill products 
vary in terms of 
cytotoxicity. 
Dawkins et 
al. (2012) 
ECs reduced desire to 
smoke and abstain over a 
20 minute period 
Schripp et 
al. (2013) 
ECs are a new source for 
chemical and vapour 
exposure in an enclosed 
environment.  
Wagener 
et al. 
(2012) 
ECs offer more benefit 
than cost, e.g. in terms of 
toxic exposure to 
smokers and bystanders, 
aids smoking cessation. 
Schober et 
al. (2014) 
ECs are not emission free 
and their pollutants have 
health implication for 
both users and bystanders.  
Vansickel 
and 
Eissenberg 
(2013) 
ECs deliver nicotine 
effectively, increase 
heart rate and reduces 
urge to smoke. 
Kim and 
Shin (2013) 
Tobacco-specific 
nitrosamines in refill 
liquids for ECs were 
found to be 10 times more 
than those published by 
Ruyan EC Company.  
Goniewicz 
et al. 
(2013) 
ECs used mostly to quit 
smoking and have lesser 
harm effect. 
Meo and Al 
Asiri (2014) 
ECs can lead to several 
health implications such 
as nausea, headache, 
dizziness, upper 
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The point here is to shed light on the divisions, contradictions and disagreements that 
existed within the scientific community and how such disagreement polarised the 
vaping health risk debate. The reasons for this scientific division and disagreement 
may be due to (a) the absence of economically resourced stakeholder groups and; (b) 
the lack of willingness by stakeholders to use available resources to protect their 
interests and shape the technical debate relating to vaping risk in the same way as was 
seen in the tobacco debate; (c) the fact that there are no obvious deaths relating to 
vaping (indeed it is seen as less of a hazard than smoking) which might also shape the 
discourse; and, (d) the fact that political power was less obvious earlier on in the 
technical debate relating to vaping. ECs are new products, and the benefits (including 
potential tax yields for the government) or possible dangers to public health and safety 
were unclear in their initial embryonic stage. These may have led to differences in 
timeframes between smoking and vaping risk debates, where in the smoking debate, 
powerful stakeholder groups were seen to exercise power with the interest of shaping 
the debate. Such scientific division has already been described in literature by 
Collingridge and Reeve (1986) as “over critical model” where those with power 
cannot supress or constrain the perspectives brought to bear on risk debate, or in this 
case, where those with economic power are unable to shape the technical debate 
brought to bear on the risk.  
 
respiratory tract irritation 
and risk of lung cancer. 
Etter et al. 
(2013) 
Finds nicotine content in 
refill liquids to be similar 
to those stated on the 
label. Although toxicants 
were found, these were 
within a safe level.   
 Pisinger 
(2014)  
ECs although less harmful 
than tobacco cigarettes 
can have negative 
consequences for public 
health if used by a large 
sections of the population. 
Dawkins 
and 
Corcoran 
(2014) 
ECs reduce urge to 
smoke. 
Norton et 
al. (2014) 
ECs found to require more 
puffing than conventional 
cigarettes, to delivere less 
nicotine and to be less 
satisfying. 
McNeill et 
al. (2015) 
ECs 
are 95% less harmful 
than conventional 
cigarettes. 
Johnson 
and 
Pennington 
(2015) 
ECs contain harmful 
substances and do not 
result in decreased use of 
tobacco cigarettes. 
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The evolving events presented in this study also show that similar divisions and 
disagreement existed amongst UK public health institutions. Institutions such as Public 
Health England (PHE), Royal College of Physicians of London and ASH UK, and the 
British cabinet office were optimistic about the potential benefits of ECs, focusing their 
arguments on existing smokers and the fact that ECs reduce exposure to carcinogenic 
substances found in tobacco cigarettes. Indeed, the issue here is how the relative risks 
are judged, either from the perspective of smokers or non-smokers. There is also an 
assumption that all those who vape are trying to quit, which begs the question of 
patches and nicotine and how effective these are as smoking cessation aids. These 
groups of public health institutions see ECs as an effective aid to smoking cessation, 
offering a safer alternative to those who do not want to quit smoking. For example, the 
British Cabinet Office’s Behavioural Insights Team (BIT - the ‘Nudge Unit’) as early 
as 2011 endorsed tobacco harm reduction in its first annual report, with ECs cited as 
potentially effective substitutes to tobacco (Stratton, 2011). In the report, it was stated 
that:  
 
“It will be important to get the regulatory framework for these products 
right, to encourage new products. A canon of behaviour change is that it 
is much easier to substitute a similar behaviour than to extinguish an 
entrenched habit (an example was the rapid switch from leaded to 
unleaded fuel). If alternative and safe nicotine products can be developed 
which are attractive enough to substitute people away from traditional 
cigarettes, they could have the potential to save 10,000s of lives a year” 
(Stratton, 2011).  
 
Other public institutions such as the British Medical Association, the UK Faculty of 
Public Health, and the European Commission took a precautionary stance and called 
for strict control and regulation of EC devices. These groups expressed concern that 
ECs may be a potential gateway to re-normalizing smoking (Rigotti, 2015) and might 
be exploited by the tobacco industry to recruit non-smokers and children (Kremer, 
2013). For example, the British Medical Association raised concerns that ECs may ‘re-
normalise’ smoking, thereby undermining the smoking bans which have helped de-
glamorise cigarettes in United Kingdom (Kremer, 2013). The UK Faculty of Public 
Health also expressed concern that there was the potential for the tobacco industry to 
use ECs to promote tobacco cigarettes while gaining access to policy makers (UKFPH, 
2014). There were those who claimed that the red-glowing tips and various fruity 
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flavours might prove enticing to children and that ECs may become a gateway for 
recruiting new tobacco smokers, especially young children and others who have never 
smoked. Other areas of contention included: adequate safety controls to prevent 
accidental injury, monitoring of trends in ‘dual use’ of EC in combination with 
continued tobacco smoking, regulation of marketing activity, and the involvement of 
the tobacco industry in the EC market.  
 
Table 7.3 (below), summarises the chronology of events relating to the vaping debate 
(between the periods of 2013 and 2016).  
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Table 7.3: Chronology of events relating to the vaping risk between the periods of 2013 and 2016 
 
Year  Evolving events 
2013 i. January - EC advertising is allowed on TV and made subject to the general rules of the advertising code. 
ii. February – Prof John Britton, Chair, Tobacco Advisory Group, Royal College of Physicians said:” If all the smokers 
in Britain stopped smoking cigarettes and started smoking ECs we would save 5 million deaths in people who are 
alive today. It’s a massive potential public health prize.” 
iii. February - Vype launches £3.6 million plus EC campaign in the UK 
iv. June - Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory Agency (MHRA) announced a plan to regulate ECs as 
medicines on the basis of the assumption that ECs function like NRTs for smokers wishing to cut down or quit (Grana 
et al., 2014a).  
v. June - Jeremy Mean, the MHRA’s Group Manager of Vigilance and Risk Management of Medicines, says that “our 
research has shown that existing electronic cigarettes and other nicotine containing products on the market are not 
good enough to meet this public health priority” (MHRA, 2013). 
vi. June - ASH announced that it “does not consider it appropriate to include ECs under smoke free regulations”. 
vii. June - MHRA announces that UK government has accepted the advice of the CHM expert group which concluded 
that the NCPs on the market did not meet required standards of safety, quality and efficacy (MHRA, 2013). MHRA 
recommended that all NCP products including ECs should be regulated as medicines. 
viii. June - The Council of European union reached political agreement on a revised EU tobacco directive draft (EC, 2014). 
2014 ix. A study found EC use to be more prevalent among youths than adults, despite a law prohibiting EC sales to minors 
(Grana et al., 2014b).  
x. February - the European Parliament approved a revised European Union Tobacco Product Directive that regulates 
ECs with nicotine concentrations up to 20 mg/mL (an amount equal to that in a pack of cigarettes) as tobacco products 
(Gallagher, 2014). The directive stipulates that ECs must be childproof and that packaging must include information 
about ingredients, adverse effects, and health warnings (EC, 2014).  
xi. The European Commission says the new rules will “deter young people from experimenting with, and becoming 
addicted to, tobacco” and should lead to a 2% drop in the amount smoked over the next five years. 
xii. Simon Clark, the director of the pro-smoking campaign group - Forest, criticised the ban as a ban on consumer choice, 
which would do little to deter children from smoking. 
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xiii. Cancer Research UK's head of tobacco policy, Alison Cox, supported the new EU directive stating that “The Tobacco 
Products Directive sets standards on tobacco which will bring real benefits for people’s health in the UK and across 
Europe.” (Gallagher, 2014). 
xiv. February - England’s Public Health Minister, Jane Ellison, reacting to the EU directive said: “I am very pleased that 
we have made a significant step towards further tough action on tobacco in the UK and across Europe.” (Gallagher, 
2014) 
xv. February - North East Conservative MEP Martin Callanan, said he was disappointed that most of his colleagues had 
voted for the EU proposals (Moss, 2014).  
xvi. February - The Committee of Advertising Practice (CAP) opened an eight-week consultation to look at introducing 
new rules to clear up “concern” and “confusion” in EC advertising (Reynolds, 2014). 
xvii. February - Etter and Bullen concluded that population-based studies indicate that, across countries, ECs are most 
commonly being used concurrently with conventional tobacco cigarettes (dual use) (Etter and Bullen, 2011).  
xviii. March - The European Parliament and Council adopts the revised Tobacco Products Directive (EC, 2014). Under this 
directive, advertising of nicotine-containing devices not licensed as medicines would be prohibited, products would be 
required to carry health warnings, meet yet to be defined purity and emissions standards, provide data on nicotine 
uptake and be subject to restrictions on total nicotine content, while suppliers will be required to bear full 
responsibility for quality and safety when used under reasonably foreseeable or normal conditions (EC, 2014). 
xix. March - The Advertising Standards Authority launched an investigation into EC Vype advertising that calls Vype 
experience “pure satisfaction” and calls on smokers to “experience the breakthrough” (Sweney, 2014). 
xx. April - ASH reported that the number of people who use electronic cigarettes in the UK had tripled over the past two 
years to 2.1 million (BBC, 2014a). 
xxi. Ash conducted a separate study and found that most EC users were using them to reduce smoking (ASH, 2014).  
xxii. May - EU Tobacco Products Directive (TPD) enters into force (Gallagher, 2014). 
xxiii. May - 53 scientists write to Dr Chan, World Health Organization (WHO) saying that regulating ECs in the same way 
as tobacco products would cost lives by reducing the number of people using them to quit smoking. They asked WHO 
to “resist the urge to control and suppress ECs” (Nicotinepolicy.net, 2014). 
xxiv. May - Prof West, of University College London told the BBC that ECs should be “regulated appropriate to what they 
are” and that they are “orders of magnitude safer” than tobacco cigarettes (Dreaper, 2014b).  
xxv. May - Dr. Vivienne Nathanson of the British Medical Association (BMA) calls for stronger regulation of ECs in the 
UK. In a BBC Breakfast show, she explained that evidence suggests that children who had never smoked were 
starting to use ECs, having been influenced by marketing campaigns. Prof John Ashton, president of the Faculty of 
Public Health, also raised concerns about children using ECs stating that the benefits of fewer people smoking must 
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be weighed against the risk of electronic cigarettes leading to more people starting to smoke, particularly children 
(Satchell, 2014).  
xxvi. June - A press campaign promoting ECs as “pure satisfaction” for smokers was banned (Sweney, 2014). 
xxvii. June - One hundred and twenty nine (129) public health and medical experts from 31 countries, representing every 
WHO region, signed a letter to Dr. Margaret Chan, the Director General of WHO, calling for new controls on ECs 
and warning of tobacco industry tactics (Aktan et al., 2014). The letter is a direct response to the previous letter signed 
by 53 experts. The letter warns WHO of tobacco tactics.  
xxviii. July - Ash Scotland calls for a legal ban on sales of electronic smoking devices to anyone under 18, with tighter 
controls on their marketing (BBC, 2014b).  
xxix. July - BBC bans the use of ECs in its offices. According to the corporation, the ban comes after advice from British 
Medical Association (Glanfield, 2014). 
xxx. August 8 - A 62 year old man dies as a result of an EC explosion in Penkett Road, Wallasey (Guardian News, 2014). 
xxxi. August 15 - An EC advert saying ‘love your lungs’ is banned for implying that they were of health benefit. An 
investigation was launched by watchdogs into LeoLite’s poster, after receiving complaints of safety and health benefit 
claims. The manufacturers however, argued there were no health claims (Evans, 2014). 
xxxii. August 26 – WHO announces that there should be a ban on the use of ECs indoors and that sale to children, should 
stop (Mundasad, 2014). 
  xxxiii. August - Public Health England’s expert evidence review concluded that ECs are around 95% less harmful than 
smoking (McNeill et al., 2015). 
xxxiv. December - UK government announced that EC will be prescribed by NHS doctors (Tonkin, 2015). 
2016 xxxv. Electronic cigarettes are to be regulated by the EU Tobacco Products Directive in the UK from 20 May 2016 unless 
licensed by the medicines regulator, the MHRA (Consumer Protection, 2016). 
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7.4 Analysis of the Vaping Debate  
 
This chapter examined the development and evolution of the vaping debate into policy 
development. The main thrust of the vaping risk debate centred on the safety and 
efficacy of EC and whether it is a potential replacement for tobacco cigarettes or a 
means of stopping smoking. The central actors involved in the initial phase of the 
debate are - WHO that raised the concern on the lack of evidence around the safety 
and efficacy of EC; the scientific community who are called upon to conduct more 
research in this arena and; EC companies and retailers who claim that EC is a safer 
alternative to tobacco but enjoy economic benefit from the sale of the product. Unlike 
the smoking debate, the EC debate occurred in a different social-political context 
including significant advances in information and communication technology (ICT) 
that has shifted the ways in which the public communicates about the risk to a more 
interactive way. There were also significant cultural shifts in policy making when 
compared to the 1950s when the tobacco debate emerged. In addition, recent times 
have seen more emphasis on citizens’ participation and deliberative policy making. 
Furthermore, there was the initial absence of economically powerful stakeholders who 
were able to engage their resources (as seen in the smoking case study) to shape the 
public health risk communication process. 
 
Within the first phase of the analysed debate (between 2008 and 2012), there was very 
little or no scientific understanding of vaping risk, there was a gradual evolution of 
scientific evidence and there was a MHRA led public consultation on how electronic 
cigarettes should be regulated. The unfolding of events suggested a sharp divide within 
the scientific and public health communities in their interpretation of available 
evidence that mirrored a divide in the public at large (see Table 7.2). The scenario here 
illustrates Collingridge and Reeve (1986)’s over critical model, where the science is 
contested and where multiple interpretations exist around available evidence. The core 
argument at this point concerns the need to “get the regulatory framework right” for 
a device that could potentially save thousands of lives (Stratton, 2011); the need for 
more research to be done before any conclusions can be drawn (Smith, 2012); and the 
need to retain familiar habits and nicotine intake, to encourage cessation (CASSA, 
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2012). This period ended by the end of 2012 with the entry of big tobacco companies 
into the electronic cigarette market that created tension and heightened scrutiny in the 
risk acceptability debate thereon. 
 
With reference to the PERC framework, the evolving events suggest that the 
institutional power of WHO was significant in pointing out that the lack of knowledge 
about the safety and efficacy of ECs was important within the context of their declared 
public health benefit. The call for research made by WHO into the safety and efficacy 
of ECs seems to have driven scientific research around the safety and efficacy frame. 
The MHRA led public consultation on how to regulate ECs also influenced the 
direction of the vaping debate. This shifted the decision making power from the policy 
to the public domain, although this may have been a reflection of a more general shift 
towards democratic policy making in contemporary political life. In terms of expertise, 
technical expertise was the means by which the public made sense of the benefits or 
risk of electronic cigarette. This suggests that while the public were involved in 
decision-making relating to regulation, public engagement in the development of 
accepted knowledge around the safety and efficacy of ECs was limited to the 
acceptability debate with scientist playing leading role in the technical debate. The 
vaping debate also highlights the importance of (mis)trust in public health risk 
communication, and how the presence or absence of trust could influence the nature 
of tension, and scrutiny of the debate around risk acceptability. For example, the entry 
of powerful tobacco companies in the EC industry fuelled tension and suspicion, and 
further heightened scrutiny of evidence and arguments brought by stakeholders in the 
vaping risk debate. 
 
In the second examined phase of the vaping debate (the period between 2013 and 
2016), the entry of tobacco companies in the EC market saw more heightened tension 
and scrutiny of scientific evidence and interpretation. This created greater visibility 
for divisions and disagreements between the various stakeholder groups engaged in 
the debate. Some of the situational factors that may have contributed to this scientific 
division and disagreement are (a) the absence of economically resourced stakeholder 
groups before late 2012 (b) caution towards the use of delay tactics by EC companies 
in the same way as was seen in the tobacco debate and (c) the fact that political power 
was less obvious earlier on in the technical debate relating to vaping. The results of 
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the MHRA led consultation were also published in this period. There was a strong 
support from medical and public health communities for the application of the 
medicines regulatory framework on ECs (MHRA, 2013). However, marketers and 
users of unlicensed ECs feared inappropriate regulation could lead to a ban on 
available products, which would force EC users back towards smoking tobacco. Three 
months following the publication of the public consultation, the UK Government 
announced that all NCPs including ECs would be regulated as medicines. Following 
this, the EU directive was also adopted.  
 
With reference to the PERC framework, structural power can be seen to be expressed 
for instance in the stakeholder relation between expert committees and policy makers. 
For example, in 2015, shortly after the public health England’s expert conclusion that 
ECs are around 95% less harmful than smoking (McNeill et al., 2015), following that, 
the UK government made the decision that EC could be prescribed by NHS doctors to 
help smokers who wanted to quit smoking (Tonkin, 2015). This decision was based 
on the advice of the expert committee of public health England, which pointed to the 
importance of the ‘stakeholder’s relationship’ in the policy perspective taken to vaping 
risk. What was also important was how technical experts’ interpretations and frames 
of argument shaped the discourse around vaping risk. There were scientists and public 
health expert groups who viewed EC as an effective aid to smoking cessation, offering 
a safer alternative to those who do not want to quit smoking. On the other hand, there 
were those who called for a precautionary stance and for stricter control and regulation 
of EC devices. The latter group of experts expressed concern that ECs may be a 
potential gateway to renormalizing smoking, undermining several years of effort in 
deglamourizing smoking, and that ECs may be exploited by the tobacco industry to 
recruit non-smokers and children who may then go on to smoke cigarettes. The nature 
of interpretation is dependent on how the relative risks are judged, from the 
perspective of either the smokers or non-smokers (see Table 7.2).  
 
In terms of communication, one unique feature of this debate was how MHRA led a 
public consultation allowed a two-way communication within policy makers and the 
public, and how that has allowed different group of stakeholders to exchange views 
and opinions with policy makers. This perhaps, may have eased public acceptability 
of EC regulation under the medical regime, as the public felt trusted and included in 
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the decision as seen in the report of the consultation that shows a strong public support 
for medical consultation of ECs. The vaping debate also highlights the importance of 
(mis)trust in public health risk communication, around how the presence or absence 
of trust could influence the nature of tensions in, and scrutiny of the debate around risk 
acceptability. An important issue within this latter stage of the debate was how the 
entrenched mistrust inherited from the smoking debate shaped the vaping debate. This 
was evidenced in a letter signed by 129 public health and medical experts from 31 
countries, representing every WHO region, to Margaret Chan, of World Health 
Organisation. This group of experts in the letter called for new regulation and control 
of ECs, warning of tobacco industry tactics (Aktan et al., 2014) and the need to be 
cautious of the favourable argument brought to bear on the vaping health risk debate.  
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Table 7.4 (below) summarises the link between events within the vaping debate and 
the study research theme.  
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Table 7.4: Linking smoking and vaping risk events (the period between 2008 and 2016) to the study research theme 
Power (to effect 
outcome) 
Expertise (interpretation and framing) Communication (mis)trust/credibility  
The ability of 
WHO to raise 
vaping risk as an 
issue worthy to 
on the health 
policy agenda. 
 
Public perception 
been shaped by 
expertise 
 
Public 
consultation 
 
Stakeholder 
relation between 
scientific 
committees and 
public health 
authorities. 
 
 
Event i: The World Health Organization (WHO) - debunked claims that 
ECs are a safer and more effective option (Nebehay, 2008). 
 
Event ii: According to Prof John Britton, Chair, Tobacco Advisory Group, 
Royal College of Physicians: “If all the smokers in Britain stopped 
smoking cigarettes and started smoking ECs we would save 5 million 
deaths in people who are alive today. It’s a massive potential public 
health prize ” (Satchell, 2014). 
 
Event xxiii: 53 specialist writes to Dr Chan, (WHO)  saying that regulating 
ECs in the same way as tobacco products would cost lives by reducing 
the number of people using them to quit smoking (Dreaper, 2014a, 
Nicotinepolicy.net, 2014). 
 
Event xxiv: Prof West, of University College London told the BBC ECs 
should “be regulated appropriate to what they are" and that they are 
"orders of magnitude safer” than tobacco cigarettes. (Dreaper, 2014b).  
 
Event xxv: Dr. Vivienne Nathanson of the British Medical Association 
(BMA) - children who had never smoked were starting to use ECs, 
having been influenced by marketing campaigns. (Satchell, 2014). 
 
Event xxxiii: Public health England expert evidence review concludes that 
ECs are around 95% less harmful than smoking (McNeill et al., 2015). 
Event iv: MHRA 
opened a public 
consultation on 
whether to bring 
nicotine-containing 
products (NCPs) 
including ECs within 
the medicines 
licensing regime 
(MHRA, 2010, 
Bryan). 
 
Public consultation 
– two way 
communication 
 
Event xxvii: 129 
public health and 
medical experts, 
signed a letter to Dr 
Margaret Chan of 
WHO calling for 
new controls on ECs 
and warning of 
tobacco industry 
tactics (Aktan et al., 
2014).  
  
 
172 
 
 
7.5 Findings relating to Social Amplification 
(or Attenuation) of Smoking Risk within 
the policy domain  
 
Study Hypothesis: Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the 
negotiation of public health risk arguments between the over critical 
model and under critical model in a science-policy relationship. 
 
Unlike the smoking debate, which spanned several decades between policy consensus 
and policy interventions, the vaping debate spanned only a few years. The awareness 
of the risk of vaping to public health and safety was raised in 2008 by the World Health 
Organization, and by 2014, the regulation of electronic cigarettes under a medical 
framework was already established, following a decision made in 2012 by MHRA. 
The analysis of unfolding events within the two debates suggests that the time scale 
between scientific consensus and policy decision depends on the ability of interest 
groups to muster their power to shape the debate. This aligns with the views of 
Collingridge and Reeve (1986), who argued that the effect of science within policy 
making is determined by the absence and presence of ‘power to’ influence the outcome 
of risk assessment. This therefore suggest that there is a strong relationship between 
the exercise of power, the nature of scrutiny and the expertise brought to bear on 
risk, which may lead to either social amplification (or attenuation) of risk and 
determine the nature of policy interventions. 
 
The next chapter examines the measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccine safety 
debate to investigate the role of power and expertise, in public health risk 
communication. As mentioned in (chapter five – methodology), the MMR vaccine 
debate was chosen because it involves debates around contested science and evidence 
and where multiple legitimate worldviews and values are brought to bear on the debate 
within the policy context. MMR vaccine also involved the delivery of drugs into the 
human body.  
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8 Measles Mumps and Rubella Risk Debate 
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8.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter is the third results chapter of this thesis. It examines the measles mumps 
and rubella (MMR) debate (between 1998 and 2003) and assesses evidence on how 
power and expertise, as well as communication and trust might shape public health 
risk communication in a policy context. This case study particularly evidences how 
technical expertise and experiential expertise shape public health communication and 
associated policymaking. It also highlights the bias against experiential expertise, 
which is undervalued in contested fields of knowledge. The events that unfolded 
within these debates are presented in chronological order (as justified in chapter five) 
and analysed within the context of the research themes. The first period of analysis 
covered the MMR vaccine debate between 1998 and 2000 in order to analyse policy 
inquiry following suggestions that MMR vaccine may be linked to autism. The second 
period examined the debate between 2001 and 2003. The first period analysed the 
initial stakeholders’ responses to the claim that MMR was linked to autism. The 
second period examined the consequences of and subsequent responses to the 
aforementioned claim. Together, these two phases cover the period from the 
emergence of the MMR vaccine debate in the UK to the introduction of policy and 
precautionary measures.  
 
The chapter begins by presenting the evolution of events in the aforementioned two 
phases. The result is then analysed within the context of the PERC framework and 
those findings are highlighted that relate to social amplification (or attenuation) of 
MMR vaccination within the policy domain. 
 
 
8.2 The MMR Vaccine Debate (1998 - 2000) 
The technical debate relating to the MMR vaccination in United Kingdom 
originated from a study led by Dr. Andrew Wakefield of London’s Royal Free 
Hospital, published in The Lancet in February of 1998. The study suggested the 
possibility of a link between the MMR vaccine and regressive behavioural 
disorders (Wakefield et al., 1998). The paper described twelve children aged 
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between three and ten, suffering from developmental regression and 
gastrointestinal problems. According to the publication, nine of the twelve 
children had become autistic, one had disintegrative psychosis and two had 
possible post viral or vaccinal encephalitis. In addition, the paper pointed to a 
possible environmental trigger and explained that the parents of eight of the 
twelve children associated the onset of these problems with MMR vaccination 
(Wakefield et al., 1998). On the eve of the publication, a press conference was 
called at the Royal Free Hospital. In the press release, it is stated that  
 
“Researchers at the Royal Free Hospital School of Medicine may have 
discovered a new syndrome in children involving a new inflammatory 
bowel disease and autism” … “The study identified a possible link 
between gut disorder in children and autism. In the majority of cases the 
onset of symptoms occurred after the MMR vaccination. We clearly need 
further research to examine this new syndrome, and to look into [any] 
possible relation to the MMR vaccine” (Royal Free Hospital Press 
Release, 1992).  
  
As a precautionary measure, Wakefield called for the suspension of the triple 
injection in favour of single vaccines until the combination MMR vaccine was ruled 
out as a possible environmental trigger. He said that  
 
“It’s a moral issue for me. .... and I can't support the continued use of these 
three vaccines given in combination until this issue has been resolved” 
(Deer, 2004).  
 
There are a number of ethical and honesty issues that should be mentioned from the 
outset. Firstly, did Andrew Wakefield use children who were already showing signs 
of autism, and then subject this group of vulnerable children to invasive and 
unpleasant procedures they did not need (Novella, 2009) in order to prove his theory? 
Some have even alleged that he may have faked his data (Novella, 2009) and may 
have taken blood from children at a birthday party, paying them £5.00 a time 
(Boseley, 2010). In addition, Andrew Wakefield did not disclose any conflict of 
interest to the research ethics committee. An investigative journalist, Brian Deer 
found that Wakefield had taken a large consulting fee from an solicitor in order to 
prepare evidence for solicitors representing clients who claimed that the MMR 
vaccine had damaged their children and who hoped to bring cases against vaccine 
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manufacturers (Deer, 2008). In fact, eleven of the twelve children in his 1998 Lancet 
publication were found to be part of the litigation. It was also discovered that he had 
logged a patent for a new vaccine against measles known as the Transfer Factor, 
which he claimed was safer (Novella, 2009) and could also be used as a treatment for 
inflammatory bowel disease (Boseley, 2010). Ten of the co-authors of the original 
paper in The Lancet in 1998 withdrew their names from the publication. The paper 
was also retracted by The Lancet editors on the basis of undisclosed conflict of 
interest (Horton, 2004).  
 
Technical verification of Andrew Wakefield’s claims began a month after The Lancet 
1998 publication, and following a request from the Chief Medical officer (CMO), Sir 
Kenneth Calman and the Medical Research council. The Medical Research Council 
(MRC) supports research across the entire spectrum of medical sciences and other 
related fields in order to improve human health, both in the UK and in MRC units in 
Africa (see website). Thirty seven (37) experts formed an ad hoc committee, combining 
current expertise in virology, gastroenterology, epidemiology, immunology, 
paediatrics and child psychiatry (Edwards, 2001), and convened to review Wakefield’s 
evidence and claims. The expert committee reviewed the associations between the 
measles virus and MMR, and between inflammatory bowel disease and autism (MRC 
1998). Professor Sir John Pattison chaired the committee. After considering the 
laboratory evidence used for the hypothesis that measles virus caused inflammatory 
bowel disease, the committee found no correlation between measles or mumps 
infection and Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis. The meeting concluded that there 
was no current evidence to support a link between MMR vaccine and autism and bowel 
disorders like Crohn’s disease and ulcerative colitis (MRC 1998: 3) cited in 
(Fitzpatrick, 2004). In addition, they suggested ‘further research on an international 
basis would settle this matter’. Following the verification, the Chief Medical Officer, 
Department of Health in a press release on the MMR vaccine stated that  
 
 “No evidence was presented to suggest that MMR vaccination gives rise 
to autism . . . The age at which MMR is usually given coincides with the 
age at which autism is often recognised; this does not mean that one causes 
the other . . . A better understanding is needed of the causes of . . . autism” 
(Thrower, 1997) item 323. 
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The conclusion was sent to every doctor in the country in a letter signed by the 
Chief Medical Officer, Sir Kenneth Calman on the 27 March (Calman, 1998). In 
the letter, Sir Kenneth Calman stated that he had  
 
“.... concluded that there is no link between measles, measles vaccine or 
MMR immunisation, Crohn’s Disease and ASD. Together with others at 
the meeting, I was not convinced that any of the studies support 
suggestions that measles or MMR vaccine is implicated in Crohn’s 
Disease and in autism. I therefore recommend children be given MMR at 
[the] appropriate time, and should not be given the separate component 
vaccines, since there is no evidence that doing this has any benefit and it 
may even be harmful. I believe that more research is needed to identify the 
causes of Crohn’s disease and ASD, but I do not think that MMR vaccine 
is in any way implicated in the cause of these conditions” (Calman, 1998). 
  
“I strongly advise parents to continue to have their children immunised 
with the MMR vaccine.” (BBC, 1998b). 
 
However, the director of Justice, Awareness & Basic Support  (JABS) group expressed 
concern that the issue was not given sufficient time for debate (Casiday, 2005). JABS 
is a group for parents who believe their children were damaged following childhood 
vaccination. The group was launched in 1994 and aims to achieve justice for the 
children and their families. In May of 1998, a 14-year Finnish study on adverse effect 
of vaccines revealed no association between MMR and autism. The study published 
in July 2000 examined a historical vaccination project report maintained by the 
national board of health investigation (Peltola et al., 1998). The researchers performed 
a two prospective cohort study, examining the histories of the vaccines and charting 
1.8 million individuals from the start of the MMR vaccination programme in 1982. 
Out of an estimated three million vaccine doses given by the end of 1996, 173 
potentially serious reactions had been recorded as having possibly been caused by the 
vaccine and 31 gastrointestinal symptoms identified, none of the children according to 
the study had developed autism (Peltola et al., 1998). The findings from this Finnish 
study were of vital significance, considering the large scope of the study. David 
Walker, department of public health medicine at Durham health authority described 
Wakefield’s association between the vaccine and the diseases as  
 
“Anecdotal reporting of a biased sample … it is poor science which has no place 
in a peer-reviewed journal” (Laurance, 1998).  
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In June of 1998, the Public Health Laboratory Service announced that MMR vaccine 
uptake was on the decline in Wales, after a study by Thomas (Thomas et al., 1998) 
found a general decline in the uptake of the MMR vaccine. Thomas and his colleagues 
assessed the impact of adverse publicity on the uptake of MMR immunisation by 
obtaining data from the Child Health System on children resident in Wales in April 
23, 1998. This study evidenced mistrust or suspicion in the MMR immunisation 
programme and of government reassurances that the vaccine was safe. Parents’ 
suspicions about the MMR vaccine may also have been linked to other previous events 
or controversies. For example, in 1992, the department of health withdrew two out of 
the three brands of vaccines used in Britain. The withdrawal was due to the suggestion 
that the mumps component of the MMR vaccine caused mild transient meningitis 
(Sugiura and Yamada, 1991). The two brands that were withdrawn are Immravax and 
Pluserix, made by Merieux UK and SmithKline Beecham respectively. According to 
the department, these brands contained a strain of a mumps virus that was linked with 
a 1 in 11,000 risk of meningitis. The third brand, MMR-II, which was manufactured 
by Merck Sharp and Dohme, used a strain that carried a lower risk (Dyer, 1994). Merck 
Sharp and Dohme in response to the growing anxiety was of the view that:  
 
“more than 150 million doses of MMR-II have been administered, establishing 
an unsurpassed record of safety and effectiveness” (Dyer, 1994). 
  
There was also the anti-vaccination movement in the Britain in the 1800s that may 
have further entrenched parents’ suspicion of the claim that there is no link between 
MMR and autism (Blume, 2006). This distrust or suspicion was accentuated by already 
existing negative attitudes to government authorities, resulting from previous public 
controversies, such as the BSE epidemic, in which government scientific advisors lost 
credibility by reversing their assurances to the public that BSE posed no health threat 
to humans (Caplan, 2000, Bellaby, 2003, Murphy-Lawless, 2003). In July 1998, the 
government in an effort to reassure parents sent two and a half million leaflets to 
parents, distributed through 9,000 GP surgeries and 156 health promotion units (BBC, 
1998a). The leaflet, MMR - The Facts, published by the Department of Health and the 
Health Education Authority (HEA), states that there is no evidence of a link between 
MMR vaccines and inflammatory bowel disease or autism, and that children could die 
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from the diseases if they fail to take the MMR vaccination (BBC, 1998a). In the leaflet, 
the government argue that   
“The risk from the three diseases [is] greater than the risk of developing autism, 
which has not been proven”.  
 
By October of 1998, a pharmacist in Croydon, Surrey, Andrew McCoig, was reported 
to be supplying parents who are opting for the single injections. Pharmacist McCoig 
believed that parents should be given alternative options and should be able to exercise 
a choice about their child’s immunisation (BBC, 1998b). In June 1999, a study funded 
by the Medicines Control Agency carried out an epidemiological study to investigate 
whether MMR vaccine may be causally linked with autism (Taylor et al., 1999). The 
study reviewed 498 cases of autism (261 of core autism, 166 of atypical autism, and 
71 of Asperger's syndrome). The children were identified through relevant registers 
and schools records in eight North Thames health districts, UK. The study did not find 
evidence for any causal association between MMR vaccine and autism. 
 
In August 1999, another study vindicating the use of MMR vaccine was published in 
the British Medical Journal (BMJ). The study found that single mumps vaccine 
(previously imported into the UK) offers no protection to children (Schlegel et al., 
1999). The significance of this study is that it went beyond only verifying Wakefield’s 
hypothesis, and also investigated his suggested alternative to the triple injection. In 
September, the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine accused doctors of dropping 
patients, including children who had not received MMR vaccination, from their 
registers in order to increase profits (Norton, 1999). This was linked to the introduction 
of vaccination target payments by which GPs earned £2865 if their practice achieved 
ninety per cent vaccination uptake, and £955 for a seventy per cent vaccination uptake.  
 
By November of 1999, eight families who were represented by solicitor Richard Barr 
lodged an injunction in the High Court against MMR vaccine manufacturers. A further 
350 families were granted legal aid for similar cases (Buncombe, 1998) in (Casiday, 
2005). In December 1999, an outbreak of measles occurred in North Dublin, Ireland 
and lasted until July 2000 (Mcbrien et al., 2003). During the outbreak, 844 suspected 
cases were recorded. This number is significant compared with 152 notifications 
between the periods of 1995-1999. Two (2) out of a hundred and one (101) children 
  
 
180 
 
hospitalised died (Mcbrien et al., 2003). By the end of 1999, no other scientific study 
or evidence was yet able to verify Dr Wakefield’s claims. In February 2000, a study 
by (Kaye et al., 2001) in the British Medical Journal finds that autism has continued 
to rise despite MMR administration being static. The time trend analysis study of the 
UK general practice research database concluded that there was no correlation 
between the prevalence of MMR vaccination and the rapid increase in the risk of 
autism over time. The study noted further that “the explanation for the marked increase 
in risk of the diagnosis of autism in the past decade remains uncertain” (Kaye et al., 
2001). 
 
That same month in another publication and co-authored by two other researchers, Dr. 
Wakefield suggested that their study found “an endoscopically and histologically 
consistent pattern of ileo-colonic pathology” in “a cohort of children with 
developmental disorders” (Wakefield et al., 2000) P.2294. The study compared 60 
cases of ‘autistic enterocolitis’ including 12 of the cases in the 1998 Lancet 
publication. This included a control group of 37 developmentally normal children 
undergoing ileo-colonscopy. The authors describe a ‘new variant’ inflammatory bowel 
disease, different from either Crohn’s disease or ulcerative colitis. They concluded that 
“this syndrome [autistic enterocolitis] may reflect a subset of children with 
developmental disorders with distinct etiological and clinical features” (Wakefield et 
al., 2000) P.2294. 
 
In response to this latest publication, the MRC commissioned another expert subgroup 
in April of 2000 to monitor research in inflammatory bowel disease and autism, and 
to examine further evidence from an expert team of the Royal Free Hospital in relation 
to ‘a classic pan-colitis associated with severe constipation and immune dysregulation 
in a group of children with developmental disorders’ (Wakefield et al., 2000). The 
MRC criticised the study for cherry-picking evidence describing it as a “self-selected 
group of patients” adding that “the histological finding of ileal lymphoid-nodular 
hyperplasia may have been secondary to severe constipation” (MRC 2000: 4) cited in 
(Fitzpatrick, 2004) and concluded that “the case for ‘autistic enterocolitis’ had not been 
proven” (MRC 2000: 4) cited in (Fitzpatrick, 2004). They stated that “there had been 
no new evidence to suggest a causal link between MMR and inflammatory bowel 
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disease/autism” (MRC 2000: 5) cited in (Fitzpatrick, 2004). They however, called for 
more research on inflammatory bowel disease.  
 
That same month, Dr. Wakefield and Professor John O'Leary, director of pathology at 
Coombe Women's Hospital in Dublin, presented their research to the US Congress 
showing that tests on 25 children with autism revealed 24 had traces of the measles 
virus in their gut (O'Leary et al., 2000). Professor O’Leary said there was now 
“compelling evidence” of a link between autism and MMR (BBC, 2008b). They 
however, did not confirm that the virus causes autism, or even that the source of the 
virus found is the MMR vaccination, which contains “dead” versions of the measles 
and mumps viruses (O'Leary et al., 2000). Wakefield suggested that the mumps 
component of the vaccine allows the measles virus from the vaccine into the intestine 
of susceptible individuals; the measles virus then renders the intestine permeable to 
certain peptides (becoming a ‘leaky gut’), which then enter the bloodstream and 
interfere with the central-nervous system opioids, and causing the autistic behaviour. 
 
In October of 2000, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) 
reviewed a paper (supplied by the authors - Wakefield and Montgomery) that was due 
to be published by the end of the year. JCVI concluded that the yet unpublished paper 
gave no new insights or evidence that changed its views on the safety of MMR 
vaccines (Medicines Control Agency and Department of Health, 2001). Two months 
later, the Medicine Control Agency (MCA) and the Department of Health (DoH) 
which also reviewed the pre-published copy of the Wakefield and Montgomery paper 
rejected any suggestion that combined measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccines 
were licensed prematurely (Medicines Control Agency and Department of Health, 
2001). The study due to be published during the following weeks suggested that MMR 
vaccine had never undergone a safety test. The MCA and DoH accused the report of 
cherry-picking evidence arguing that the triple MMR vaccine is safer for children than 
single injections, which would expose them and others to a far greater risk of measles, 
mumps and rubella through slow or non-existent take-up (Medicines Control Agency 
and Department of Health, 2001).  
 
The following week, Dr. Wakefield published the pre-reviewed paper entitled ‘MMR 
vaccine: through a glass, darkly’, saying the vaccine has never undergone proper safety 
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tests (Wakefield and Montgomery, 2000). Dr. Wakefield reported that original safety 
checks on the vaccine were poorly conducted and only lasted for four weeks. He 
explained that he identified nearly 170 cases of a new syndrome and his team was 
testing the hypothesis that the measles virus from the vaccine can lodge in the gut of 
susceptible children. He noted that in almost every case of testing the vaccine, 
observation periods were too short to include the time of onset of delayed neurological 
or other adverse events, and that too few patients were followed up. In December of 
2000, a part-funded study by Merck Sharp Dohme reported of a follow-up study aimed 
at identifying serious adverse events relating to MMR vaccination (Patja et al., 2000). 
Data were obtained from a countrywide surveillance system set up in Finland to detect 
serious adverse events associated with MMR. The study examined 1.8 million 
immunization records of individuals’ consumption of almost 3 million vaccine doses 
by the end of 1996. The study similar to the 1998 publication could not prove a link 
between MMR vaccine and autism (Patja et al., 2000). By the end of 2000, other 
scientific studies were not able to replicate Andrew Wakefield’s claims that MMR 
vaccine was linked to autism. Table 8.1 below provides a summary of events that 
unfolded in the MMR Vaccine debate following the 1998 publication and 2000.  
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Table 8.1: Summary of events that unfolded in the MMR Vaccine debate (1998-2000) 
Year  Event 
1998 i. February of 1998, a study led by Dr. Andrew Wakefield, London's Royal Free Hospital published in The Lancet 
suggested the possibility of a link between the MMR vaccine and regressive behavioural disorders (Wakefield et al., 
1998).  
ii. At a press conference coinciding with the publication, Wakefield called for the suspension of the triple injection in 
favour of the single vaccines until the MMR vaccine was ruled out as a possible environmental trigger. “I can't 
support the continued use of these three vaccines given in combination until this issue has been resolved”  
iii. The following month, the Chief Medical officer (CMO) called for independent scientific seminars to verify the work 
of the Royal Free Hospital group on MMR (Medicines Control Agency and Department of Health, 2001). Thirty 
seven (37) experts were convened, including leading experts in virology, epidemiology, immunology, paediatrics, 
child psychiatry and gastroenterology (Edwards, 2001). The meeting concluded that evidence does not support a link 
between the MMR injection and autism and bowel disorders like Crohn's disease and ulcerative colitis. Therefore, it 
recommend that there was no reason for a policy change in the current MMR vaccine programme (Medicines 
Control Agency and Department of Health, 2001).  
iv. The director of Justice, Awareness & Basic Support  (JABS) group expressed concern that the issue was not given 
sufficient time for debate (Casiday, 2005).  
v. A 14-year study by Finnish scientists published in May 1998 on adverse effect of vaccines revealed no association 
between MMR and autism (Peltola et al., 1998). 
vi. June, the Public Health Laboratory Service reported that MMR vaccine uptake was on the decline in Wales (Thomas 
et al., 1998).  
vii. July, the Department of Health and the Health Education Authority (HEA) issued an independent review of 
information about children’s what and sent two and a half million leaflets to parents and health workers in an effort 
to calm fears over the triple vaccination for measles, mumps and rubella. The leaflet, MMR - The Facts, states that 
there is no evidence of a link between MMR vaccines and inflammatory bowel disease or autism. The government 
argued that the risk from the three diseases was greater than the risk of developing autism, which had not been 
proven. 
1999 viii. June – An independent expert group working for the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) was asked to assess 
reports from parents who believed that their children had been damaged by measles vaccine. They reported that 
evidence did not constitute proof that vaccination caused the symptoms and suggested temporal coincidence, since 
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the age at which children receive their first MMR jab coincides with the age at which most autism cases are first 
diagnosed. 
ix. A study blamed decline of MMR vaccine uptake on media scares (Anderson, 1999). 
x. A study by Taylor et al, commissioned by the UK Medicines Control Agency (MCA) concluded that causal 
association between MMR vaccine and autism could not be found (Taylor et al., 1999).  
xi. A study published in British Medical Journal (BMJ) says that single mumps vaccine offers no protection (Schlegel et 
al. 1999). The Government banned the import of single vaccine substitutes (Casiday, 2005). 
xii. September, the Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine accused doctors of dropping patients, including children 
who had not received MMR vaccination, from their registers in order to increase profits (Norton, 1999). 
xiii. November, eight families, who were represented by solicitor Richard Barr, lodged an injunction in the High Court 
against MMR vaccine manufacturers. A further 350 families were granted legal aid for similar cases (Buncombe, 
1998) in (Casiday, 2005). 
xiv. December, an outbreak of measles occurred in North of Dublin, Ireland and lasted until July 2000 (Mcbrien et al., 
2003) with a record high of 844 suspected cases.  
2000 xv. In April, the working expert group of MCA issued a statement confirming the conclusions of an earlier expert 
seminar in 1998, reporting that there was “no new evidence of a link between autism and MMR” 
xvi. Five days later, Dr. Wakefield and Professor John O'Leary, director of pathology at Coombe Women's Hospital in 
Dublin, present research to the US Congress showing that tests on 25 children with autism revealed 24 had traces of 
the measles virus in their gut (O'Leary et al., 2000).  
xvii. In October, the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) reviewed a pre-publication copy (supplied 
by the authors) of the Wakefield and Montgomery paper in October 2000 and concluded the paper gave no new 
insights or evidence that changed its views on the safety of MMR vaccines (Medicines Control Agency and 
Department of Health, 2001). 
xviii. In December, the MCA and DoH also reviewed a pre-publication copy of the Wakefield and Montgomery paper in 
October 2000. They rejected the suggestion that combined measles, mumps and rubella (MMR) vaccines were 
licensed prematurely (Medicines Control Agency and Department of Health, 2001).  
xix. Dr Wakefield published a paper entitled ‘MMR vaccine: through a glass, darkly’, claiming that original safety 
checks on the vaccine were poorly conducted and only lasted for four weeks (Wakefield and Montgomery, 2000).  
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The burden of proof within this period lay largely with Andrew Wakefield and his 
team who had to demonstrate the credibility of their research and the claims they made 
on its basis. This highlights the importance of credibility in the nature of expertise and 
the manner of interpretation brought to bear on public health risk communication in a 
policy domain. Public health authorities also shared the burden of proof of reassuring 
parents that the MMR vaccine was indeed safe for their young infants. Public health 
institutions responsible for advising the UK government on immunization (including 
MMR and autism) include the department of health (DoH), the Medicines Control 
Agency (MCA), the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) and the Joint 
Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI).  
 
 
8.3 The MMR Vaccine Debate (2001-2003) 
This phase of the debate saw an evolved state of knowledge, information and evidence 
about the safety of the MMR vaccine, which included fierce and conflicting arguments 
between Andrew Wakefield and public health authorities on the opposing side of the 
debate. The period also recorded a decline in the uptake of MMR vaccination and an 
increase in measles outbreaks in some parts of the country (with associated deaths). 
What was also interesting was how Tony Blair, the then Prime Minister and his son 
Leo were in the middle of the political debate relating to MMR vaccine.  
 
At the start of 2001, the Government launched a £3 million advertisement campaign 
in order to cope with a growing concern about the use of the MMR vaccine (Boseley, 
2001). The campaign was directed at parents and health professionals, a move which 
was criticised by National Autistic Society, saying that the government focus should 
be on research rather than advertising (Boseley, 2001). The same month, the MRC 
announced it would fund Professor Andrew Hall of the London School of Hygiene 
and Tropical Medicine to conduct a computerised database study on risk factors for 
autism, including immunisation. The Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM), 
which also considered the pre-publication copy of the Wakefield and Montgomery 
paper, together with the available evidence on MMR safety, in a press release, 
concluded that vaccination with MMR was very effective at preventing serious and 
occasionally fatal diseases. The expert group expressed the view that the policy of 
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giving MMR vaccine in two doses was safer than giving the three component 
vaccines sequentially with six injections, and as such, the balance of benefit to risk 
was therefore highly favourable (DoH, 2001). 
 
Also in January, Wakefield revealed to the Daily Telegraph that he had evidence of 
170 new cases of ‘autistic syndrome’, with the majority of cases backed by 
documentary evidence of regression following vaccination. According to him, 
authorities failed adequately to address the safety of the MMR vaccine (Fraser, 
2001c). The Daily Mail and other news media launched campaigns to back Dr 
Wakefield (Deer, 2011), who was at this point viewed as a genuine expert standing 
alone against powerful corporations and the government. At this time, newspaper 
reports revealed that 500 parents planned to sue the DoH, claiming that the vaccine 
had damaged their children. 850 families were given legal aid (Hall, 2001). 
 
Shedding Light on Areas of Uncertainty 
 
One feature of the MMR debate is the evolving nature of Wakefield’s claims. 
Wakefield was keen to prove that he had found a link between MMR and autism. 
From the assertion that MMR may be linked to Chrohn’s disease and ulcerative 
colitis, to the hypothesis that it may be linked to autism and bowel cancer, to a virus 
found in the guts of autistic children. He then went further to claim that the MMR 
vaccine safety may be unduly conducted. In February of 2001 he also revealed to the 
Telegraph that he had evidence of 170 new cases of ‘autistic syndrome’ (Fraser, 
2001c) (see In June 2001, further study (Farrington et al., 2001) provided further 
evidence against a causal association between MMR vaccination and autism. The 
study reanalysed the data from the previous study commissioned by the MRC (Taylor 
et al, 1999) and concluded that the results did not support a link between MMR and 
autism. However, that same month, the Lothian division of the British Medical 
Association (BMA) requested that the BMA back single vaccines as an alternative 
for parents who refuse the MMR vaccine. In August, a doctor offering separate 
vaccines in his clinic was reported to the General Medical Council (GMC) (Fraser, 
2001b) in (Casiday, 2005), and two months later was cleared of any misconduct. He 
was allowed to continue to offer single injections on the condition that he provide up 
to date information of the safety of MMR (Boseley, 2001). In September, a study by 
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(Elliman and Bedford, 2001) warned parents of the risk of vaccination with 
unlicensed products, which may be ineffective and carry a slightly higher risk of 
meningitis. The study reviewed the evidence on separate MMR vaccines. In October, 
(Fombonne and Chakrabarti, 2001) performed a cross-sectional study of 262 autistic 
children and the study demonstrated no difference in age of first parental concern or 
rate of developmental regression by exposure to MMR vaccines. No association 
between developmental regression and gastrointestinal symptoms was observed. 
 
Figure 8.1). 
 
In June 2001, further study (Farrington et al., 2001) provided further evidence against 
a causal association between MMR vaccination and autism. The study reanalysed the 
data from the previous study commissioned by the MRC (Taylor et al, 1999) and 
concluded that the results did not support a link between MMR and autism. However, 
that same month, the Lothian division of the British Medical Association (BMA) 
requested that the BMA back single vaccines as an alternative for parents who refuse 
the MMR vaccine. In August, a doctor offering separate vaccines in his clinic was 
reported to the General Medical Council (GMC) (Fraser, 2001b) in (Casiday, 2005), 
and two months later was cleared of any misconduct. He was allowed to continue to 
offer single injections on the condition that he provide up to date information of the 
safety of MMR (Boseley, 2001). In September, a study by (Elliman and Bedford, 
2001) warned parents of the risk of vaccination with unlicensed products, which may 
be ineffective and carry a slightly higher risk of meningitis. The study reviewed the 
evidence on separate MMR vaccines. In October, (Fombonne and Chakrabarti, 2001) 
performed a cross-sectional study of 262 autistic children and the study demonstrated 
no difference in age of first parental concern or rate of developmental regression by 
exposure to MMR vaccines. No association between developmental regression and 
gastrointestinal symptoms was observed. 
 
Figure 8.1: Wakefield MMR-Autism claims  
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In December of 2001, Dr. Wakefield resigned from the Royal Free stating that “I 
have been asked to go because my research results are unpopular … I did not wish to 
leave but I have agreed to stand down in the hope that my going will take the political 
pressure off my colleagues and allow them to get on with the job of looking after the 
many sick children we have seen … They have not sacked me. They cannot; I have 
not done anything wrong. I have no intention of stopping my investigations.” (Fraser, 
2001a). Also in December, the MRC published a report that reviewed available 
research into autism and found that the number of autistic cases had increased to (6 
in 1000 children) (MRC, 2001a). However, this rise was attributed to increased 
recognition and changing definitions of autism. The report found no evidence of a 
link with MMR, and suggested that autism was the result of a range of causes, with 
the strongest evidence to date being genetic. The report expressed the view that 
several genes interact to create susceptibility to the disorder and suggested that the 
interplay between genetic and environmental factors is likely to play a key role, 
noting that the nature of the disease still remains unknown. 
 
There were other key events that led to the public amplification of the MMR vaccine 
risk. These included: Tony Blair and Neo Leo Saga; Family Conflict - Love and Law, 
Measles Virus and  
Crohn's disease  
and ulcerative  
colitis (1995) 
MMR possible  
cause of autism and  
bowel cancer (1998) 
Virus found in the guts  
of 24 out of 25 autistic  
children (April, 2000) 
Vaccine check safety  
(Dec, 2000) 
Virus found in the guts  
of 170 autistic children  
(January, 2001) 
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Measles Outbreaks and Media Report, other scientific reports and Brian Deer’s 
Investigation and the General Medical Council (GMC) professional misconduct 
investigation. 
 
Tony Blair and Neo Leo Saga 
 
The government decision not to offer a single vaccination programme put the then 
Prime Minister, Tony Blair into the spotlight. In December of 2001, during Prime 
Minister's Questions, MP Julie Kirkbride, a mother of a 14-month-old boy asked Mr 
Blair whether his son Leo had been immunised with MMR. Mr Blair declined to 
answer insisting on the family privacy on medical matters. Some groups within the 
public began to speculate that Blair was publicly (and hypocritically) supporting a 
dangerous vaccine that he would not give to his own child (Riddell, 2001). The prime 
minister’s insistence on not saying whether Leo was given the triple injection further 
heightened suspicion about the vaccine’s safety. This seemly trivial event became the 
centre of attention in 2001 with 32% of media featuring this story (Speers and Lewis, 
2004). The Tony Blair saga was brought to an end in February 2002, when The 
Independent newspaper revealed that Leo Blair had been given MMR vaccine 
(Dillon, 2002). The Prime Minister however, refused to confirm this report on the 
grounds of privacy in personal medical matters. Other factors were also blamed for 
amplifying the risk of MMR vaccine. Wakefield for instance blamed the MMR crisis 
on the removal of choice by the government, stating that:  
 
“What precipitated this [MMR] crisis was the removal of the single 
vaccine, the removal of choice, and that is what has caused the furore—
because the doctors, the gurus, are treating the public as though they are 
some kind of moronic mass who cannot make an informed decision for 
themselves.” (Wakefield, 2002).  
 
Parents were to give voluntarily consent to their children to be vaccinated. However, 
one parent, frustrated about the fact that she was not given an option, said: 
 
“We were angry that we were not given a choice, that it had to be the 
combined three together, why they couldn’t split it ... We were told no you 
couldn’t ... we were never given that choice, we were just told this is how 
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it is ... why are we not allowed to have it, why is there not the option to 
have any of those three separate vaccines?” (Evans et al., 2001b). 
 
In February of 2002, the Government launched its own campaign, featuring an open 
letter to GP surgeries and televised appeals on the BBC from Chief Medical Officer 
Liam Donaldson. The aim was to reassure parents, presenting them with information 
so they could make informed decisions.  In April of 2002, another study co-authored 
by Wakefield and O'Leary suggested a link between the measles virus and bowel 
disease in children with developmental disorders (Uhlmann et al., 2002). The study 
investigated whether children with developmental disorders, such as autism, as well as 
a bowel disorder also had the measles virus in their gut. The study found traces of the 
virus in the guts of 75 children out of 91 with bowel disease, but in only five out of 70 
healthy children. The researchers theorised that the virus may act as a trigger, leading 
to problems with the immune system. Dr. Wakefield said that most of the children in 
the study had had MMR, though a few had the single vaccine. He and his colleagues 
emphasised that it would be wrong to jump to any hasty conclusions about MMR 
causing either bowel disease or developmental disorders such as autism. In the same 
month, the Royal Free Hospital where Dr. Wakefield carried out his initial research - 
published a study on the British Medical Journal website stating that there is no link 
between MMR and autism. The team analysed 473 children with autism born between 
1979 and 1998. It found the proportion of children with developmental regression 
(autism) or bowel disorders did not change significantly over that time. The study 
concluded that the incidence of developmental regression did not differ between 
cohorts, and the authors observed no differences in the prevalence of gastrointestinal 
symptoms between vaccinated and unvaccinated autistic children (Taylor et al., 2002). 
 
The politics of the MMR debate continued nevertheless to be important. In April MP 
Julie Kirkbride announced plans to introduce a bill in Parliament allowing parents to 
choose single vaccines without charge under the NHS (Dillon, 2002). The following 
month, Lord May called on Government to access the MMR vaccine since parents 
were not persuaded by blanket government assurances that MMR poses no risk of 
autism (Highfield, 2002). In June, the then Mayor of London, Ken Livingstone, 
announced that he would opt for single vaccines for his yet unborn child (BBC, 2002). 
In a statement to BBC Radio Five Live he said he would be giving his unborn child 
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separate injections, when the time came, to guard against mumps, measles and rubella. 
The chairman of the British Medical Association, Dr. Ian Bogle, however criticised 
him, urging him to apologise and retract the statement. Dr Wakefield again in June of 
2002 presented evidence to a US congressional committee claiming that the measles 
virus identified in the guts of autistic children had been identified by a team led by 
John O'Leary as originating from the vaccine (Deer, 2011). 
 
Family Conflict - Love and Law  
 
Family conflicts were also brought to bear on the debate when, in July of 2002, two 
mothers were brought to court by their estranged husbands for refusing to give their 
children the MMR vaccine (Payne, 2002). The fathers, who did not have custody over 
the children, wanted them to receive the MMR. One year later the court ruled in favour 
of the fathers, mandating that MMR vaccine be given to the children, who may not 
have been able to make informed decisions, given that they could have been exposed 
to wrong or false information by their mothers (Payne, 2002). In July of 2002, the 
government decision to order wholesale suppliers of the single rubella vaccine to 
decrease the amount supplied to private clinics (Vallely, 2002) further aggravated 
parents’ fears and anxiety, as options for choice were further curtailed. This left them 
with little or no choice to give consent to their children being given the MMR vaccine. 
Out of the three, Rubella was the only single vaccine licensed for use in the UK because 
it is given to women planning pregnancy who do not already have rubella antibodies. 
That same month, GPs voted to abandon the 'cash for jabs' system (Hall, 2002) as an 
earlier study revealed that many doctors had previously admitted using ‘scare tactics’ 
(Morrison, 2001)  to persuade parents to vaccinate their children in order to profit under 
the scheme. Parents who came to know about vaccination targets questioned the 
objectivity of their doctors’ advice on MMR vaccine. 
 
In August, a US study giving weight to Wakefield’s argument found an unusual MMR 
antibody in 75% of autistic children, but not in children without autism (Singh et al., 
2002). The study expressed the view that “autoimmunity to the central nervous system 
(CNS), especially to myelin basic protein (MBP) may play a causal role in autism, a 
neurodevelopmental disorder” thereby suggesting a strong association between MMR 
and CNS autoimmunity in autism. This study was widely shared amongst anti-MMR 
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campaigners. In September, DoH launched a new website, ‘MMR: The facts’ to give 
parents information about the vaccine and the scientific studies supporting its safety, 
and also news about the controversy. This was to give parents access to the relevant 
information with ease and also to enable them to ask questions directly of members of 
the DoH.  
 
In November, another study revealed that increase in autism rates was due to 
environmental factors rather than to improved diagnoses or increased awareness as was 
earlier claimed (Byrd, 2002) in (Casiday, 2005). That same month, NHS GP, Dr Peter 
Smith of Kingston, Surrey invited a private-owned company - Direct Health 2000, to 
provide single vaccines to parents who had refused the MMR vaccine (Fraser, 2002). 
Dr Smith who supported MMR vaccination, wanted to provide options for parents who 
were not convinced of the safety of MMR in order to ensure children did not go 
unvaccinated (Casiday, 2005). By the end of November, using a national registry, 
Danish researchers determined the vaccination status and autism diagnosis in 537,303 
children born during 1991 (Madsen et al., 2002). The authors observed no differences 
in the relative risk of autism between those who did and those who did not receive 
MMR vaccine. Among autistic children, no relationship between date of vaccination 
and development of autism was observed. The controversy continued in the face of 
preparation of legal cases, parliamentary debates, further Department of Health 
promotional materials and scientific publications, while demand for separate measles, 
mumps, and rubella vaccines rose dramatically. 
 
At the beginning of 2003, The London Assembly warned of lower rates of vaccination 
uptake when compared to the nationwide rate (73% vs. 85%). The assembly urged the 
Government to boost immunisation levels and issue a review, reporting on possible 
side-effects (Wright, 2003). The Health Protection Authority (HPA) also announced 
that mumps cases in Wales had doubled from 65 cases in 2001 to 143 in 2002 (de 
Bruxelles, 2003). At the same time, demands for separate measles and mumps vaccines 
had increased dramatically. The single measles demand rose from 11,818 requests in 
2001 to 71,859 in 2002 and demand for mumps vaccine rose from 17,800 to 39,089 
(Laurance, 2003). By March, Desumo Information and Health Care (Worcester) were 
ordered to stop offering single vaccines until the company was registered with the 
National Care Standards Commission, leaving 5,000 families uncertain about how 
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their children's vaccination courses would be completed (Fraser, 2003). The following 
month, the DoH wrote to doctors warning that up to 40,000 children vaccinated at the 
Elstree Aerodrome in Hertfordshire and Hillsborough Arena in Sheffield were at risk 
of the diseases, and that they should be re-immunised with MMM (Casiday, 2005).  
 
In August of 2003, Dr David Pugh, of Elstree Aeromedical centre, is taken to court to 
faces charges of forging blood test results relating to single measles, mumps and 
rubella vaccines (Payne, 2002). Dr Pugh was believed to have fudged the results to 
allay parents’ worries over the effectiveness of single injections. Dr. Pugh ran a private 
clinic and at the heart of the scare about the relation of autism to the triple MMR 
injection was treating about 250 children and earning more than £17,000 a week. Dr 
Pugh was eventually arrested in December 2004 (Sapsted, 2004). Also in August of 
2003, a study revealed that measles cases in Britain had risen with decline in MMR 
vaccination (Jansen et al., 2003). The study revealed that there was an indication that 
the chance of an epidemic increased from 0.47 (1995-1998) to 0.82 (1999-2002). In 
September, the annual immunization uptake report showed MMR uptake to have been 
at a record low (79%) since the vaccine was introduced (Boseley, 2003). This study 
reiterated the existence of mistrust in public health institutions and their experts.  
 
In October, parents (by now, more than 1500) who were suing MMR vaccine 
manufacturers over alleged damage to their children, lost their legal aid funding for the 
case (Martin, 2003). The parents’ appeal was turned down. Simon Murch, a co-author 
on the paper that triggered the MMR debate (Wakefield et al., 1998) warned The 
Lancet in a letter of the heightened likelihood of measles outbreak in the winter if 
MMR uptake did not increase (Murch, 2003). Murch claimed he had never believed 
there was firm evidence linking the vaccine with the behavioural and bowel disorders 
described in the paper. Andrew Wakefield in response to Murch claimed that he had 
been pressured into publicly changing his view on MMR. Wakefield made his claim 
on Radio 4’s Today programme. In December, Channel Five aired a drama - 'Hear the 
Silence' which portrayed a mother's struggle, assisted by Dr Wakefield, to find 
recognition and treatment for her autistic son, whom she believed had been damaged 
by the MMR vaccine. The programme was aired, despite protests from doctors and the 
DoH that it misrepresented the controversy and could further undermine the 
Department of Health’s immunisation programme (Wells and Boseley, 2003). Also in 
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December, an outbreak of mumps at some UK universities sparked a campaign to give 
the MMR vaccine to students (Longrigg, 2003). Such anomalies brought the costs and 
benefits of the MMR vaccine to bear on the debate; whether there are alternatives to 
the MMR vaccine or if the risk of MMR vaccine should be accepted. A study which 
lent support to the safety of the MMR vaccine was published and revealed that the rise 
in childhood autism could be explained by changing diagnoses of behavioural 
disorders (Jick and Kaye, 2003). At this stage of the debate, there was an evolved state 
of scientific evidence relating to the safety and efficacy of MMR Vaccination.  
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Table 8.2 (below) provides some of the narratives of technical experts relating to the 
safety and efficacy of MMR vaccination. 
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Table 8.2: Narratives of technical expert around the safety and efficacy of MMR 
vaccination  
 
One observation that can be made from  
  
Studies supporting claim linking 
MMR to autism  
Studies refuting claim linking MMR to 
autism 
Author Findings and 
conclusion  
Author Findings and conclusion  
 
Wakefield 
et al. (1998) 
Suggest a link between 
MMR and Autism. 
Peltola et al. 
(1998). 
A 14-year study by 
Finnish scientists on 
adverse effect of vaccines 
revealed no association 
between MMR and autism. 
Wakefield 
et al. (2000) 
Found a new variant 
inflammatory bowel 
disease, different from 
Crohn’s disease or 
ulcerative colitis in 
children with 
developmental disorder. 
 
Taylor et al. 
(1999). 
Found a steady increase in 
cases of autism and no 
‘step-up’ was found after 
the introduction of MMR 
in 1988. 
 
Kawashima 
et al. (2000) 
Measles virus found in 
peripheral mononuclear 
cells in some patients 
with chronic intestinal 
inflammation. Virus 
consistent with vaccine 
strains. 
Kaye et al. 
(2001) 
Finds that autism has 
continued to rise despite 
MMR administration 
being static. 
 
Wakefield 
and 
Montgomer
y (2000) 
Concludes that vaccine 
has never undergone 
proper safety tests 
Farrington 
et al. (2001) 
Results do not support a 
link between MMR and 
autism.  
 
Uhlmann et 
al. (2002) 
Finds possible link 
between the measles 
virus and bowel disease 
in children with 
developmental 
disorders. 
Fombonne 
and 
Chakrabarti 
(2001) 
No  observed association 
between developmental 
regression and 
gastrointestinal symptoms. 
  Halsey 
(2001) 
Found no evidence of 
combined vaccination 
increasing the burden on 
the immune system. 
  DeStefano 
and Chen 
(2001) 
Available evidence does 
not support a causal 
association between MMR 
or other vaccines. 
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Table 8.2 is that the expert narratives potentially linking MMR vaccine to autism and 
other diseases were either authored or co-authored by Andrew Wakefield (Wakefield 
et al., 1998, Wakefield and Montgomery, 2000, Wakefield et al., 2000, Kawashima et 
al., 2000, Uhlmann et al., 2002). Wakefield and Montgomery (2000) also raised 
concern that safety testing of the MMR vaccine may have been incomplete. In their 
paper entitled ‘MMR vaccine: through a glass, darkly’, the authors argue that the 
vaccine has never undergone proper safety tests, arguing that original safety checks 
on the vaccine were poorly conducted and only lasted for four weeks. In the same 
paper, the authors also claimed that they identified nearly 170 cases of a new syndrome 
and are testing the hypothesis that the measles virus from the vaccine can lodge in the 
gut of susceptible children. He notes that in almost every case of testing the vaccine, 
observation periods were too short to include the time of onset of delayed neurological 
or other adverse events, and that too few patients were followed up. 
 
However, public health institutions responsible for advising the UK government on 
immunization (including MMR and autism) such as the department of health (DoH), 
the Medicines Control Agency (MCA), the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) 
and the Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) were quick to 
dismiss Andrew Wakefield’s claims. The government realised it needed to do more 
than reassure parents and also had to provide information about what is known 
scientifically to both health practitioners and the public. The initial government 
reassuring response and one-way risk communication model was seen to be 
ineffective, since MMR uptake was for the first time on the decline in some parts of 
the country. Perhaps, where effective feedback processes were initiated, the outcome 
may have been different. This raises questions about whether the media scare alone 
can be held responsible for the decline in MMR vaccine uptake, or whether the one-
way and ineffective risk communication approach of policy makers and health 
practitioners, who were keen to offer reassurances to concerned parents, are also 
significant. Other factors that may also have partly influenced the debate were the fact 
the MMR vaccine debate came after the BSE inquiry, which occupied the attention of 
two chief medical officers in England and Wales, and occurred at the start of the 
Labour Government. These are all possible factors that could have influenced and 
shaped the social amplification (or attenuation) of the MMR vaccine debate. Error! 
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Not a valid bookmark self-reference. (below) provides a summary of unfolding 
events in the MMR Vaccine debate between 2001 and 2003. 
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Table 8.3: Summary of events that unfolded in the MMR Vaccine debate between 2001 and 2003 
  
Year  Event 
2001 i. By the start of 2001, the UK government launched a £3 million advertising campaign in order to cope with 
growing concerns about the use of the MMR vaccine (Boseley, 2001). 
ii. The MRC announced it will fund Professor Andrew Hall of the London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine to conduct a computerised database study on risk factors for autism, including immunisation.  
iii. The Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) considered a pre-publication copy (supplied by the authors) of the 
Wakefield and Montgomery paper, together with the available evidence on MMR safety, in January 2001. They 
concluded that The Wakefield and Montgomery paper provided no new scientific data and criticised the article 
for being selective and flawed in its analysis (MRC Report, 2001).  
iv. Wakefield reveals to the Telegraph that he has evidence of 170 new cases of ‘autistic syndrome’, with the 
majority of cases backed by documentary evidence of regression following vaccination (Fraser, 2001c). 
v. Newspapers reports revealed that 500 parents plan to sue the DoH with claims that the vaccine had damaged 
their children. 850 families had been given legal aid (Hall, 2001). 
vi. A study by (Kaye et al., 2001) in the British Medical Journal found that autism has continued to rise despite 
MMR administration being static.  
vii. A study carried out by (Farrington et al., 2001) provides further evidence against a causal association between 
MMR vaccination and autism.  
viii. June, the Lothian division of the British Medical Association (BMA) requests that the BMA back single vaccines 
as an alternative for parents who refuse the MMR. 
ix. August, a doctor offering separate vaccines in his clinic was reported to the General Medical Council (GMC) 
(Fraser, 2001b) in (Casiday, 2005). Two months later, the doctor was cleared of any misconduct and allowed to 
continue to offer single injections on the condition that he provided up to date information of the safety of MMR 
(Boseley, 2001). 
x. September, study by Elliman and Bedford (2001) warned parents of the risk of vaccinating with unlicensed 
products, which may be ineffective and carry a slightly higher risk of meningitis. They reviewed the evidence on 
separate MMR vaccines.  
xi. October, in their paper Fombonne and Chakrabarti (2001) reported a cross-sectional study of 262 autistic 
children, demonstrating no difference in age of first parental concern or rate of developmental regression by 
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exposure to MMR vaccines. No association between developmental regression and gastrointestinal symptoms 
was observed.  
xii. December, Dr. Wakefield resigns from the Royal Free Hospital (Fraser, 2001a). 
xiii. During Prime Minister’s Questions, MP Julie Kirkbride, mother of a 14-month-old boy, asked Mr Blair, the then 
prime minister whether his son Leo had been immunised with MMR. Mr Blair declined to reply (BBC, 2001). 
xiv. The MRC published its report on the review of autism research and found that the number of autistic cases has 
increased to (6 in 1000 children) due to increased recognition and changing definitions of autism (MRC report, 
2001).  
2002 xv. January - A study reveals that babies' immune systems are capable of handling up to 10,000 different infections 
at a time (Offit et al., 2002). The report exonerated the practice of combining Vaccines. 
xvi. In February, the Independent newspaper revealed that Leo Blair had been given MMR (Dillon, 2002). The Prime 
Minister however, refuses to confirm this report on the grounds of privacy in personal medical matters.  
xvii. The Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM), which examined the most recent publications into the safety of 
the MMR vaccine, concluded that current scientific evidence does not support a causal link between MMR 
vaccination and autism or bowel disease.  
xviii. February - Wakefield linked the decline in MMR vaccine to removal of the single vaccine and of choice 
(Wakefield, 2002). 
xix. In April, a study co-authored by Wakefield and O'Leary suggests a link between the measles virus and bowel 
disease in children with developmental disorders (Uhlmann et al., 2002).  
xx. Conservative MP Julie Kirkbride announced plans to introduce a bill in Parliament allowing parents to choose 
single vaccines for free under the NHS (Dillon, 2002). 
xxi. The Royal Free Hospital where Dr. Wakefield carried out his initial research - published a study on the British 
Medical Journal website saying there is no link between MMR and autism.  
xxii. In May, Lord May called on Government to access the MMR vaccine as parents were not persuaded by 
government blanket assurances that MMR possess no risk of autism (Highfield, 2002). 
xxiii. June, Wakefield presented evidence to a US congressional committee claiming that the measles virus identified 
in the guts of autistic children had been identified by a team led by John O'Leary as originating from the vaccine 
(Deer, 2011). 
xxiv. In September, DoH launched a new website, ‘MMR: The facts’ to give parents information about the vaccine and 
the scientific studies supporting its safety and news on the controversy. The website also has frequently asked 
questions sections and a forum for parents to ask questions directly to members of the DoH. 
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xxv. November – A study links increase in autism to environmental factors (such as vaccination) rather than to better 
diagnosis or increased awareness as was earlier claimed (Byrd, 2002) in (Casiday, 2005). 
xxvi. Using a national registry, Danish researchers observed no differences in the relative risk of autism between those 
who did and those who did not receive MMR vaccine (Madsen et al., 2002). 
2003 xxvii. At the beginning of 2003, The London Assembly warned of lower rate of vaccination uptake when compared to 
the nationwide record (73% vs. 85%). The assembly urged the Government to boost immunisation levels and 
issue a review report of possible side-effects (Wright, 2003). 
xxviii. The Health Protection Authority (HPA) also announced that mumps cases in Wales had doubled from 65 cases in 
2001 to 143 in 2002, up from (de Bruxelles, 2003). At the same time, demands for separate measles and mumps 
vaccines had increased dramatically (Laurance, 2003). 
xxix. March - Desumo Information and Health Care (Worcester) ordered to stop the offer of single vaccines until the 
company was registered with the National Care Standards Commission, leaving 5,000 families uncertain about 
how their children’s vaccination courses would be completed (Fraser, 2003). 
xxx. June - High Court rules in favour of the fathers of the children of two divorced couples, mandating MMR 
vaccine be given to the children. Their fathers demanded their children be given immunisation (Payne, 2002). 
xxxi. July - DoH wrote to doctors warning that up to 40,000 children vaccinated at the Elstree Aerodrome in 
Hertfordshire and Hillsborough Arena in Sheffield were at risk of the diseases and that they should be re-
immunised with MMM (Casiday, 2005).  
xxxii. August - Dr David Pugh, of Elstree Aeromedical centre, was taken to court to face charges of forgery of blood 
test results relating to single measles, mumps and rubella vaccines (Payne, 2002). Dr Pugh was eventually 
arrested in December 2004 (Sapsted, 2004). 
xxxiii. A study revealed that measles cases in Britain had risen with decline in MMR vaccination (Jansen et al., 2003).  
xxxiv. September - Annual immunization uptake report showed MMR uptake at a record low (79%) since the vaccine 
was introduced (Boseley, 2003). 
xxxv. October - Parents (by now, more than 1500) suing MMR vaccine manufacturers over alleged damage to their 
children lost their legal aid funding for their cases (Martin, 2003). The parents appeal was turned down. 
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8.4 Analysis of MMR Vaccine Debate 
 
This chapter examined the emergence and the evolution of the MMR vaccine safety debate in 
the United Kingdom and the associated policy responses to the claim that MMR vaccine was 
a risk factor to young infants. The main thrust of the MMR vaccine safety debate centred on 
whether the institutionalised MMR vaccine immunisation routine was safe for young infants 
given its suggested link to autism. Andrew Wakefield and his team in the 1998 suggested a 
link between MMR vaccine and autism and called for a precautionary approach to use a single 
injection until any risk from the MMR vaccine was ruled out. However, this suggestion was 
meet with stiff opposition by public health authorities who are charged with the responsibility 
of managing public health. While some of the co-authors retracted their support for the 1998 
paper, Andrew Wakefield insisted for many years that the MMR vaccine was unsafe for some 
young infants. He claimed in several studies that that the vaccine has never undergone proper 
safety tests. Within the first phase of the debate, public health institutions responsible for 
advising the UK government on routine immunization, such as the department of health (DoH), 
the Medicines Control Agency (MCA), the Committee on Safety of Medicines (CSM) and the 
Joint Committee on Vaccination and Immunisation (JCVI) were quick to dismiss Andrew 
Wakefield’s claims, accusing him of cherry-picking evidence, unethical conduct and 
committing fraudulent acts. These authorities argued that the triple MMR vaccine was safe and 
preferable to single component injections (Bosley, 2001). No policy changes were 
recommended or made in the first analysed phase of the debate. 
 
In the second phase of the debate (the period between 2001 and 2003), Andrew Wakefield 
continued to insist that the MMR vaccine was unsafe for young infants. He claimed that he had 
found a virus in the guts of 170 autistic children (Fraser, 2001c). This period also saw a rise in 
measles outbreaks in the UK. At this point, the government, realizing the importance of 
communication and trust between public and health authorities launched a £3 million 
advertising campaign in order to cope with a growing concern about the use of the triple MMR 
vaccine (Boseley, 2001). This move was criticised by National Autistic Society, saying that the 
government focus should be on research rather than advertising (Boseley, 2001). Subsequently, 
the MRC announced it would fund Professor Andrew Hall of the London School of Hygiene 
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and Tropical Medicine to conduct a computerised database study on risk factors for autism, 
including immunisation. Public health authorities continued to criticise Wakefield’s conduct 
but also argued that the policy of giving MMR vaccine in two doses was safer than 
administering the three component vaccines sequentially with six injections (DoH, 2001). In 
addition, an investigation by journalist Brian Deer of The Sunday Times revealed that 
Wakefield had been paid £55,000 for his research by a legal team preparing a case against the 
vaccine manufacturers (Deer, 2004). Wakefield earlier disclosed a link with the Legal Aid 
Board in a letter to The Lancet three months before his 1998 publication (Booth, 2004), but 
failed to mention the money he was paid for the study. He was struck off the British medical 
register by General Medical Council for serious professional misconduct in 2010 (Meikle and 
Boseley, 2010).  
 
In terms of the PERC framework, Barnett and Duvall (2005)’s notion of structural power seem 
to be significant here in shaping the policy perspective taken to risk. This was manifest in the 
stakeholder relationship between policy makers and technical experts (the 37 expert committee) 
whose expertise was called upon to make sense of the risk to public health. The 
recommendation of the committee, that there was no reason for a policy change in the current 
MMR vaccine programme, led to the policy perspective that the MMR vaccine was indeed safe 
and in the best interest of infants and public health. Andrew Wakefield’s membership of the 
medical profession gave him the authority and mandate to speak to this domain of risk, which, 
combined within his interpretation in the press conference following the first publication of his 
findings, may have also sparked the public controversy over whether MMR vaccine is linked 
to autism. 
 
In regard to the role of expertise, technical experts can be seen to play a significant role in 
shaping the MMR vaccine safety discourse (in this case from under critical model to over 
critical mode and vice versa). Wakefield raised concern that MMR vaccine may be linked to 
autism, despite the fact that his 1998 study did not constitute a causal proof of a link. Certainly, 
it was his suggestion of a possible link in a press statement on the eve of the publication and 
subsequent media presentation that raised parents’ concerns while looking to make the safest 
choices for their children. Technical experts can also be seen to act as policy advisers advising 
the government on the policy action in the interest of public health. For example, the 37 expert 
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committee after its investigation recommended that there was no reason for a policy change in 
the current MMR vaccine programme (Medicines Control Agency and Department of Health, 
2001). The experts agreed however that there is a need for more research generally into the 
causes of Crohn's disease, ulcerative colitis and autism. Therefore, government officials were 
quick to refute Wakefield’s claims and reassure concerned parents that MMR vaccine policy 
was indeed safe and in the best interest of both their infants and public health. The first 
examined phase of the MMR vaccine debate also illustrates the bias against experiential 
expertise, which is undervalued in fields of contested knowledge. This can be seen in parents’ 
observations linking the onset of their children’s behavioural responses to the MMR 
vaccination. Nevertheless, the fear-mongering discourse of Andrew Wakefield that MMR 
vaccine may be linked to autism combined with some of the parents’ accounts of their 
children’s behavioural changes may have amplified risk (erroneously) in the face of scientific 
evidence.  
 
With reference to communication and trust, what seems apparent is how the government’s 
initial response was focused on reassuring parents that the claim that MMR was linked to 
autism was unsubstantiated. However, these reassurances were carried out in a one-way 
communication fashion that is now recognised as a deficient model for public health risk 
communication. This perhaps, may be one reason why MMR vaccine uptake was found to have 
declined in some parts of the country, despite quick government reassurances. For example, as 
early as June 1998, the Public Health Laboratory Service reported that MMR vaccine uptake 
was on the decline. The study was conducted by Thomas et al., (1998) who assessed the impact 
of adverse publicity on uptake of MMR immunisation by obtaining data from the Child Health 
System on children resident in Wales in April of 1998. This suggested that government 
official’s reassurances that MMR vaccine was safe failed to convince some concerned parents 
in some parts of the UK. However, there was another study that blamed the decline of MMR 
vaccine uptake on media scares (Anderson, 1999). Subsequently, the launching of the website 
enabled a forum for parents to ask questions directly to members of the DoH; a move towards 
a two-way communication.  
 
The analysis of the unfolding events further suggests that social amplification (or attenuation) 
of public health risk has real health consequences. For example, Wakefield’s incorrect assertion 
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linking MMR and autism led to a decline in vaccination rates in the United Kingdom for the 
first time since its introduction in 1988. The decline in the uptake of MMR vaccine in some 
parts of the UK saw a parallel rise in measles and mumps outbreaks that led to serious illness 
and death. Besides, his continuing cautions against the MMR vaccine maintained a climate of 
distrust of both MMR and other vaccines. Studies such as (Poland and Jacobson, 2011, Deer, 
2009)  has reached similar conclusions.  
Table 8.4 summarises the link between the two analysed phases of the MMR vaccine to the 
study research themes.  
 
Table 8.4: Linking unfolding events in MMR vaccine debate to the stud research theme 
between 1998 to 2000 
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Power (to effect 
outcome) 
Expertise (interpretation and framing) Communication (nature 
of communication  
Trust/credibility  
Risk perception 
being shaped by 
means of ‘technical 
expertise’. 
 
Table 8.1, Event iii: 
Stakeholders 
relation between 
technical experts 
(e.g. 37 expert 
committees) and 
policy makers. See 
also event viii, vix 
 
 
 
Table 8.1, event ii: Wakefield calls for 
suspension of the triple injection. 
Event iii: The CSM concludes the policy of 
giving MMR vaccine in two doses is safer 
than giving the three component vaccines 
sequentially with six injections, as such, the 
balance of benefit to risk is therefore highly 
favourable. 
 
Table 8.2, event iv,:  Wakefield reveals to the 
Telegraph that he has evidence of 170 new cases 
of ‘autistic syndrome’, with the majority of cases 
backed by documentary evidence of regression 
following vaccination. According to him, 
authorities have failed to adequately address 
safety of the MMR vaccine (Fraser, 2001c). 
 
Other related events vi, vii, x, xi, xiv etc 
 
Table 8.2, event xxi: The Royal Free Hospital 
where Dr. Wakefield carried out his initial 
research - publishes a study on the British 
Medical Journal website saying there is no 
link between MMR and autism. 
Table 8.2, Event i:  The 
British government launches 
£3 million advertising in 
other to address the growing 
concern around the use of 
MMR. 
 
Table 8.2, event xxiv:  DoH 
launches a new website, 
‘MMR: The facts’ to give 
parents information about 
the vaccine and the 
scientific studies supporting 
its safety and news on the 
controversy. The website 
also has frequently asked 
questions sections and a 
forum for parents to ask 
questions directly to 
members of the DoH. 
 
Event xii: Andrew 
Wakefield resigns from 
Royal Free Hospital. 
 
Table 8.1, event iii: The 37 
expert committee conclude 
that evidence does not 
support a link between 
MMR injections and autism 
and bowel disorders like 
Crohn's disease and 
ulcerative colitis. See also 
events v, viii, and x. 
 
Table 8.2, event xvi: Tony 
Blair declines to answer if 
his son Leo has taken the 
MMR vaccine. 
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8.5 Findings relating to Social Amplification 
(or Attenuation) of MMR Vaccine Risk 
within the Policy Domain  
 
Study Hypothesis: Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the 
negotiation of public health risk arguments between the over critical 
model and under critical model in a science-policy relationship. 
 
The analysis of the evolving events carried out in this chapter suggests that there is 
strong relationship between over use of power of experts by stakeholder groups 
and social amplification (or attenuation) of risk in a policy domain. This is 
evidenced by Wakefield's research (shrouded by unethical behaviour) and his incorrect 
suggestion that MMR vaccine is linked to autism despite the fact that his study did not 
constitute a proof. When this is combined with vested interest (as those seen in the 
case of Andrew Wakefield), this could present a dangerous and salient avenue of 
power in public health risk communication that may go unnoticed or unscrutinised 
because of a perceived credibility of technical expertise that may allow social 
amplification (or attenuation) of risk to thrive. 
 
The next chapter (nine) carry out a cross case analysis of the smoking, vaping and 
MMR vaccine debates and provides interpretive insights through the theoretical lens 
of the policy evaluation risk communication (PERC) framework and other extant 
literature. This will enable the study to consolidate the findings from the three chapters 
and also to check for the usefulness of the PERC framework.  
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9 Public Health Risk Debate and the Policy 
Evaluation Risk Communication Framework 
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9.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter discusses the cross-case empirical findings of the smoking, vaping and 
MMR vaccine safety debates through the lens of the policy evaluation risk 
communication (PERC) framework described in chapter four. The chapter begins by 
briefly summarizing the elements of the PERC framework using this as a lens to 
discuss the empirical findings from the smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine safety 
debates (presented in Chapters six, seven and eight). The implications of the empirical 
findings for public health risk communication and its associated policymaking are 
then set out, consolidating findings from the three examined case study debates.  
 
9.2 The Policy Evaluation Risk 
Communication framework  
 
On the basis of gaps and weaknesses identified in the Collingridge and Reeve (1986) 
under critical and over critical models (see chapter two) and Kasperson et al. (1988), 
social amplification of risk framework (see chapter three), a policy evaluation risk 
communication (PERC) framework was developed (see chapter four). Chapter one of 
the thesis set out to examine the roles of power and expertise in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policy. Using debates about smoking, vaping and the 
MMR vaccine (see chapter six, seven and eight), the PERC framework was tested to 
understand how power and expertise shape public health risk discussion in the policy 
domain. The PERC framework is based on the assumption that social amplification of 
risk is the driver of the negotiation of public health risk argument between the over 
critical model and the under critical model in a science-policy relationship. Within 
this, social amplification is viewed as a multi-dimensional and multi-channel process, 
a view already held by (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012), and developed by this study in 
chapter ten to provide a modified account of SARF. The PERC framework further 
describes how individual or group behavioural responses and their emergent problems 
may influence the transition of risk argument between over critical and under critical 
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models. However, due to the resource (time and word limit) constraints of this PhD, 
emphasis will be placed on the empirical testing of how power, expertise, 
communication and trust shape the social amplification (or attenuation) of public 
health risk communication within their policy contexts. Future research will require an 
empirical validation of how behavioural responses and their emergent problems shape 
this transition of risk argument between the over critical and under critical models.  
 
The core argument of the PERC framework is that policy debates relating to risk 
encounter multiple interactions between power and expertise that can enhance or 
inhibit risk communication, create or destroy trust and credibility, and privilege certain 
social and professional relationships over others. The consequence of this is that a 
degree of bias can arise from the asymmetries of power underpinning these interactions 
and processes that, in turn, perpetuate the domination of certain risk perspectives 
and/or shape the prioritisation of issues and debates in the policy domain.  
 
The following section therefore, discusses the cross-case empirical findings within the 
elements of the PERC framework and then critically analyses these within the context 
of extant literature. The key elements are power, expertise, communication and trust. 
 
9.2.1 Power and Expertise 
The constructs of power and expertise are jointly discussed here because the two are 
intertwined and in some cases overlap. For example, the analysis of the smoking, 
vaping and MMR vaccine debates showed that ‘power’ was expressed through 
‘expertise’. However, expertise may be an outcome of power or even produce power. 
Having said this, considering the roles of power and expertise in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policy making, it would appear that institutional 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962), productive (Lukes, 2005) and structural (Barnett and 
Duvall, 2005) powers provide the best (although still inadequate) explanation of how 
power shaped the smoking, vaping risk and the MMR vaccine safety debates and 
associated policy making. This argument is elaborated below. 
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Institutional Power in Risk Debate 
 
The smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debate showed that institutional power 
(Bachrach and Baratz, 1962) was able to explain how certain stakeholder groups can 
exercise the ‘non-decision making’ (p.952) power and how that shaped public health 
risk communication. For example, the evolving events in the smoking risk debate 
suggest that the medical research council and ministry of health exercised non-decision 
making power by prioritizing inquiry into the relationship between smoking and lung 
cancer in the 1950’s. This consideration led to the sponsorship of Doll and Hill’s 
research and that triggered the emergence of the smoking debate, making smoking risk 
a health priority in the UK. Institutional power was also expressed by the World Health 
Organisation, which raised concerns about inadequacies in the understanding of the 
safety and efficacy of electronic cigarettes (EC) as a smoking cessation aid. Marketers 
had initially claimed ECs were a safer alternative to tobacco cigarettes in 2008 when 
they were initially introduced into the European market. The same exercise of 
institutional power applies to public health authorities that determined what questions 
were essential in assessing the incorrect suggestion that MMR vaccine was linked to 
autism. There were those who were interested in understanding the causes of autism. 
Instead, initial emphasis of the 37 expert committee conveyed by the Minister of 
Health focused on examining (validating or refuting) Andrew Wakefield’s evidence.  
 
Such non-decision making power as exercised by public health authorities (seen in the 
smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine case studies) influenced the initial direction and 
scope of the discussion, which prevented any overt conflicts or initial challenges from 
other stakeholder groups. This finding is similar to Birkland (2007) who suggested that 
setting the risk or policy agenda determines which risk issue or solution gains public 
and policy attention, which ultimately, will drive the issue and conversely, reduce the 
significance of those issues or problems relating to the risk that fail to make it to the 
agenda. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) raised caution about the ways policy makers 
define ‘critical’ or ‘key’ issues that make an issue a policy priority. They argue for a 
“restrictive face of power” that considers non-decision making, and which can be used 
to: (a) uncover procedural, institutional or social bias and the extent to which powerful 
  
 
212 
 
persons and groups are able to influence those values and institutions that are brought 
to bear in risk communication and that may profit or disadvantage certain groups; (b) 
as a foundation for analysing those directly or indirectly involved in decision making; 
and, (c) a standard for distinguishing between ‘key’ and ‘routine’ policy decisions” 
(p.952). Bachrach and Baratz (1962) reject any suggestion that undermines this as a 
useful means of deconstructing institutional power in risk discussion, despite 
recognising that identifying these restrictive or enabling forces is a subjective act. 
 
 
Productive power 
 
Productive power - the capacity to influence others in a covert way - can also be seen 
to be manifest in the analysis of the evolving events relating to smoking, vaping and 
the MMR vaccine debates. Productive power was expressed through technical 
expertise  and media sources  which are the means by which interested stakeholders 
and the public made sense of the risks they face. For example, the expert interpretation 
that states that there is a ‘real association’ between smoking and lung cancer expressed 
by Doll and Hill was accepted by key government advisory bodies, and this 
interpretation shaped the policy perspective taken to smoking risk. Similarly, in the 
vaping debate, technical experts can be seen to play a central role in helping the public 
make sense of the safety and efficacy of electronic cigarettes, including its social 
consequences. This can be observed from the initial identification of the uncertainty 
or gaps in scientific knowledge about the safety and efficacy of ECs by World Health 
Organisation, to the development of knowledge and framing of EC risk within the 
public health context.  
 
Technical experts were also the means by which other experts are held accountable to 
their interpretations. For example, the scenario in the EC debate suggests that the 
science (around the safety and efficacy of ECs and their associated social values) was 
contested within both the scientific and public health communities. On the one hand, 
there are expert groups that viewed ECs as an effective aid to smoking cessation, 
offering a safer alternative to those who do not want to quit smoking. On the other 
hand, are those who called for a precautionary stance for strict control and regulation 
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of EC devices. The two groups of experts on the opposing sides of the debate fiercely 
scrutinized the evidence and arguments of the other group in a way that continually 
shaped the understanding of the vaping risk and the risk acceptability debate. 
Productive power can also be observed in the MMR vaccine safety debate where 
Andrew Wakefield suggested a link between MMR vaccine and autism. His assertion 
created a lot of tension and distress in relation to public health and safety, despite the 
fact that his research did not constitute any kind of proof of a link between the MMR 
vaccine and autism. Surely, it was his interpretation in the press conference before the 
publication of his findings, where he called for the suspension of the triple injection in 
favour of the single vaccines, until such time as the MMR vaccine is ruled out as a 
possible environmental trigger for autism and the subsequent presentation of this in 
the media that fuelled the concern amongst parents.  
 
The centrality of science and its experts in helping the public and policy makers make 
sense of smoking vaping and MMR vaccine risks suggests that technical experts have 
the capacity to influence the perception of others in both overt and covert ways. This 
view is in line with the assertion made in several studies, such as (Collingridge and 
Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012), that expertise is seen as a 
sense making aid to other stakeholders engaged in dialogue. The centrality of science 
and its experts suggests that technical experts are key influential amplification agents 
during unfolding public health controversies, especially in the policy context. Lukes 
(2005) recognises that this form of power does not have to be negative but also 
“productive, transformative, authoritative and compatible with dignity” (p.109). 
Technical expertise has allowed us better to understand the nature of the risk we face 
and enabled us to build capacity by carefully and critical reflecting upon evidence 
around us (Muscatelli, 2016). However, where there are gaps in knowledge and where 
vested interest cannot be ruled out, we must pay attention to the manner in which 
technical experts may become prominent, and perhaps dangerous, amplification or 
attenuation agents. 
 
It can be seen from the analysis of the evolving events within the three debates that the 
media are another source for the exercise of productive power. For example, in the 
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press conference before and after The Lancet 1998 publication of his work, and in 
subsequent presentations in the media, Andrew Wakefield’s interpretation fuelled 
concerns amongst parents of a link between autism and MMR. This assertion is in line 
with other studies, such as Anderson (1999) who held ‘media scares’ to be responsible 
for the decline of MMR vaccine uptake. Luke, (2005) has highlighted the importance 
of media sources and how they shape the “perception, conception and preferences” of 
risk in ways that may even shape public perception away from what would be in its 
own best interest. Indeed, expert interpretation and media sources are critical in public 
health risk communication since members of the public are sometimes unwilling or 
unable accurately to assess or decode the science or evidence for themselves. 
 
Structural power 
 
Structural power can be seen also to be manifest in the analysis of the evolving events 
within the examined case studies. Barnett and Duval (2005) talk of how power exists 
or may be exercised in a direct and specific relationship. For example, representatives 
of the tobacco industry sought to shape policy developments by pursuing an informal 
health policy arrangement by voluntary agreement with the Government on how to 
regulate tobacco sales and advertising. This enabled them to develop social and 
professional relationships by which they were able to exchange views and express 
opinions with policy makers. These negotiations, according to Collingridge and Reeve 
(1986), strengthened the industry political positions by enabling them to delay or make 
unnecessary the establishment of stricter and legally binding rules. For example, the 
1971 negotiation over the health warnings on tobacco products (accepted by the 
government), killed a Private Member’s Bill in the house of common which threatened 
a much stronger warning on cigarette packs (Popham, 1981).  
Stakeholder relationships (between expert committees and policy makers) were also 
prominent within the three case study debates. For example, in the evolution of events, 
shortly after the Public Health England expert review reported that ECs are 
approximately 95% less harmful than smoking (McNeill et al., 2015), the UK 
government decided that ECs could be prescribed by NHS doctors to help smokers 
who wanted to quit smoking (Tonkin, 2015). This decision was based on the advice of 
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the expert committee of Public Health England, hence pointing to the importance of a 
‘stakeholder relationship’ in the policy perspective taken towards the use of electronic 
cigarettes. Stakeholder relationship can also be observed in the MMR vaccine safety 
debate. For example, event iii, on table 8.1 suggests that policy makers convened a 
committee of 37 experts to verify Andrew Wakefield’s claims that the MMR vaccine 
may be linked to autism. The 37 expert committee recommended that there was no 
reason for a policy change in the current MMR vaccine programme (Medicines 
Control Agency and Department of Health, 2001), and this recommendation shaped 
the policy perspective taken to the MMR vaccine. As a result of this recommendation, 
the government decided not to take any action. This was against the suggestion by 
Andrew Wakefield who had called for the withdrawal of the triple dose in favour of a 
separate single vaccine for each disease.  
Other approaches have highlighted the importance of indirect and socially diffuse 
relationships whereby power is not exercised through direct relationships but formed 
by them (Foucault, 1980). This includes the form of power that arises from being a 
member of a social group (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). This type of structural power 
can be observed in how being a member of a professional discipline enhances the 
ability of technical experts to speak authoritatively in certain domains of risk. A good 
example of this is how a group of public health and medical experts who, by virtue of 
their membership of a public health and medical community, jointly signed several 
letters to Margaret Chan, of the World Health Organisation, advising on the best course 
of action in regulating ECs and proposing measures that would avoid corporate pitfalls 
(similar to those seen during the tobacco debate).  
Resistance 
 
Foucault’s notion of resistive power is also relevant here. This can be observed 
within the MMR vaccine debate in terms of some parents’ refusal to give consent 
to their infants being given the MMR vaccine, and opting instead for the single 
immunisation components, see also (Evans et al., 2001a). This led to a drop in the 
uptake of the MMR vaccine to below the threshold of herd immunity for the first 
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time since the introduction of the vaccine. This exercise of power led the 
government to change its strategy towards communicating its position on the MMR 
vaccine risk. There was also a change from a one-way communication strategy 
focused on reassurance, to a two-way and interactive communication strategy. The 
UK government later launched a new website - ‘MMR: The facts’, to give parents 
information about the vaccine and the scientific studies supporting its safety, as well 
as updated news on the continuing controversy. This gave parents access to the 
relevant information and also enabled them to address any concerns they may have 
had by putting direct questions to members of the Department of Health. 
 
The above analysis of power suggests that institutional power (Bachrach and Baratz, 
1962), productive power (Lukes, 2005) and structural power (Barnett and Duvall, 
2005), as well as Foucault’s resistive power (Foucault, 1978) operating through the 
earlier mentioned three dimensions, were together able to explain how power shaped 
public health risk communication as it relates to policy making. This validates the 
argument (made in section 3.3.1) that risk communication is a process embedded 
within institutional, productive and structural powers that may allow social 
amplification (or attenuation) of risk to thrive. However, neither of this theory of 
power alone is sufficient to explain how power functions in public health risk 
communication. Future research in risk communication should look at consolidating 
insight form these forms of power to theorise and empirically validate how power 
functions in situations of risk and policy making. 
 
 
Economic resource, power and social amplification of risk 
 
It is also important how wider economic factors significantly made it possible for 
economically resourced stakeholder groups (e.g. tobacco companies) to act in way that 
protected their interests, at least for some time, until evidence began to tilt the balance 
of power. Aside from forging relevant stakeholder relationships, the analysis of the 
evolving events in the smoking debate shows that the tobacco industry was able to use 
its resources (e.g. economic means) to purchase the relevant scientific expertise, and 
to exert influence on the perception of smoking risk while also engaging in policy 
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development relating to tobacco cigarettes. The analysis also points to how the 
industry circumvented the ban on advertising in the UK through sponsorship of 
sporting and cultural events. It was also able to delay policy interventions with legal 
battles against UK government policy decisions, and by working with allies in key 
government positions. The knock-on effect was that despite the seeming consensus in 
government departments about the dangers of smoking as earlier as the mid-50’s (see 
Table 6.2, events v, viii, x, xi, xvi), and pressures from advisory committees, including 
some members of parliament and the MRC, no immediate action was taken by the 
government to inform the public of the dangers of smoking. This perhaps, can be 
linked to the tobacco industry’s ability to use its economic power to its advantage in 
the smoking risk discussion within the public and policy domain.  
 
Voluntary agreement was used as a means to control the sale and marketing of tobacco 
products, which bought the industry time and strengthened its political positions in 
delaying, or making unnecessary the establishment of stricter and legally binding rules. 
Most of the stricter and legally binding policy interventions were legitimised in the 
1990’s. Also, its ability to attack the technical case made against smoking by means 
of technical expertise could also explain the delay in policy intervention. At least, this 
created doubt in the minds of the public, as there was little or no causal proof of a link 
between smoking and lung cancer. These findings correspond with the conclusion of 
other studies such as (Saloojee and Dagli, 2000, Trochim et al., 2003, World Health, 
2000, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). This suggests that there is a seeming relationship 
between economic power, technical expertise and policy interventions. The 
relationship between economic power and policy making has also been suggested by 
previous studies see (Smith, 1988). Smith (1988) has previously argued that “corporate 
bodies are able to exert considerable influence on the decision-making process due to 
their economic power and technical expertise” (p1). 
 
Another line of argument that can be drawn from the analysis of the evolving events 
of the three examined case studies is that those with economic and political power 
(agenda control and decision making power) demonstrated higher ability to influence 
the technical expertise brought to bear on risk because they often have the means or 
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authority to acquire necessary scientific expertise in risk discussion. This can be seen 
in how the tobacco industry was able to engage and attack the technical case linking 
smoking to lung cancer via its own technical expertise. It is also evident in how policy 
makers through scientific committees come to make sense of a potential or actual risk. 
Political and economic power also enhances the ability of stakeholder groups to 
influence other forms of power, such as productive and structural powers. For 
example, in 1991, the UK tobacco industry sued the UK government over the size of 
the new compulsory health warnings on cigarette packs, using legislation and 
loopholes in the law to delay, restrict or influence government policies on tobacco 
control. In this way, tobacco companies were able to use their economic resources to 
buy legal expertise in the court of law to further their aim. In addition, by means of 
voluntary agreements, they were able to use their economic resources to strengthen 
their structural power position. This finding aligns with the views of Kasperson et al., 
(1988) who suggested that the understanding of risk is a reflection of ‘intuitive biases 
and economic interests’ (p.178). 
Economic resource, expertise and social amplification of risk 
 
 
The analysis of the smoking and vaping risk debate suggest that the short lived timeline 
between the transition of policy argument from over critical to under critical models 
and policy action (or inaction) debate, may be linked to the absence of powerful 
economically resourced stakeholders groups, unlike those seen in this tobacco debate. 
For example, the vaping risk debate witnessed an almost absence of economically 
powerful stakeholder groups who were able to use their resources to shape the public 
health risk debate in the manner seen in the tobacco debate. As at the time the vaping 
risk debate emerged in 2008, ECs had been newly introduced into the European and 
UK markets and many of the electronic cigarette companies were still new and 
financially less resourced, especially when compared to the big tobacco companies. 
From this, it is logical to suggest that EC companies were not in a position to mount 
an effective challenge on the technical case made against ECs in the same way that the 
tobacco companies did in the smoking debate. Instead, any arguments that would 
advantage EC companies economically were received with caution so as to avoid 
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similar deceit and delay tactics that was used successfully by the tobacco companies 
for many years. The inference that can therefore be drawn from this (and as previously 
noted in chapters four and seven) is that time scale between scientific consensus and 
policy action depends on the ability of interest groups to muster their power to 
influence the nature of the debate brought to bear on the risk.  
 
This raises another issue; that where there is power, the influence of trust and 
credibility is reduced. However, the relevance of trust and credibility becomes 
heightened where power is absent from shaping the policy perspective taken to risk. 
For example, Wakefield’s incorrect suggestion and the inability of other scientists 
around the world to replicate his claim put the burden on him and his colleagues to 
prove their credibility (his colleagues later retracted their support for the paper). While 
he had the technical expertise, he was not financially resourced to mount an effective 
challenge against the public health authorities that refuted his claims of a link between 
MMR vaccine and autism. This paradoxical relationship between power and trust has 
been suggested in previous studies. For example, Buchmann (2001) argues that where 
power increases, the effect of trust decreases, and where power decreases the effect of 
trust increases. The absence of economically resourced stakeholder groups may be one 
reason why trust and credibility was a central factor in shaping the arguments brought 
to bear on both the vaping debate and the MMR vaccine safety debate.  
 
9.2.2 Power, expertise and the negotiation of risk argument 
between over critical and under critical model 
 
Within the first phase of the smoking debate (as analysed in chapter six), the evolving 
events suggest that there was some sense of scientific consensus that smoking was 
linked to lung cancer (see Table 6.2, events i, ii, ix, xiii and xiv). However, as the 
debate evolved, the analysis of the smoking debate indicates that the tobacco 
companies were able to engage the resources at their disposal to acquire or access the 
necessary technical expertise effectively to refute and attack the technical case made 
against smoking. The industry provided scientific evidence to contradict research, 
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especially around the technical details linking advertising (e.g. sports sponsorship) and 
recruiting new smokers (see Table 6.5, event xxiii). However, since subsequent studies 
continued strongly to point to a link between tobacco and lung cancer, there was a shift 
in the balance of power to the point where it was generally accepted that smoking is 
linked to lung cancer; a shift towards the under critical model. This suggests that those 
with resources (such as knowledge, expertise or capital) and political power (decision 
and non-decision making power) demonstrate a greater ability to influence the 
technical expertise brought to bear in risk debates. The evidence seen in the tobacco 
case suggests that powerful elite groups are able to acquire the scientific expertise that 
supports their interest in the negotiation of risk. Furthermore, those in charge of 
managing public health may influence technical expertise through the selection of 
expert committees, which act as advisors to policy makers.  
 
While the influence of economic and political power was less salient in the initial 
stages of the vaping risk debate, productive power exercised through technical 
expertise was largely dominant in shaping the risk discussion. This can be seen in the 
arguments presented by both sides of the debate and where evidence presented is 
subjected to intense scrutiny by the either side. This suggests that powerful individuals 
or groups with requisite knowledge or expertise are able to use their knowledge or 
technical expertise to shape public health risk communication. Interestingly, this 
‘productive’ power can also be exercised as a means of resistance in the sense used by 
Foucault, suggesting that power is fluid and exists everywhere. When technical 
expertise is combined with a vested interest (e.g. in the MMR vaccine debate Dr. 
Andrew Wakefield fraudulently claimed there is a link between MMR vaccine and 
autism), this productive kind of power (that is, technical expertise) could present a 
salient and perhaps dangerous avenue of power in risk communication, which could 
go unnoticed or unscrutinised in such a way that may disadvantage other risk 
perspectives or worldviews in a policy domain.   
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9.2.3 Communication and Trust 
The influence of communication (or language) featured strongly in the analysis of the 
three cases in chapters six, seven and eight, especially in the use of languages of 
uncertainty. For example, in the smoking debate, representatives of tobacco companies 
can be seen to frequently point to gaps in knowledge, and a lack of any available causal 
proof (see table text 1, in section 6.3). By using this language of uncertainty, the 
tobacco industry was able to attack (and attenuate) the technical case made against 
smoking. According to Simmerling and Janich (2016), who argue that languages of 
(un)certainty are ‘highly context sensitive’ and may affect how a risk argument is 
received and believed. The knock-on effect as seen in the smoking debate is that it 
delayed the transition of the smoking risk argument towards the under critical model, 
and the development of any concrete policy intervention that would otherwise have 
improved human health and living conditions. Similarly, experts on opposing sides of 
the argument in the vaping risk debate were quick to point to lack of evidence in claims 
put forward by opposing sides of the argument, bringing about endless technical 
debates about the safety and efficacy of ECs. The importance of this has been noted 
by Fischbacher-Smith (2011) who highlights how uncertainty “creates problems of 
interpretation and speculation, but also occasionally served to heighten the 
uncertainty surrounding the event”. In such situations, those at risk may become 
confused about what action to take or to avoid or from which to disengage having been 
alerted to a risk issue. In other words, the public may ignore the science and associated 
scientific advice. 
Furthermore, the analysis of the vaping debate suggests that the MHRA-led public 
consultation (a two-way communication between stakeholders) may have eased public 
acceptability of EC regulation under the medical regime. The report of the consultation 
showed strong public support for regulation of EC devices under a medical regime. 
Besides, it has been suggested by Fischbacher-Smith et al. (2010) that people’s 
willingness to consult with each another reduces the likelihood of risk intensification 
and tension during risk acceptability debates. The ‘two-way communication model’ as 
rightly suggested by Shannon and Weaver (2015) is shown to be essential in public 
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health risk communication because it allows risk regulators and policy makers to 
understand and learn about public concerns. At the same it, it empowers the public in 
the discussions of the risk issue, enabling them to make valuable input to decision 
making. This two-way model of communication has moreover been suggested to foster 
trust (Renn, 1991a). 
 
Trust and credibility were also critical in the debates under examination. For example, 
public health authorities such as CHSC and SACCR were observed to have believed 
in the credibility of Doll and Hill’s research linking smoking and lung cancer. As such, 
they accepted their interpretations, urging the government to inform the public of the 
dangers of smoking. This was also captured in the words of Dr. Green who, after the 
meeting between representatives of the tobacco companies and Richard Hill, expressed 
the view that “it was pretty clear to me that Mr Partridge and his colleagues felt that 
Hill had answered all their queries in a way which left hardly any loophole for 
doubt…” (ash.org.uk). (Mis)trust and credibility also featured strongly in how 
stakeholders responded to the arguments brought to bear on the debate around the 
regulation of electronic cigarettes. This can be linked to many years of lies, deceit and 
cover-ups during which the tobacco industry attempted to refute claims that smoking 
was linked to lung cancer and other diseases. As a result, there was a lot of suspicion 
around any argument seen to be of economic interest to stakeholder groups (e.g. 
corporate organizations) in risk discussions. Evidence of this can be seen in a letter 
signed by 129 public health and medical experts from 31 countries to Margaret Chan, 
of the World Health Organisation. This group of experts called on WHO to establish 
new controls on ECs and warned of tobacco industry tactics (Aktan et al., 2014) and 
the need to be cautious of how vested economic interests bring the various arguments 
to bear in the debate (see Table 7.3, event xvii). Further suspicion was raised when 
tobacco companies entered into EC manufacture. There was concern about 
conspiracies, which may have even led to the fierce nature of the scrutiny seen in the 
risk acceptability debate about how ECs should be framed within the public health 
context. The lack of trust coupled with concerns about conspiracies created tension 
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around the risk acceptability debate, and this was a driving force shifting the vaping 
risk argument more towards the over critical model.  
 
The analysis of the evolving events in the MMR vaccine debate also highlights the 
importance of trust and credibility in amplifying public and policy makers’ perception 
of MMR vaccine safety.  For instance, the credibility of Andrew Wakefield and his 
claims was called into question especially within the policy context when his evidence 
could not be verified by a 37 expert committee and subsequent technical research 
work. His credibility was further dented when he was found to have falsified evidence 
to support his argument see (Deer, 2011) which lead to his dismissal by the General 
Medical Council (GMC) in 2010. Other factors that had implications for trust can be 
linked to other similar public health debates that have occurred in the past. An example 
was the withdrawal of two out of the three brands of vaccines used in Britain by the 
department of health due to links with mild transient meningitis (Sugiura and Yamada, 
1991). In addition, the anti-vaccination movement that has endured since the 1900’s 
in Britain may have entrenched further suspicion of the MMR vaccine among 
concerned parents Blume (2006). 
 
The controversies around Tony Blair and his son (Leo) further highlight the 
importance of public trust in policy makers or those in charge of managing risk (see 
Table 8.3, event xiii). This is important from the perspective that public behavioural 
responses may exert influence upon the success or failure of any policy strategies 
adopted. The analysis of the MMR debate suggests that the reluctance of the Prime 
Minister to reveal his son’s MMR status is believed to have steered public anxiety 
amongst parents who were about to immunise their infants in the face of Andrew 
Wakefield’s suggested link of the MMR vaccine to autism.  
 
9.2.4 The state of evidence, information and knowledge  
The state of evidence, information and knowledge also played a role in shifting 
arguments between over critical and under critical models. A typical example is how 
the tobacco industry was seen to change its power strategy from one of attacking the 
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technical case made against smoking and lung cancer by means of technical expertise, 
to focusing effort on influencing policy development relating to smoking health risk 
using professional lobbyists and government allies. The analysis of the smoking debate 
suggests that this was due to the evolved state of evidence, information and knowledge 
that tilted the balance of power against the tobacco industry. As such, the state of 
evidence, information and knowledge impacted on the nature of power and expertise, 
including communication and trust, brought to bear on the risk of smoking, which in 
turn shaped the manner in which these factors determined the negotiation of risk 
arguments between over critical and under critical models.  
 
Table 9.1 below provides a descriptive summary of how power, expertise, 
communication and trust/credibility shaped the social amplification (or attenuation) 
processes in public health risk communication within the policy domain. 
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Table 9.1: Summary of factors shaping social amplification processes in policy 
evaluation risk communication in three case studies 
 
Factors shaping social amplification and attenuation processes  
in public health risk communication within the policy domain 
 
Smoking and Vaping Risk Debate MMR Vaccine safety 
debate Smoking Risk Debate Vaping Risk Debate 
 
Power 
o Institutional  
o Productive  
o Structural and  
o  
Power 
o Institutional  
o Productive and 
o Structural  
 
Power 
o Institutional  
o Productive  
o Structural and  
 
Technical expertise 
o Interpretation 
o Policy advisory 
o frames 
 
Expertise (Technical/local) 
o Interpretation 
o Policy advisory 
o frames 
 
Expertise (Technical) 
o Interpretation 
o Policy advisory 
o frames 
 
Communication  
o Using language of 
uncertainty  
 
 
Communication  
o Public consultation 
 
Communication  
o Government 
reassurance 
o Multichannel 
communication 
Trust and credibility 
o Reduced 
confidence in 
tobacco industry 
argument due to 
evolved state of 
evidence.   
Trust and credibility 
o Lies, deceit and 
cover up from 
previous smoking 
controversy  
Trust and credibility 
o Lack of credibility  
o Anti-immunisation 
movement in the 
1800’s).  
o Previous failed 
reassurances e.g. 
BSE event). 
 
 
 
Having analysed the three case studies (smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debates), 
it can be seen that the PERC framework is relevant and able to explain how certain 
perspectives of risk in a policy domain become amplified and how risk arguments 
transition between over critical and under critical models. Nevertheless, further 
empirical research is needed to validate how behavioural response to policy 
interventions may shape the transition between over critical and under critical models.  
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Table 9.2 (below) provides an overall summary of the empirical findings of this study 
that are relevant to the role of power and expertise in public health risk communication 
as it relates to policy making. 
 
Table 9.2: Cross case empirical findings relating to power and expertise in public 
health risk communication as it relates to policy making. 
 
Key Research Question 
How does an argument within a set of risk argument become amplified in a 
policy context 
Case 
study 
Empirical findings relating to power and expertise in public health 
risk communication as it relates to policy making 
Cross-
Case 
Analysis 
 Risk communication is embedded within institutional, 
productive and structural dimensions of power. There is also power 
in the form of resistance that is available to everyone willing to 
exercise it.  
 ‘Power’ in risk communication may be expressed through 
technical expertise, control of communication and creation of trust 
(through scientific credibility). 
 The centrality of science and its experts in making sense of 
the risk faced suggest that technical experts are key influential 
amplification agents during unfolding public health controversies 
especially in the policy context. 
 Social amplification of risk is the driver behind the transition 
of policy arguments between over critical and under critical models.  
 Policy debates relating to risk arise from, and are conducted 
within a public space in which there are multiple interactions 
between power and expertise that enhance or inhibit risk 
communication, create or destroy trust and credibility, and privilege 
certain social and professional relationships over others. As such, a 
degree of bias can arise from the asymmetries of power 
underpinning these interactions and processes that in turn, perpetuate 
the domination of certain risk perspectives and/or shape the 
prioritisation of issues and debates in the policy domain. 
Smoking  Economic resources are likely to enhance the ability of 
stakeholder groups to exercise institutional, productive and structural 
forms of power in public health risk communication within the 
policy context.   
 Economic resources are likely to condition the nature of 
technical expertise brought to bear on risk, to control communication 
and to create trust (through perceived scientific credibility). 
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 Language use (e.g. language of (un)certainty) enhances or 
attenuates the ability of stakeholder groups to undermine or amplify 
the magnitude of risk. 
Vaping  The time scale between scientific consensus and policy 
decision depends on the ability of interested groups to muster their 
power to shape the risk debate. 
 There is a strong relationship between the exercise of power, 
the nature of scrutiny and expertise brought to bear on risk that may 
either lead to social amplification (or attenuation) of risk and 
concrete policy interventions. 
 There is a bias against experiential expertise, which is 
undervalued in fields of contested knowledge. 
MMR 
vaccine 
 There is a strong relationship between over use of power of 
experts by stakeholder groups and social amplification (or 
attenuation) in risk communication. 
 
 
 
9.2.5 Consequences of power in public health risk 
communication 
 
The analysis of the evolving events in the smoking debate further suggests that there 
are distributive inequalities associated with errors or inadequacies in the understanding 
of risk and government action or inaction (see Table 6.5, event iii). For example, the 
second Royal College of Physicians Report Smoking and Health Now published in 
January of 1971 refers to cigarette smoking as a present day “holocaust” and suggests 
a clear socio-economic divide in smoking behaviours. For example, those in 
professional classes (e.g. doctors) were giving up smoking, while people in manual 
and unwaged groups maintained their smoking behaviour (RCP Report, 1971). While 
the analysis did not reveal why such a divide occurs, this supports the argument (made 
in chapter one of this thesis) that the powerless (typically the poor) suffer the 
consequences of inadequacies or errors in public understanding of smoking risk. 
Further research will require empirical validation to elaborate how errors or 
inadequacies in the understanding of risk bring about distributive inequalities, and the 
impact this has for public health and safety.  
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Having considered the empirical findings of this study through the theoretical lens of 
the PREC framework, the thesis draws the conclusion that ‘power’ in public health 
risk communication within its policy context may be expressed through technical 
expertise, control of communication and creation of trust (through scientific 
credibility). The following section discusses the implication of the empirical findings 
on power and expertise for public health risk communication and its associated policy 
making.  
 
 
9.3 The Implication of the Study Findings on 
Power and Expertise for Public Health 
Risk Communication  
 
The ability of powerful stakeholders (individuals or groups) to muster their power to 
exert influence upon risk communication processes would appear to be an issue of 
concern to public health and safety, particularly when risk communication is used as 
an effective means to understand the nature of public health risk faced and improve on 
public health and safety standards in the United Kingdom. The manner in which public 
health risk is communicated is important because it shapes public understanding (or 
perception) of the risk and the policy perspective taken to it, which influences 
subsequent individual or group behavioural responses, which may in turn have positive 
or negative consequences for public health and safety, and also potentially other as yet 
unknown economic or socio-political effects. The analysis of the evolving events in 
the smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debates (in chapters six, seven and eight) has 
led to the conclusion that powerful elite individuals or groups are able to express power 
in risk communication by means of technical expertise, control of communication and 
creation of trust (through perceived scientific credibility). ‘Expertise’ see 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012); 
‘communication’ see (Bernstein, 2003, Foucault, 1971, Smith, 1990, Fischer, 2003, 
Kasperson, 2012b) and ‘trust and credibility’ (Kasperson, 1992, Löfstedt and Horlick-
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Jones, 1999, Frewer, 2003) have received greater levels of attention in the extant 
literature and are now recognised as the critical elements of effective risk 
communication that shapes public understanding and perception of risk and associated 
mitigation advice. However, at this time, understanding of the role of power in risk 
communication remains weak and under developed.  
 
Understanding the role of power in public health risk communication is important 
because it reveals salient factors that enable or constrain certain stakeholder groups in 
risk communication in such way that may benefit or disadvantage certain perspectives 
or worldviews in the policy perspective taken to risk. Moreover, the issue of vested 
interest (individual or group) cannot be ignored, especially where something of human 
value is a stake and even more so where there is unequal distribution of the costs and 
benefits associated with a risk. When power (expressed through expertise, 
communication or trust) is combined with vested interests, the problem that may arise 
as it relates to public health risk communication is in the manner in which distortion, 
or bias may come to shape the expert interpretation brought to bear on risk signals (see 
section 2.5). The danger here is that this may go unnoticed and unscrutinised by the 
public and policy makers, and thus not affect the way they make sense of the risk faced 
or subsequent decisions relating to it.  
The analysis of the smoking, vaping and the MMR vaccine debate has highlighted the 
significance of power (especially when combined with vested interests) in public 
health risk communication. The analysis of the smoking debate shows that 
representatives of tobacco companies were able to use the resources within their means 
(e.g. economic resources, expertise and political allies) to influence the smoking risk 
debate. They acquired relevant technical expertise to advance their worldview, refuting 
any damaging arguments and even disrupting existing knowledge (as it relates to the 
technical details of addiction). Representatives of the industry also used professional 
lobbyists and allies to exert influence on the smoking risk debate, especially within the 
policy domain. For example, through voluntary agreements, representatives of the 
industry were able to develop the necessary social and professional relationships with 
policy makers, which afforded them the opportunity to exchange views and opinions 
  
 
230 
 
and provided a platform upon which to make the economic case for their existence. It 
also gave them opportunity to gain insight into policy and ideas about smoking risk, 
which placed them in a strategic position of power when compared to other stakeholder 
groups.  
 
The outcome of this privileged exchange or power informed relationship led to a 
situation where voluntary agreements were largely relied upon by the UK government 
as a means to control cigarette sales and distribution for a long period until the 1990s. 
By means of voluntary agreement, the industry was able to delay concrete, strict and 
legally binding policies. In other instances, tobacco companies used loopholes in the 
law to shape the debate by taking the UK government court over the size of the new 
health warnings on cigarette packs. This way, they were able to delay, restrict or 
influence government policies on tobacco control. In addition, evidence also suggests 
that the industry attempted to influence smoking policy through its network of 
advisors. It was further revealed that the chairman of the Tobacco Advisory Council 
was on the UK government sports council. This meant that the interests of the tobacco 
industry were protected in policy advice given to the government on sporting issues. 
This multi-dimensional exercise of power by the tobacco industry can be seen to have 
shaped and influenced the timeline of the tobacco debate from its emergence in the 
1950s, and spanning several decades thereafter. 
 
The MMR vaccine debate also presents another dimension where the impact of 
powerful elite persons or groups (combined with vested interests) can be examined 
and lessons learnt for risk communication. Because of personal, undisclosed (e.g. 
economic and reputational) interests, Andrew Wakefield fraudulently suggested that 
MMR vaccine was linked to autism, even when his research did not constitute proof. 
Certainly, it was his interpretation in the press conference before the publication and 
subsequent presentation in the media that fuelled the concern amongst parents of a link 
between autism and MMR. Anderson (1999), for instance, blamed the decline of MMR 
vaccine uptake on media scares. Indeed, expert interpretation is important because 
members of the public are sometimes unwilling or unable accurately to assess or 
decode the science or evidence themselves. This leaves them ‘dangerously trusting’ 
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the judgement and interpretation of experts despite the possibility of there being a 
margin of error (or intentional bias) in expert judgement, especially in unfamiliar risk 
circumstances where there is large residual uncertainty. Such errors in expert 
interpretation even when corrected (as in the case of the MMR vaccine), may have had 
adverse consequences for public health and safety, and even the risk communication 
process itself.  
The consequences are far reaching and may result in situations where there are 
inadequacies or errors in public understanding of the nature of a risk to health and 
safety or its effects within some segment of the society. In the smoking debate, this led 
to a delay in concrete policy intervention until the 1990’s, which may in fact have also 
sent the wrong message in terms of attenuating the significance of the smoking risk to 
the public. There is also the possibility that lives may have been saved and incidences 
of lung cancer reduced if the appropriate policy interventions or information had been 
communicated to the public as soon as evidence was established in the 1950/60s of a 
link between smoking cigarettes and lung cancer. Delays in policy intervention can 
also be dangerous or damaging to public trust as this may bring about loss of public 
confidence in government officials’ ability to protect public health from powerful 
vested interests at the expense of public health and safety. For example, there was a 
lot of suspicion in the policy debate relating to the vaping risk that vaping involves a 
smoking like behaviour. This suspicion is linked to many years of lies and cover up by 
the tobacco companies (Bero, 2003), where their representatives concealed evidence 
of a link between tobacco and lung cancer while knowing that cigarettes are in fact 
dangerous to health. Perhaps, the loss of public confidence in public officials and 
corporations (from the previous smoking debate) may be one reason why the vaping 
risk debate was so fiercely contested by scientists, suspicious of vested interests and 
keen to ensure minimal distortion in the understanding of vaping risk to public health 
and safety by powerful groups. 
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Risk communication, expertise and policy makers 
 
What is also important in terms of power is the ability of politicians (or policy makers) 
to shape the nature of expertise brought to bear on public health risk communication. 
For example, the analysis of the three case studies carried out in this thesis has 
highlighted the importance of stakeholder relationships in bringing about hegemony 
of a risk discourse. This may be a relationship between technical experts who are called 
upon to provide information (experts committees) and policy makers, or between other 
resourced groups (as seen in the case of tobacco) and policy makers. Since the vested 
interests of politicians or the need to promote a policy agenda by policy makers can 
also not be ruled out when something of human value is put a stake, it is necessary to 
pay attention to how expert (scientific) committees are constituted. This is essential in 
order to avoid cherry picking of technical experts who share similar policy ideas in 
technical verification of risk, which will have implications for the nature of 
interpretation bought to bear on risk in the policy domain. This is essential in order to 
avoid situations where policy decisions do not reflect local experiences, increasing the 
potential for those at risk to reject or undermine associated policy interventions. Such 
a situation exposes the individuals or the public to a higher level of risk and danger for 
longer than necessary. This may come with other negative consequences for public 
confidence in the ability of government and public health officials to protect public 
health. 
 
In addition, it is necessary to consider how different stakeholder groups are able to 
access policy makers. The importance of this is that it may privilege some perspectives 
or worldviews over others by providing a platform where exchanges of views, values 
and ideologies are possible in a way that might enhance or disadvantage certain 
perspectives in policy making. For example, the privileged interaction of 
representatives of tobacco companies with policy makers in their negotiations on 
voluntary agreements allowed the industry to gain valuable insight into policy 
perspectives and present its arguments in a favourable manner. This may have 
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disadvantaged other groups (e.g. children with reference to passive smoking) brought 
about by the delay in legally binding policy interventions.  
 
 
Risk communication as a way forward for public health and safety 
 
 
One of the biggest challenges for public health risk communication in an everyday 
societal context is how to develop an appropriate public understanding and policy 
perspective to a risk, where there are multiple perspectives, values and strong power 
dynamics. This is significant considering the conclusion drawn in this study that 
‘power’ in risk communication within its policy context may be expressed through 
technical expertise, control of communication and creation of trust (through scientific 
credibility). ‘Expertise’ see (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 1996, 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2012); ‘communication’ see (Bernstein, 2003, Foucault, 1971, 
Smith, 1990, Fischer, 2003, Kasperson, 2012b) and ‘trust and credibility’ see 
(Kasperson, 1992, Löfstedt and Horlick-Jones, 1999, Frewer, 2003) have been 
recognised as key elements of effective public health risk communication. To reduce 
the chances of, or avoid the exploitation of these factors, attention must be paid to the 
notion of power, which is another important element that should not be ignored in the 
field of risk communication.  
Therefore, one way of improving public health risk communication would mean 
opening up risk assessment and its policy debate for public input and scrutiny (see 
section 11.4 for practical next steps). It would entail drawing on the knowledge of 
multiple experts (including local expertise or those in close proximity to the risk) in 
risk communication especially in situations of uncertainty, ambiguity and complexity. 
Moreover, technocratic styles of policy inquiry pose a threat to the advancement of 
knowledge creation around risk, as interpretations of risk signals are not subject to the 
wider public scrutiny. Technocratic styles of policy inquiry also ignore the dynamics 
of bargaining that lie at the heart of democratic politics. Opening up public health risk 
communication recognises the different forms of expertise and acknowledges these 
differences as a resource instead of an impediment (Stilgoe et al 2006). It is an 
  
 
234 
 
approach similar to that of Irwin (2015)’s third-order thinking, which encourages a 
‘more critical reflection – and reflection-informed risk practice’ (p.10). While, 
practical next steps are carefully set out in chapter eleven, the advantages of this 
approach must be clearly articulated here. 
There are several advantages to this approach when communicating about public 
health risk and safety. Firstly, it allows normative concerns to be weighed in on the 
risk. This allow technical experts in charge of managing the risk to understand and 
learn about public concerns in a way that could feed into the interpretation brought to 
bear on risk signals. There is even the possibility that this may reduce the attraction of 
technical expertise being used or exploited to forge vested interests, and where honest 
negotiation of risk can occur in situations of risk and where values are a stake. 
Moreover, this creates an enabling environment for trust and relationship building 
between stakeholders (e.g. public and public health officials), which in the past has 
been damaged or tainted by public health risk controversies in the UK. Trust has been 
suggested to be generated through repetitive interactions (Adekola, 2012) and believed 
to promote openness, transparency, and honest dialogue. Therefore, it is necessary to 
pay attention to trust and relationship repair, and to improve on future public health 
risk acceptability debate and public uptake of scientific advice in the UK.  
Secondly, it presents the opportunity to take advantage of advancement in information 
communication technology (ICT) and social media to engage the public in debates 
relating to risk. It also enables the public to understand the inevitable compromises 
and trade-off associated with risk issues and their policy formulation (Adekola et al., 
2017) and avoids the pitfall of bringing risk information to the public with a deficient 
one-way model of risk communication, which is now recognised to be ineffective. This 
is important from the perspective that members of the public are increasingly able to 
engage in online research and assess information for themselves. However, it must be 
stated that sometimes such information may be false or incomplete (as seen in the 
Brexit debate) but still shape individual or group perception of the risk, and inform 
critical risk decision-making. In addition, if the public feels disempowered by the 
manner in which a risk is communicated and framed, it may reduce motivation to take 
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up any associated advice. Finally, it reduces the burden of dangerously trusting 
technical experts to make sense of risk in unfamiliar risk territory.  
Having stated this, it is clear that any understanding of social amplification of risk, 
without consideration to the role of power and expertise in risk communication, will 
fail to provide a robust account of social amplification (or attenuation) processes. This 
will require a development of a modified version of the social amplification of risk 
framework that accounts for the role of power and expertise in the amplification (or 
attenuation) process that shapes risk perception (see chapter ten). 
9.4 Summary of key points and conclusions 
1. This chapter is a discussion chapter of empirical findings (presented in chapters 
six, seven and eight) through the lens of the policy evaluation risk communication 
framework (PERC). The analysis of the smoking, vaping and the MMR vaccine debate 
shows that the PERC framework was capable of explaining the transition of public 
health risk arguments between over critical and under critical advisory situations 
(models). Therefore, the evidence supports the thesis hypothesis that proposes that 
social amplification of risk is the driver behind the transition of policy argument 
between over critical and under critical model. However, more research is needed to 
empirically validate how behavioural responses shape the transition of risk argument 
between over critical and under critical models. 
2. From the analysis and discussion carried out in this thesis, it concluded that 
‘power’ in public health risk communication within its policy context might be 
expressed through technical expertise, control of communication and creation of trust 
(through scientific credibility). As expertise, communication and trust are critical 
elements of an effective risk communication, there is a need to pay attention the notion 
of power to avoid the exploitation of these factors. 
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3. The centrality of science and its experts in making sense of the risk faced 
suggested that technical experts are key influential amplification agents during 
unfolding public health controversies especially in the policy context.  
4. The study also found that power in public health risk communication might 
create errors in the understanding of risk and cause delays in policy interventions, 
while having negative consequences for public health and safety. Unfortunately, the 
costs and benefits are unevenly distributed amongst different social groups and 
typically borne by poorer sections of the society. However, more research is needed to 
substantiate this argument empirically.   
5. The next chapter ten will develop a modified model of the social amplification 
of risk framework, which accounts for the role of power and expertise in the 
amplification (or attenuation process). It provides a detailed account of the social 
amplification of risk as a multi-channel and multi-dimensional process.   
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10 Power, Expertise and Social amplification of 
risk framework 
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10.1  Introduction  
 
This chapter provides a modified account of the social amplification of risk framework 
(SARF) based on the theoretical and empirical findings and discussion of power and 
expertise carried out in this thesis. The account of SARF presented in this chapter 
focuses on ‘what’ factors shape the social amplification (and attenuation) of risk and 
how they operate (see figure 9.1), rather than on the ‘who’ factors used in the existing 
conceptualisation of SARF, especially in the information mechanism stage. The 
emphasis on the ‘who’ factor in the existing conceptualisation of SARF neglects 
critical underlying and salient factors that shape social amplification (or attenuation) 
processes in public health risk communication. For example, the SARF was criticised 
for paying too little attention to the notion of power (Petts et al., 2001) and expertise 
in risk communication (see chapter three). Therefore, it was unable to explain the role 
of power and expertise in amplifying an argument within a set of arguments that 
privileges certain public groups over others in a risk discussion. Addressing these 
weaknesses in the existing conceptualisation of the SARF is essential, as the SARF is 
a key theoretical framework in the field of risk communication that shapes the 
understanding of individual and group perception and behavioural responses, and how 
risk is communicated. Moreover, the insight provided by the policy evaluation risk 
communication (PERC) framework, originally designed within the policy context in 
this study, provides valuable evidence on how power and expertise shapes social 
amplification or attenuation of risk that is applicable in broader contexts. Therefore, 
this can be used to address adequately the failing of the SARF. 
 
This current account of SARF is built on the assumption that social amplification of 
risk is a multi-channel and multi-dimensional process (Fischbacher-Smith et al. 2012). 
It views risk communication as a field of play and competition (Petts et al., 2001), 
where each actor responds to the action or (inaction) of the other in an effort to win 
the risk argument and compete for resources, such as health or profit. Insight from this 
study’s PERC framework suggests that power, expertise, communication and 
trust/credibility are critical factors driving social amplification (or attenuation) 
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processes in public health risk communication, so that one argument becomes 
dominant in relation to policy. This aligns with the views expressed in other studies, 
such as Petts et al, (2001) that competition in risk communication revolves around four 
key aspects. These are: (i) institutional and structural factors shaping the risk agenda 
and debate; (ii) legitimacy of who has the authority to speak; (iii) control of 
communication, over when and what is made visible or concealed and on what basis; 
and, (iv) whose perspective is believed and trusted (Petts et al., 2001). Within these, 
processes involving the nature of power and expertise, and communication and trust 
shape the arguments brought to bear on risk communication. Together, these factors 
determine whose interpretation and framing of reality is believed and legitimised 
within the policy context.  
 
The following sections begin by re-highlighting the weaknesses in existing 
conceptualisations of the SARF (see section 3.2 for more details) and then provide a 
detailed account of social amplification of risk from the power and expertise 
perspectives. The account of SARF provided here is based on insight from the 
literature (see chapters one to four) and the analysis of the evolving events (see 
chapters six to nine of this thesis). Four hypothetical scenarios were then created in 
order to highlight the impact (both positive and negative) of power and expertise for 
social amplification (or attenuation) processes, and the implication this has for risk 
communication and public health. From the analysis of the evolving events within the 
three cases studied, the study drew the conclusion that ‘power’ in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policy making may be expressed through technical 
expertise, control of communication and creation of trust (through scientific 
credibility). 
10.2  Weakness in the Existing 
Conceptualisation of SARF 
In chapter three of this thesis, a critical review of the SARF framework led to the 
identification of several weaknesses of the framework see ( 
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Table 3.2). Within this, it was observed that the SARF over-emphasised the ‘who’ 
factor (that is, sources, channels and transmitters) especially ‘the media’ in amplifying 
(or attenuation) risk signals. While this is valuable, it ignores underlying factors, such 
as power and expertise that condition the amplification (or attenuation) process of risk, 
especially in the information mechanism stage of the SARF. It is on this basis, that the 
alternative perspective of SARF is presented here. This account of SARF is built rather 
on the assumption that social amplification of risk is a multi-channel and multi-
dimensional process (Fischbacher-Smith et al. 2012). This perspective recognises the 
dynamic representations of the different stakeholder groups (Pidgeon et al., 2003) and 
makes a radical move away from the view that sees the media as the primary amplifier. 
The assumption here is that scientific experts and the science they know, understand 
and communicate are powerful influences that may thereafter form the basis of debate, 
mediated by the other groups (including the media). This suggests that social 
amplification of risk may have even occurred before it reaches the overt risk arena, as 
a result of expert technical identification, construction and communication of the risk. 
This assumption is in line with the views of Irwin (2015) who argued that there is a 
recurrent predisposition among political, regulatory and scientific institutions (charged 
with the responsibilities of managing the risk) to separate the processes of knowledge 
production and risk communication. 
 
10.3  Social Amplification of Risk as a 
Multi-Channel process  
A critical review of literature and insight from the analysis of the smoking, vaping and 
MMR vaccine debates suggests that risk signals may arise directly from personal 
experience of a risk, or through third party sources such as professional experts, 
government officials, activist groups, social networks, and media sources (Kasperson 
et al., 1988). This suggests that social amplification of risk occurs through multiple 
channels (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). In reality, stakeholder groups engage in a two or 
multi-way exchange of information (or both) which sets out the parameters of 
communication process as an interactive one. This multi-channel and interactive 
process that may allow social amplification to thrive include the (simultaneous) use of 
  
 
241 
 
different communication channels or sources such as (a) internet websites sites (for 
example, the department of health launch of a new website - 'MMR: The facts' during 
the MMR vaccine controversy, to give parents information about the vaccine and the 
scientific studies supporting its safety including general news on the controversy. The 
website also allows interested persons to ask question or raise concerns with member 
of the department directly); (b) exchange of information via main stream media (e.g. 
recurrent tendency of expert debates, or press releases); (c) using social media sites 
such as  Facebook and twitter to communicate about risk; a medium which is on the 
increase in recent decade and; (d) the use of poster campaigns and mail shots (used by 
the Health Education Authority when it issued two and a half million copies of the 
leaflet ‘MMR: The Facts’ to parents and health workers in order to calm fears over a 
triple vaccination for measles, mumps and rubella. Other channels identified in 
literature are documents, reports, articles, laws and regulation, meetings and seminars 
(Jönsson et al., 2016). The use of multiple channels of risk communication to engage 
different groups within the public allows social amplification of risk to occur through 
multiple channels. 
 
Regardless of the source or medium of communication, the main purpose of the 
process is for the information to reach the general public or the targeted audience with 
whom the information sender enters into information exchange relations. While the 
media has, for instance, remained an established means by which stakeholders engage 
in negotiation or deliberation over the identification, definition and communication of 
risk (Eldridge, 1999, Pett et al., 2001), these other channels of communication are also 
critical in these processes of political struggle. For example, the advancement in 
information communication technology (ICT) and the rise of social media and mobile 
communication is increasingly becoming pivotal in exchanging information, expertise 
and opinions. Moreover, it comes with the advantage of increasing the potential of 
multi-layered interaction, widening access to relevant information and expertise, easy 
identification of discourse coalitions, support, and surveillance, and ultimately, has the 
potential to exert influence upon policy choices (Moorhead et al, 2013).  
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The transmitter in risk communication has two roles in the communication process: 
(a) to receive information from sources; and (b) to process this information like the 
final receiver. It is within this process of encoding, transmission, decoding and re-
coding that social amplification of risk occurs. For example, social amplification (or 
attenuation) may occur with personal selection filters and evaluation strategies, or 
professional and institutional rules governing the selection of received signals and their 
interpretation (Renn, 1991a). Journalists for instance, follow specific professional 
guidelines (e.g. hearing both sides in a controversy), as well as institutional rules such 
as the required editorial style and fulfilling the expectations of the perceived target 
audience of the medium in question (Petts et al., 2001). Social amplification (or 
attenuation) infuses this subjective act of value judgement. Moreover, recoding the 
risk message involves conscious or unconscious changes in the original information 
material (Renn, 1991a). For example, the choice of storyline, discourse, and framing 
or even the integration of a message from several sources by adding or removing 
comments, pictures or tune may serve to amplify or reduce risk. The understanding 
and re-coding of the incoming message through multi-channels is an integral part of 
the transmitting process and may serve to intensify or reduce risk magnitude and its 
consequences through multiple channels.  
 
The amount of reporting and coverage (which although tending to signify the 
importance of the risk issues in the face of competing newsworthy events) only 
provides further layers for amplification. As a result, it is wrong to assume that the 
media is the main amplifier, as suggested by existing conceptualisation of SARF. This 
view corresponds to those of other studies such as (Petts et al., 2001)  and may be one 
reason why Pett et al, (2001) fiercely refute Kasperson et al. (1998)’s claims that the 
media is the main amplification station. Social amplification of risk by expert groups 
may have occurred even before it reaches the public domain as a burden of proof 
debate within scientific discourse (especially where the experience of the risk is not 
one of a direct experience). What is more, insight from the analysis from the smoking, 
vaping and MMR vaccine debate has shown that technical experts are key influential 
amplification agents during unfolding public health controversies within the policy 
context because they play central roles in the identification, negotiation and 
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communication of risk. Therefore, the first impact of social amplification of risk may 
arise from the interpretation and framing of risk by experts (who observe the risk) but 
also those who experience the risk first hand. This first set of interpretation may then 
be re-interpreted and transmitted to further audiences, which may also lead to further 
amplification (and attenuation) of the risk signal.  
 
Having discussed social amplification of risk as a multi-channel process, the following 
section discusses social amplification of risk as multi-dimensional process. Social 
amplification as a multi-channel process considered the sources and medium of risk 
information exchange. Social amplification of risk as a multi-dimensional process will 
now focus on factors that enable or constrain different stakeholder groups to influence 
risk-related agendas; to control communication and trust, including the nature of 
expertise brought to bear on risk in a way that permeates the entire public health 
communication processes. 
 
10.4  Social Amplification of Risk as a 
Multi-Dimensional process  
 
Insight from this study’s PERC framework suggests that power, expertise, 
communication and trust are key factors driving social amplification (or attenuation) 
processes in public health risk communication within the policy context. Further 
analysis of the debates suggests that ‘power’, ‘expertise’, and ‘communication’ are 
important factors shaping the information mechanisms of risk. Trust on the other hand, 
were found to be a critical factor driving the response mechanism of social 
amplification of risk (as will be argued here).  
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10.4.1 Information Mechanism 
 
The information mechanism of the SARF concerns the exchange of information about 
the risk (Kasperson, 2012b) including factors that shape (constrain and enable) the risk 
information exchange process. 
 
Power 
 
The analysis of the smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debate suggests that there are 
multiple dimensions by which social amplification (or attenuation) of risk may occur. 
These include institutional, productive and structural factors that enable certain 
persons, issues or perspectives to gain dominance in a risk arena. For example, the 
analysis of the smoking risk debate shows how the medical research council and 
ministry of health exercised non-decision making (institutional) power (Bachrach and 
Baratz, 1962) by prioritizing inquiry into the relationship between smoking and lung 
cancer in the 1950’s. The World Health Organisation also exercised such institutional 
power when it raised concerns about the uncertainty in the understanding of the safety 
and efficacy of electronic cigarettes (EC) as a smoking cessation aid. This directed the 
focus of the initial research of electronic cigarette into the safety and efficacy of 
electronic cigarettes (EC) as a smoking cessation aid. Similarly, public health 
authorities that determined what questions were asked in assessing the erroneous 
suggestion that the MMR vaccine was linked to autism exercised this institutional form 
of power. The ability of these public health institutions to identify that an uncertainty 
is significant to public health and safety is such that it draws attention to that particular 
arena, increasing its potential to exert influence upon a risk debate. This suggests that 
power lies in the ability of stakeholder individuals or groups to influence a risk agenda, 
which shapes the context, and the risk issues that are deliberated upon in a risk arena.  
 
Power can also be exercised through mediated sources (such as technical expertise or 
media sources) whereby the public makes sense of the risk faced, which in turn shapes 
its perceptions, desires and needs (Lukes, 1974, Lukes, 2004). In the analysis of the 
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smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debates, technical experts can be seen to play a 
central role in making sense of the risk faced in the identification, construction and 
communication of the risk see also (Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 1996, 
Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). The analysis also suggests that media sources are crucial in 
echoing these interpretations further. A good example of how technical expertise and 
the media shapes public perception is when Andrew Wakefield fraudulently suggested 
a link between MMR vaccine and autism, despite the fact that his research did not 
constitute proof of a link. Surely, it was his personal interpretation in the press 
conference before the publication of his paper and its subsequent presentation in the 
media that fuelled parents’ concerns that MMR may in fact be linked to autism. This 
suggests that where there is residual uncertainty and where something of human value 
has been put at stake in the interpretation of risk signals, the potential for deceit and 
bias in technical expertise brought to bear is enhanced. The danger here is that such 
misconception may be echoed by media sources and carry to larger sections of the 
public in such a way that may create false perceptions. 
 
Another dimension where power may be exercised to bring about social amplification 
(or attenuation) in risk communication is in direct and specific relationships between 
stakeholder groups (Barnett and Duvall, 2005). A typical example is how 
representatives of the tobacco industry sought to shape policy development through 
voluntary agreement with the UK Government on how to regulate tobacco sale and 
advertisement. This enabled them to develop a social and professional relationship that 
enabled them to gain insight into policy thinking, strengthening the industry’s political 
positions and making possible exchanges of view in a way that exerted influence on 
risk acceptability debates and policy decision.  
 
Expertise 
As noted above, the analysis and discussion on expertise carried out in this study 
suggest that technical experts play a dominant role in helping the public make sense 
of the risk they face. However, a critical review of literature on ‘expertise’ and the 
analysis of the smoking, vaping and the MMR vaccine debates raised some caution 
around how technical expertise is used as a sense making aid in policy inquiry relating 
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to risk. Insight from the critical review and case study analysis suggests that technical 
experts and the nature of interpretation brought to bear on risk signals are shaped by 
many factors that may allow social amplification of risk to thrive. These include the 
epistemology and methodological orientation of scientists (Furlong and Marsh, 2010), 
paradigm blindness (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012), intrusion (Castel et al., 2007), 
motivational bias (Tversky and Kahneman, 1973, Slovic, 1993, Shrader-Frechette, 
2010), organisational conditions and vested interests, as seen in the MMR vaccine 
debate arising from Andrew Wakefield’s fraudulent claims (see also section 2.5 for in-
depth discussion on expertise).  
 
The significance of these intervening variables lies in how they shape the nature of 
interpretation brought to bear on risk signals and how technical experts engage with 
other available expertise (or local expertise) in their interpretation of the risk. For 
example, Furlong and Marsh (2010) argued that the ontological and epistemological 
position of scientists shapes their approach to theory, while the methodology that 
scientists use impacts on how they interpret risk signals. Having said this, where there 
is large residual uncertainty combined with vested interests, it is possible for technical 
experts, who often have the privilege of authority or dominate process of making sense 
of risk signal, and introduce bias into their selection and use of theories and methods 
in a way that may amplify or attenuate their interpretation of the risk. This also 
determines how and the extent to which they engage with local expertise (if they 
engage with it at all). Andrew Wakefield’s MMR vaccine scaremongering continues 
to be a good example of how technical expertise and bias (brought about by vested 
economic interest, lies and deceit) shapes expert selection of evidence (where he 
cherry picked children showing signs of autism in his study) and interpretation of risk 
signals. Similarly, the smoking debate gives further credence to how bias can be 
introduced into expert interpretation where there is vested capital interest, as observed 
in how the tobacco industry attempted to debunk the link between tobacco and lung 
cancer for many decades.  
 
In an ideal modern day risk communication, it would be expected that technical experts 
engage with local expertise (that is, the expertise of those who encounter the risk in 
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their day to day activities) to ease the burden of proof on technical experts, but also to 
improve on the robustness of evidence upon which decision makers and those who 
experience the risk can rely. This is because risk assessment decisions, as correctly 
suggested by Furlong and Marsh (2010) and other scholars, such as (Wynne, 1996, 
Stilgoe et al., 2006b, Stilgoe, 2007, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, Irwin, 2014b, Welsh and 
Wynne, 2013), are value laden. As such, technical experts alone should not to have 
dominance or control in risk assessment and communication decisions, especially 
where there is large residual uncertainty and where something of human value is at 
stake. Public discussions (which go beyond science) play an important role in 
accounting for evidence, and the nature of expert opinion when it is not over-reaching 
(Brown, 2016). It reduces the potential for distributive inequities in risk decisions 
(Shrader-Frechette, 2010) and the discounting of local expertise, which in some cases 
may prove significant in pointing to public concerns and solving gaps in knowledge 
(Wynne, 1996, Stilgoe et al., 2006b, Stilgoe, 2007, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, Irwin, 
2014b, Welsh and Wynne, 2013). However, it is necessary to pay attention to the 
underlying and established structures of power that determine the risk agenda and who 
has the authority to speak (based on institutionalized perceived power position of 
technical expertise), to one where ideas and human experiences (Noväng et al., 2015) 
are central in public discussion of risk. 
 
Communication 
 
The thesis analysis and discussion on communication suggest that there are multiple 
ways in which communication may bring about social amplification (or attenuation) 
of risk. First, the nature of language used in the risk communication (debate) including 
the language used to qualify the risk. For example, where the language of uncertainty 
is used, the ability of stakeholders to refute or undermine damaging arguments is 
enhanced. The opposite is the case where language of certainty is used (especially 
when backed up with perceived credible scientific evidence and sources). This is 
exemplified in how representatives of the tobacco industry framed their arguments 
within the context of uncertainty, pointing to a lack of causal proof in the technical 
case made against smoking and lung cancer. Hence, they were able to create doubt in 
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the mind of the public, raising questions around the validity of such claims. The 
manner by which risk is framed may also amplify or reduce the perception of the risk.  
In addition, communication may serve to heighten or reduce public concern through 
the quality of and interactive nature of feedback available that determines how risk is 
decoded. Two-way communication processes allow for clarification of meaning and 
discussion of sensitive issues. For example, the Department of Health’s creation of a 
new website, ‘MMR: The facts’ gave parents easy access to the relevant information 
and also enabled them directly to question expert members of the Department of 
Health, which reduced the potential for amplification (or attenuation) of the risk 
concern by other mediated sources. Other important ways in which communication 
may bring about social amplification or attenuation of risk and which are already noted 
in literature are discourse characterisation of the risk (Kasperson, 2012a) and the 
source and channel of communication (Renn, 1991a). 
 
10.4.2  Response Mechanism 
The response mechanism is suggested to be the second major stage of social 
amplification of risk (Kasperson et al., 1988). A critical review of literature on ‘trust’ 
and the analysis of the smoking, vaping and the MMR vaccine debates suggests that 
trust is a key element driving individual or group behavioural responses to risk 
(Frewer, 2003, Earle and Siegrist, 2008), including how value was decoded and 
attached to the risk information received.  
 
 
Trust  
 
 
The findings in this study shown that ‘trust in’ and ‘perceived credibility’ of expert 
sources contributes to ease risk acceptability debate in terms of how decision makers 
take up expert interpretation and scientific advice. For example, key government 
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advisory bodies accepted Richard Doll and Bradford Hill’s conclusion linking 
smoking to lung cancer (described by him as a ‘real association’) and as such shaped 
the policy perspective taken to smoking risk. This acceptance would have been based 
on some of level of trust in the credibility of Doll and Hill’s research by these public 
experts who commissioned the report. According to Petty and Cacioppo (1984) trust 
contributes to how evidence and interpretation are received and scrutinised, which may 
serve to reassure (or alarm) the decoder. However, distrust, contributes to heighten 
tension and to fierce scrutinising of the arguments of those on the other side of the 
argument. The analysis of the smoking and vaping debate also suggests that (mis)trust 
has temporal and spatial effects, evident in how the lies, deceit and dishonest behaviour 
of representatives of tobacco industry in the smoking debate impacted on the nature of 
trust brought to bear on the vaping debate.  
 
These four factors (power, expertise, communication and trust) are the means by which 
an argument within a set of risk arguments may become amplified in a policy context 
and as such, they are the means whereby ‘power’ may be expressed in public health 
risk communication as it relates to policy making. The above account of SARF as a 
multi-dimensional process is depicted in understanding of risk. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 10.1 which shows how power, expertise, communication and trust shapes the 
public understanding of risk. 
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Figure 10.1: Alternative perspective to social amplification of risk 
 
 
Ripple Effect 
As depicted in understanding of risk. 
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Figure 10.1, the outcomes of power, expertise, communication and trust that bring 
about social amplification (or attenuation) of certain aspects of risk shape the socially 
negotiated risk. The negotiated understanding of risk forms the basis for policy 
interventions and individual and group responses to these, which ultimately shape 
public understanding of the risk. Instead of Kasperson et al (1988)’s linear model of 
ripples spreading out from a stone dropped into water, which suggest that amplification 
also occurs even in its transmission, this account of SARF suggests that this 
(amplification in its transmission) might not always be the case, since the waves will 
find traction in certain areas (due to the expression of power by different stakeholders) 
as they continue to respond to the action or inaction of the other. In other words, the 
ripples will be differential in their dispersion and impact. These behavioural responses 
and the evolving nature of evidence and information may create real consequences (or 
secondary impacts) including social-political, economic (e.g. investment and 
insurance) and improved or impoverished public health and safety.  
 
10.5  Four Hypothetical Scenarios of 
Social Amplification of Risk and the 
Implication for Risk Communication and 
Public Health and Safety 
 
One key conclusion drawn from the critical review of literature and the analysis of 
smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debate is that power may be expressed through 
technical expertise, control of communication and creation of trust (through scientific 
credibility). This conclusion highlights the importance of power, expertise, 
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communication and trust in shaping the social amplification (or attenuation) processes 
in public health risk communication as argued and evidenced throughout this thesis.  
 
Table 10.1 further highlights the importance of these factors by giving illustrative 
scenarios of how they shape the social amplification (or attenuation) of public health 
risk and the implication this has for public health and safety. This was done by creating 
hypothetical scenarios that highlight how social amplification of risk affects different 
stakeholder groups. This hypothetical scenario can also be used as a framework by risk 
regulator or experts in accessing risk within a local context. In particular, to understand 
how salient factors such as power and expertise may create problems for public health 
risk communication, especially where the management of the perception of risk is 
crucial. This also makes a further case for the need to pay attention to the notion of 
power and expertise in risk communication, hence, highlighting further the 
significance of this study.  
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Table 10.1 Hypothetical Scenarios of Social Amplification (or attenuation) of Risk and Implication for Public Health  
 
Scenario Scientist Media Policy makers Population at risk Organizations 
Over use of power of 
experts by 
stakeholder groups 
with conflicting 
science. 
Not affected directly but the 
value of science and 
expertise diminishes in the 
eyes of (individuals, groups 
or policy) decision makers. 
Presenting conflicting 
information to the 
public leaving the 
conclusions to different 
media outlets. 
Cannot use evidence 
well. Rely on perception 
and uninformed debate.  
Politicizing policy 
decisions. 
Confused. Do not 
engage or disengage 
having been alerted to 
the risk issue. Ignore 
science (and scientific 
advice). 
Not sure how to 
intervene to solve 
problems. Ignore the 
risk issue in business 
endeavours. Exploit 
the situation. 
Extreme exercise of 
salient (e.g. 
institutional, 
economic and 
structural) power in 
risk communication. 
Influence the direction of 
science in the technical 
verification of risk. 
Some risk issues do not 
make it in to the risk 
agenda therefore leading 
to one-sided reporting of 
the risk issue. 
Disadvantages certain 
perspective in 
policymaking. Creates 
scenario where policy 
decisions do not reflect 
the risk experience of 
locals. 
Science may not reflect 
local experience or 
expertise. Heighten the 
potential for resisting 
science and policy 
intervention. 
Enjoy benefits or 
suffer loss in the 
public understanding 
or policy perspective 
taken to the risk. 
Inappropriate 
exercise of power to 
control 
communication (who 
says what, when, 
how and how much). 
May not understand or have 
the full access to evidence 
and interpret the risk in its 
totality. Increasing the 
potential to introduce bias 
and intrusions where gaps 
in knowledge exist. 
Unable to access the 
requisite expertise, 
information or evidence 
to make sense of the risk 
faced by and to the 
public. 
Cannot decode meaning 
in or access relevant 
science to make 
informed policy 
decision.  
Unable to engage in risk 
debate. Rely on the 
interpretation of third 
party sources increasing 
chances of errors in 
understanding. 
Produce own science 
which may be costly 
to generate or rely on 
third party sources to 
make business 
decision 
Over use of power to 
create trust through 
science and its 
experts. 
 
Relied on to make sense of 
risk signal even where 
margin of errors or large 
uncertainty exist. 
Re-echoing the 
interpretation of science 
as if it were the ultimate 
truth creating false 
perception. 
Dangerously trusting 
technical experts.  
Reduced preparedness 
for emergent conditions. 
Dangerously trusting 
science and its experts in 
the interpretation taken 
to risk in decision-
making. 
Rely on expert 
interpretation in 
business decisions.  
Social and Health 
consequences  
Errors in understanding the 
nature of risk. Undermines 
the value of science in risk 
decision making.  
One sided story telling. 
Media blamed for 
emergent conditions and 
undesired behavioural 
responses. 
Delay in appropriate 
policy interventions. 
Loss of trust in 
government officials to 
protect public health. 
Longer period of 
exposure to health risk 
and danger due to errors 
in the understanding of 
risk. 
Raises moral and 
ethical debate (CSR) 
in business conducts.  
Positive outcome Raise research interest and 
creates knowledge in 
certain domains of risk 
Raising awareness of 
some potential risk and 
danger 
Policy consideration of 
(some aspect of) the risk 
issue 
Risk awareness  Consideration of 
(some aspect of) the 
risk issue in business 
decision 
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10.6  Summary of Key Points and 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a modified account of the social amplification 
of risk framework (SARF), based on the findings and discussions of power and 
expertise carried out here and also evidence from the extant literature. The account 
of SARF provided here focuses on the ‘what’ that factors shape amplification (and 
attenuation) in public health risk communication (see figure 9.1) and how they 
operate, especially in the information mechanism stage. The SARF was criticised for 
paying too little attention to the notion of power (Petts et al., 2001, Goodby, 2004) 
and the role that expertise can play within the processes of risk communication (see 
chapter three). In addressing these weaknesses, the perspective of social 
amplification of risk provided in this chapter builds on the assumption that the social 
amplification of risk is a multi-channel and multi-dimensional process (Fischbacher-
Smith et al. 2012). Power, expertise and communication were identified as factors 
shaping the information mechanism of social amplification of risk. Trust was 
identified to be a key element shaping the response mechanism of the SARF. Further 
research will require this account of SARF to be used on an international basis to test 
for its robustness, usefulness and to check for errors.  
 
The next chapter (eleven) summaries the research work carried out in this thesis, 
illustrating how the thesis addressed the study aims and objectives set out in chapter 
one, and also sets out a series of recommendations for further research. Best practice 
in risk communication, especially as it relates to policy-making, is also offered, based 
on insights drawn from this study. The main contributions and the limitations of this 
study are also set out in the final chapter. 
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11 Recommendations and Conclusions 
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11.1 Introduction  
This research set out to explore the role of power and expertise in public health risk 
communication as it relates to policy making. In particular, it sought to address the 
question of how does an argument within a set of risk argument become amplified in 
a policy context.  The social amplification of risk framework (SARF) was used as 
lens to investigate this question from the risk perspective and was therefore critically 
reviewed (in chapter three). The identified weaknesses of existing conceptualisation 
of the SARF formed the basis of the literature review that followed in that chapter. 
The over critical and under critical models were further used as a framework to assess 
the research question within its policy context (see chapter four). The synthesis of 
this study perspective of social amplification of risk with the over critical and under 
critical models, led to the development of a new model - the policy evaluation risk 
communication (PERC) framework (see chapter four), aimed at explicitly addressing 
the study research question. The PERC framework was empirically tested (in 
chapters six, seven and eight) using three public health risk debates as situational 
context to investigate the issues under consideration. Further discussion and cross 
case analysis of the empirical findings was carried out (in chapter nine) through the 
lens of the PERC framework. The critical review of the literature (in chapter three) 
and the study’s empirical findings were then used to advance existing 
conceptualization of the SARF (in chapter ten). 
 
This conclusion chapter (eleven) summarises the knowledge and understanding 
gained from the study findings and discussions in the preceding chapters.  Also 
presented in this chapter are recommendations for best practice public health risk 
communication and future research. There is also a personal reflection of the Ph.D. 
journey highlighting the limitations of study.  
 
11.2 Summary of the Study 
Chapter one of this study set out the problem space that laid down a foundation for 
the research. Three research aims were identified: 
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(a) Examine the role of power and expertise in risk communication in a policy 
context;  
(b) Design a (or extend an existing) framework to understand how certain risk 
argument becomes dominant in a policy context; 
(c) Draw lessons and identify best practices for public health risk communication 
as it relates to policy making. 
 
A review of extant literature on the construction of risk and risk communication was 
carried out to set the study perspective of these ideas. The discussion of risk and risk 
communication was further contextualised within the policy context in chapter two. 
A critical review of the role of expertise within policy inquiry was also conducted in 
chapter two. Chapter three provided an account of the social amplification of risk 
framework (SARF) and then explored key concepts within the literature that can 
inform the critique of the framework. Based on insight from the inter-disciplinary 
literature review carried out in chapters one, two and three, two research gaps were 
identified. Firstly, understanding the role of power in public health risk 
communication remains weak and poorly documented in the extant literature. 
Secondly, the negotiation of policy arguments between over critical model (contested 
science) and under critical model (policy consensus) requires further investigation 
(Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). However, it must be noted that these two issues are 
linked with reference to the role of power and expertise in risk communication. Based 
on the identification of these two research gaps, the study research question was 
designed - how does a set of risk arguments evolve such that a particular perspective 
becomes dominant in a policy context?  
The synthesis of insights from this study’s conceptualisation of social amplification 
of risk framework and over critical and under critical models led to the development 
of a new model: the policy evaluation risk communication (PERC) framework (see 
section 4.7). The PERC framework is based in the hypothesis that social 
amplification (or attetuation) of risk is the driver behind the negotiation of public 
health risk argument between the overcritical model and under critical model in a 
science-policy relationship. Within the PERC framework, power, expertise, 
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communication and trust are identified as key factors shaping the amplification (or 
attenuation) processes in public health risk communication as it relates to policy 
making. Collectively, these salient factors drive the negotiation of risk argument 
between over critical and under critical models.  
 
Chapter five presented the methodology and methods and explained why a case study 
approach was adopted. It also discussed in details the sources and processes of data 
collection, the data analysis and how the data was interpreted so as to inform the 
insights that followed in chapters six, seven and eight. Chapters six, seven and eight 
represented the finding and analysis chapters of this thesis. Public health risk debates 
were used as a situational context to investigate the research aim, due to its increasing 
trend in the UK (see section 1.5). In chapter nine, findings from the three case studies 
were discussed through the lens of the policy evaluation risk communication 
framework, and implications for risk communication outlined. The knowledge 
gained from the findings and analysis and discussion chapters of this thesis informed 
the philosophical remodelling of the social amplification of risk framework. 
 
11.3  Synthesizing findings with the 
study research aim and objectives 
Research aim one 
 
The first aim of the study was to examine the role of power and expertise in public 
health risk communication within a policy context. The summary of findings are 
set in ( 
 
Table 9.2). Insights from the literature (see section 3.3) and the analysis and 
discussion (in chapters six to nine) led the study to conclude that ‘power’ in risk 
communication is embedded within institutional, productive, and structural forms of 
power. Further in-depth analysis of the smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debates 
suggest that ‘power’ in risk communication may be expressed through technical 
expertise, control of communication and creation of trust (through scientific 
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credibility) (see chapter nine). Further analysis of the smoking, vaping and MMR 
vaccine debate suggests that those with economic and political power (agenda 
control and decision making power) demonstrated a greater ability to influence the 
technical expertise brought to bear on risk. An example of this concerns how 
representative of tobacco companies were able to engage and attack the technical 
case linking smoking to lung cancer using science through their own technical 
experts.  
 
The economic power of the tobacco industry was observed to enhance its ability to 
establish social and professional relationships with policy makers (extending their 
structural power) through entering in into voluntary agreements, thereby obviating 
the need for formal legislation. From the analysis of the smoking, vaping and MMR 
vaccine debate, it was also found that those in charge of managing public health 
influenced the technical expertise brought to bear on risk through selection of 
members for expert committees who acted as advisors to policy makers. 
Furthermore, powerful individuals or groups who embodied the requisite knowledge 
and expertise were able to use their authority to shape risk communication (as seen 
in the MMR vaccine debate where Andrew Wakefield’s suggestion that MMR 
vaccine was linked to autism triggered a controversy that saw for the first time a drop 
in vaccine uptake). When combined with vested interests (e.g. reputation, economic 
or professional gains), this could present a salient avenue of power in risk 
communication due to the perceived credibility of science and its experts that may 
disadvantage other credible risk perspectives 
In terms of expertise, insight from the literature (see section 2.4 and 2.5) and the 
analysis and discussion (in chapters six to nine) suggest that technical experts play a 
dominant role in public health risk communication within its policy context This has 
become an area of contention within the extant literature, see post-positivist scholars 
(Wynne, 1989, Wynne, 1996, Smith, 1990, Irwin, 1995a, Fischer, 1998, Funtowicz 
and Ravetz, 2003, Stilgoe, 2004, Renn, 2008). Moreover, the analysis of the 
smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debate suggests that there was a seeming 
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disregard for or discounting of other forms of expertise. A typical example is the case 
of the MMR vaccine debate where parents’ observations and concerns were initially 
dismissed (see chapter seven). The centrality of science and its experts in making 
sense of the risk faced, led to the conclusion that technical experts are key influential 
amplification agents during the unfolding of public health controversies, especially 
in a policy context. This aligns with other studies that suggest that science and its 
experts are the means by which risk is identified, communicated and validated 
(Collingridge and Reeve, 1986, Jasanoff, 1996, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012). 
The nature of communication or language in use was also identified as a key element 
in the amplification (or attenuation) process of risk. The analysis of the smoking 
debate (see chapter six) reveals how power may be exercised through the use of 
languages of (un)certainty (see Table one in chapter six). For example, 
representatives of the tobacco industry were able to attack the technical case made 
against smoking and refute damaging claims made against tobacco cigarettes by 
highlighting the uncertainty in the knowledge of the risk argument. Trust was also 
found to be essential in the perceived credibility of the stakeholders arguments 
brought to bear on the risk debate. For example, trust in the perceived credibility of 
industry representatives was implicated in the vaping risk debate as a result of many 
years of lies and deceit during which the tobacco industry engaged in attempts to 
cover-up evidence that smoking was linked to lung cancer and other diseases. This 
raised concerns about the credibility of the arguments of corporations, which were 
seen to be enjoying economic benefit associated with the product. The knock-on 
effect was that it created a lot of tension around the vaping risk acceptability debate; 
this was one reason why the debate around the regulation of ECs was so fiercely 
contested (see analysis of the vaping in chapter seven). 
The study also found that errors in the understanding of risk, and delays in policy 
interventions have negative consequences for public health. Unfortunately, the cost 
and benefits are unevenly distributed amongst different public groups (see Table 6.5, 
event iii). For example, the second Royal College of Physicians Report, Smoking and 
Health Now published in January 1971 refered to cigarette smoking as a present day 
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“holocaust” and suggested a clear socio-economic divide in smoking behaviours. For 
example, those in professional classes (e.g. doctors) were giving up smoking, while 
people in manual and unwaged groups maintained their smoking behaviour (RCP 
Report, 1971). This suggested there are distributive inequalities associated with 
errors or inadequacies in the understanding of risk and government action or inaction. 
This therefore, supports the argument that the powerless (typically the poor) suffer 
the consequences of inadequacies or errors in the public understanding of smoking 
risk.  
Research aim two 
 
 
The second aim of this study is to design a framework or extend an existing one to 
understand how certain risk arguments become dominant in a policy context. This 
aim was addressed through the development of the PERC framework (in chapter 
four) and the extension of the SAR framework (in chapter ten).  
 
Research aim three 
 
 
The final aim of this study is to identify and recommend best practice public health 
risk communication in a policy context. This is outlined in the section (11.4) that 
follows. 
11.4  Best Practice Public Health Risk 
Communication in a Policy Domain 
An open, engaging and transparent process of risk communication  
The findings from the investigation carried out in this study provide a number of 
opportunities to improve on public health risk communication and its related policy 
development. Chief among these is the opportunity for policy makers, risk 
regulators, and stakeholder representatives to engage in a more open, engaging and 
transparent process of risk identification, communication and validation that 
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involves the exchange of multiple levels of expertise, views and information. Policy 
development relating to public health and safety already rely on the use of technical 
expertise (Wynne, 1989, Wynne, 1996, Smith, 1990, Irwin, 1995a, Fischer, 1998, 
Funtowicz and Ravetz, 2003, Stilgoe, 2004, Renn, 2008) as a means to make sense 
of the risk faced. However, using these means alone can serve to reinforce 
misconceptions and misunderstandings about the nature of possible threats to public 
health and safety. The empirical findings from the analysis of smoking, vaping and 
MMR vaccine debate carried out in this study highlight the idea that scientific 
interpretations must be treated with caution and not as more reliable than they are. 
This is important for the viewpoint that suggests that ‘technical expertise is domain 
specific’ (Schneider et al., 1989, McGraw and Pinney, 1990, Smith and McCloskey, 
2000, Castel et al., 2007) since it is necessary to acknowledge a reduced validity of 
technical expertise where there are unknowns or large residual uncertainties or when 
dealing with interdisciplinary issues.  
Since many public health risks are interdisciplinary (Fischbacher-Smith, 2012), there 
are bound to be gaps in knowledge which may be subjected to intrusions, bias and 
paradigm blindness (see section 3.4). The significance of this (according to the 
analysis of smoking, vaping and MMR vaccine debate) lies in the imbalance of 
power amongst the different stakeholder groups, and the ability of powerful elite 
groups to acquire the necessary technical expertise and other professional means to 
shape public health risk communication and exert influence upon public perception 
and policy perspectives taken to risk.  
The importance of local (experiential) expertise in risk communication 
Local expertise and those in close proximity to a risk are highly important in 
developing an understanding of and framing a public health risk (Wynne, 1996, 
Stilgoe et al., 2006b, Stilgoe, 2007, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, Irwin, 2014b, Welsh 
and Wynne, 2013). It has been highlighted in the literature that local expertise could 
serve as a target (Stilgoe, 2004) for scientific research in such a way that could lead 
to co-production of knowledge about risk. It could also ease the burden of proof on 
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technical experts and improve on the robustness of evidence upon which decision 
makers and those who experience the risk can effectively rely. This is important as 
risk assessment decisions are value laden (Wynne, 1996, Stilgoe et al., 2006b, 
Stilgoe, 2007, Fischbacher-Smith, 2012, Irwin, 2014b, Welsh and Wynne, 2013, 
Furlong and Marsh, 2010). Moreover, it allows us to draw on expertise and insights 
that lie outside normal scientific boundaries, which could provide a unique 
perspective to risk that would otherwise not have been considered in a scientific 
setting (Stilgoe, 2004).     
If the public feel a sense of disempowerment, this may discourage them from taking 
up public health advice. Besides, this eases tension around risk tolerance and 
acceptability debates as compromises and trade-offs associated with risk issues will 
be well understood by the public (Adekola et al., 2017). Local expertise, even if 
anecdotal, forms important bricks that build or provide a viewing perspective that 
shapes risk perception in a way that may lead to estimation of the likelihood of 
outcomes (Rosenbaum, 2016) and bring technical data alive (Covello, 2003) with 
careful and systematic filtering (Bates and Byrne, 2007). As such, a paradigm shift 
is necessary from the reductionist view that considers local expertise or knowledge 
of those in close proximity to the risk as inconsequential or bad science, to one that 
acknowledges its relevance in shaping risk perception and understanding of risk, see 
(Irwin, 1995b, Irwin, 2015). Furthermore, drawing on local expertise reinforces the 
view that suggests that risk assessment should consider the views of all stakeholder 
groups (Bennett, 2010) and it is the means by which the less powerful can call to 
account those charged with the responsibility of managing the risk. 
The role of the media 
Having stated this, the media and academics have a role to play here. The media play 
a critical role (Lichtenberg and MacLean, 1991) in information exchange and sharing 
of expertise (Murdock et al., 2003) since the media tend to be accessible to the 
majority of society and are largely relied upon as a means of making sense of risk. 
Media sources can also have vital influence in shaping the policy agenda as well as 
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set the agenda for public discussion of risk issues (Lupton, 1993). However, 
advances in ICT and the rise of social media (Wendling et al., 2013, Gutteling) have 
enhanced the abilities of interested stakeholders within the risk arena, by use of new 
ways of directly reaching the wider public. In addition, the growing use of digital 
media by traditional media organisations has extended further their reach (Petts et 
al., 2001). It is however, more useful to think of mainstream media and social media 
as two parallel media sources rather than as one more authentic than the other (Petts 
et al., 2001). Formal media outlets have a moral obligation to engage multiple levels 
of expertise (including the experiences and expertise of those who encounter the risk) 
to ensure a robust and balanced view that helps the public to make sense of health 
risks. This is particularly important in the social media age where it may be difficult 
to discern the differences between credible arguments from propaganda when 
dealing with public health risk issues or emergencies. The media also have a role in 
reflecting the diversity of public concerns, more explicitly bringing these to the 
consciousness of experts, academics and politicians, and highlighting uncertainties 
where they exist.  
 
The role of Academics or Technical Experts 
Academics or technical experts also have a role here. It is necessary for academics 
to acknowledge the relevance of local expertise (Irwin, 2015) or the experiences of 
those in close proximity to the risk when they identify, interpret and make sense of 
risk signals. Academics must do more to counter the enduring ideology that the 
experience and expertise of those in close proximity to the risk is ‘anecdotal’ and 
therefore ‘bad science’. Rather they should adopt one that sees space for contrary 
experiences and work out how facts and evidence interact with them and where 
public discussion fails adequately to account for the facts, evidence, even for expert 
opinion. This makes science relevant to the audience it serves and presents a higher 
potential of communicating relevant risk messages with greater impact to the 
different audiences. 
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A two-way communication  
Moreover, drawing on multiple stakeholders in public health risk communication 
encourages a two-way communication in risk assessment and, reduces the burden of 
erroneously trusting or relying on technical experts to make value judgements on 
behalf of individuals or groups in situations of risk and uncertainty. The importance 
of this lies in the reduced validity of expertise when dealing with interdisciplinary 
health risk issues and the avoidance the pitfall of extending margins of error for 
expert judgement in unfamiliar risk circumstances. Moreover, there is an opportunity 
to take advantage of recent advances in communication technology (e.g. social 
media) to engage the wider public, share views, information, expertise and opinion 
and, to an extent, redistribute power associated with control of communication 
(Riedlinger and Rea, 2015).  
Indeed, with advancements in ICT, the public is now more than ever able to seek 
knowledge, engage in public debates relating to science and risk, to share expertise 
and even challenge existing states of knowledge and assumptions. The upsurge in 
use of mobile telephone technology and electronic social media represents a further 
opportunity to enhance the potency of risk communication (Veil et al., 2011), 
especially in terms of expertise and information sharing. For example, a recent 
Google report suggested that over 75% of Europeans have Internet access, with an 
average of 1.25 mobile subscriptions per person. In the same report, it was suggested 
that people on average spend over 1,900 minutes per month online, which is 
equivalent to over 30 hours (see the digital garage website). Social media supports 
public access to relevant risk information and increases the likelihood of public 
engagement with organisations (or those in charge of managing risk). Such 
technological advances can reduce the extent to which information and 
communication can be controlled and used as means to exercise power in public 
health risk communication and shape policy decisions. It is also possible to use the 
upsurge in the use of ICT and social media to engage the public to identify concerns 
and questions, in order that these can be addressed during the technical analysis of 
risk. It has been suggested that where sensitive issues and public concern are 
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addressed, the pressure for social amplification of risk is reduced (Fischbacher-Smith 
et al, 2009). 
The selection of scientific committees 
It is also important to make the process of expert or scientific committee selection 
more transparent and open to public scrutiny. This will reduce the chances of cherry 
picking experts whose opinions fit in with policy ideology and thereby bring about 
bias in the nature of subsequent interpretations and policy recommendations. Also, 
effort must be made by policy makers to avoid disadvantaging other groups by 
making possible stakeholder relationships that may privilege certain exchanges of 
views, information and ideologies in risk communication. Those in charge of 
managing the risk need to reach out to and build relationships with all stakeholder 
groups including local experts or those in close proximity to the source of the risk 
before policy decisions are made. This was seen to some extent in the vaping risk 
debate, where through consultation the public was able to input to decision-making 
relating to how ECs should be regulated.  
 
Trust relationship 
 
However, more needs to be done in establishing trustworthy relationships with all 
stakeholders at all stages of the risk (including the technical) debate. In this arena, 
social media may play an important role in establishing and sustaining (a low cost) 
relationships with relevant stakeholder groups. While social media comes with added 
advantages as outlined above, it must be noted that using social media (such as 
Facebook or Twitter) for risk communication has its own disadvantages since these 
can be used for political propaganda or as a way of spreading so called ‘fake news’. 
When this is combined with the unwillingness of some public groups critically to 
investigate or research the credibility of such information, this could prove 
problematic in creating false public perception of risk. Therefore, risk regulators and 
policy makers need to make efforts to establish a social media presence, and relay 
reliable and credible information of what is known and not known. Social media 
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organisations also have a role to play in minimizing the use of their sites for political 
propaganda and spreading fake news.  
 
Making scientific information more useable to all stakeholders 
Furthermore, several steps are required to make scientific information more useable 
when drawing on multiple stakeholder groups. Care must be taken in how risk 
messages are coded to avoid communication barriers see (Bernstein, 2003). Most 
important is that fact that the use of unfamiliar (or technical) terms may be 
‘intentional’, designed to keep those who do not understand these codes outside of 
the risk debate and thereby deny them the opportunity to express their right to 
participate freely in political decision making (Adekola et al., 2017). Language 
codification has the potential to create power imbalances between actors in certain 
domains of risk in such a way that allows the domination of certain worldviews in 
policy debates relating to risk at the expense of others.  
 
The need to reflect uncertainty or gaps in knowledge in the risk messages  
It is also important to reflect uncertainty or gaps in knowledge in risk messages and 
policy decisions. In this way it is possible to distinguish evidential knowledge from 
political decisions, and to understand the nature of disputes and how to resolve them. 
It also aids risk regulators and managers to better prepare for any emergent properties 
of risk.  
The need for a ‘reflective risk inquiry’ 
Finally, there is a need for a ‘reflective risk inquiry’. Reflective risk inquiry allows 
a deconstruction of risk assessment practices - a powerful way to uncover 
assumptions and contradictions that guides (tacitly or explicitly) risk assessment and 
communication practices, moving such assumptions and contradictions from the 
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unconscious into the conscious management psyche. Scholars such as Hilgartner 
(1992) have argued that risk assessment practices pay too little attention to processes 
by which risk objects are conceptualised and constructed. Of importance is the fact 
that social construction of risk does not just exist in a vacuum, but is contingent upon 
the social construction of risk practices that makes the construction of public health 
risk possible (Power, 2007).  
A ‘reflective risk inquiry’ will involve questioning whether the assumptions and 
rationality upon which risk assessment inquiry is conducted may amplify or attenuate 
certain perspectives and stakeholder voices over others. This reflective approach 
goes beyond not only the science of risk assessment and its epistemological debates, 
but also the regulatory, institutional and organisational (managerial) processes in 
which it is embedded. If we as society want to ensure that policy decisions relating 
to risk are not solely the product of powerful stakeholders who are able to shape the 
risk debate, there is a need to embrace what (Irwin, 2015) described as ‘contemporary 
knowledge relations’ where both citizens as well as scientific and institutional 
organisations engage in critical reflection and reflection-informed practice (p.10). In 
this way, there is greater potential to break power barriers in public health policy 
making and ensure that policy decisions relating to risk are not solely the product of 
powerful stakeholders, who are able to shape the risk debate. Furthermore, it presents 
an opportunity to empower the powerless (and typically economically poor) who 
would otherwise suffer in the distributive inequalities of health risk. 
11.5 Contribution of Study to Theory 
This study makes four important contributions. Firstly, it brings together key theories 
in the field of risk communication and policy science and develops them into a new 
policy evaluation risk communication (PERC) framework that both addresses gaps 
in the literature, and goes beyond existing substantive theories. It proposes a detailed 
understanding of policy making in contemporary risk arenas where power dynamics 
are at play, and which have so far lacked depth and empirical validation. Secondly, 
the study contributes to the literature on public health risk communication by 
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advancing knowledge of the role of power and expertise in public health risk 
communication within its policy context. It discusses in detail how risk 
communication is embedded in institutional, productive and structural forms of 
power. Thirdly, it extends the knowledge of social amplification of risk framework 
by clearly highlighting how power interacts with expertise, communication and trust 
to shape social amplification of risk communication processes within policy 
domains. This is significant because it highlights salient mechanisms of power that 
can shape risk communication in a way that may go unnoticed and unscrutinised. 
Finally, the study also makes significant theoretical contributions to the over critical 
and under critical models set out by Collingridge and Reeve (1986) by looking at the 
negotiation of policy arguments between the two models. This sheds light on how 
certain risk arguments become amplified in a policy context where there are multiple 
legitimate viewpoints, values and power dynamics brought to bear on policy debates. 
It also elaborates on the science-policy relationship. 
11.6  Limitation of study   
While this study has made significant contribution to knowledge, there are however 
some limitations that must be highlighted. Firstly, the study uses an interpretivist 
philosophy and social constructionist approach (see section 3). Hence, the 
interpretation made throughout this study is contingent upon the interpretation of the 
researcher and the methodology used in the analysis. In addition, the sources of data 
collection (published sources), which are considered one of the strengths of this 
study, could potentially also be a limitation. Data was collected from archival and 
documentary sources and were therefore not specifically produced within the context 
of this study. However, these sources of data were used because they contain the 
exact information about names, references, dates and details of events, thereby 
broadly covering a long span of time, many events and contexts (Yin, 2011, Yin, 
2013). The use of published sources also enabled the study to capture the views and 
input of various stakeholders, and allowed the researcher to reflect on the debates by 
drawing differentially on evidence and experts. Hence, it provided greater insight to 
each case in such a way that available evidence was more readily comparable across 
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cases. Despite the aforementioned possible limitations, the researcher took measures 
to verify the work and conclusions drawn in this study by using multiple data sources. 
The work was also presented at academic conferences to get feedback; the researcher 
has moreover sought to address the study’s limitations. 
11.7 Recommendation for further study  
This interdisciplinary public health risk communication study has covered a broad 
area of research, which requires further theoretical and empirical attention. 
Therefore, several recommendations for future research are set out here.  
a) In order to test the robustness, to point to areas for improvement and general 
application of the PERC framework developed in this study, future research will need 
to collect empirical data, using different methods of data collection and within 
different contexts. Such data collection may involve interviewing elite/powerful 
stakeholders and other key stakeholders within a context relevant to the 
understanding of public health.  
b) There is a need to further ascertain empirically the extent to which new 
emergent forms of risk are influencing processes of policy decision-making.  
c) Future research should look to empirically investigating how behavioural 
responses influence policy positions and strategies and then ideologies of risk. A 
good case example is where the government in Canada had to change its power 
strategy by reducing tobacco tax (which was initially increased) to curb illegal 
importation. This will require further investigation to provide perspectives that will 
improve public health policy making.  
d) It will also be useful to investigate the extent to which there are costs or 
benefits associated with inadequacies or errors in the understanding of the nature of 
actual public health risks, and the implications that these may have for public health 
and safety. 
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e) There is also a need to further elaborate how errors or inadequacies in the 
understanding of risk bring about distributive inequalities and the impact this has for 
public health and safety.  
f) Future research should look to using the modified account of SARF on an 
international basis to test for its robustness, utility and to check for errors. 
11.8 Conclusion 
The study examined the role of power and expertise in risk communication. Within 
this, it aimed to understand how a set of risk arguments evolves in such a way that 
one argument becomes dominant in a policy context. Although the notion of 
‘expertise’ in risk communication has received some level of attention in existing 
studies, our understanding of the role of power in risk communication is weak and 
under developed. Against the background of theoretical conceptualisations and using 
a rich and complex set of published data, this study shed light on how a particular 
risk argument becomes amplified in a policy context, and explicates the transition of 
risk arguments between over critical and under critical models. The key contribution 
lies in explaining factors that shape the social amplification of risk in a policy 
context, namely, power, technical expertise, communication and trust. The findings 
also offer detailed explorations of the relationships between science and policy 
making.  
Further research in public health risk communication would include collecting 
primary data in different contexts to test for the robustness and usefulness of the 
PERC framework. Such data collection may involve interviewing elite/powerful 
stakeholders and other key stakeholders within a context relevant to the 
understanding of public health. There is also the need to empirically investigate how 
behavioural responses influence policy strategies, and the transition between over 
critical and under critical models. In addition, it is necessary to further ascertain 
empirically the extent to which new emergent forms of risk are changing processes 
of policy decision-making. Finally, it will also be useful to investigate the extent to 
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which there are costs (to stakeholders such as the government or other groups) 
associated with inadequacies or errors in the understanding of the nature of actual 
public health risks and the implication that this may have for public health and safe. 
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